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ABSTRACT

NATURAL LAW AND LATINX SOCIAL ETHICS
A NARRATIVE APPROACH

By
Mathew D. Garcia Scruggs
May 2021

Dissertation supervised by James Bailey, Ph.D.
This dissertation will argue concepts rooted in Latinx social ethics provides a corrective
to acontextual and ahistorical, Euroamerican natural law frameworks by positing natural law as a
type of moral reasoning rooted in the contexts, histories, and narratives of particular
communities. Rooting natural law in the narrative practices of Latinx communities not only
reveals the need for justice for oppression against Latinx bodies from the wider community, but
also offers a corrective to ahistorical and acontextual Euroamerican natural law frameworks. A
Latinx natural law functions as a radical and prophetic critique against systems of oppression that
destroy the lives of Latinx communities as well as provides an epistemological framework to be
able to discern the universal. Latinx social ethics is a privileged place for discerning natural law
not just for the Latinx community, but for dominant Anglo-communities as well. This
dissertation will derive a natural law framework from Latinx narratives, histories, and social
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practices. This dissertation also argues that natural law is not only corrected by Latinx social
ethics but it is also realized in the liberation of the Latinx community from oppression. In light of
the marginalization of the Latinx community and the need for the Latinx community to be able to
make normative claims against their marginalization, this dissertation posits that natural law is
judged and revealed through the social, cultural, ethical and narrative practices of the Latinx
community.
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Introduction
Latinx identity is a complex, multidimensional, and pluralistic conception of identity.
One of the crucial questions for anyone who self-identitifies as Latinx is what constitutes Latinx
identity. For some, Latinx identity is rooted in a person’s connection to the Spanish language.
Ada María Isasi-Díaz argues that her use of the term ‘Hispanic’ is rooted in the connection that
Hispanics have with Spanish. She argues that “Spanish has become ‘the incarnation and symbol
of our whole culture, making us feel that here in the U.S.A. we are one people, no matter what
our country of origin is.” 1 For Díaz, Spanish is so important that many, “who understand a little
Spanish and can speak only a few words insist on saying that they do know Spanish.” 2 The use
of Spanish also functions to “resist the empire building of the U.S.A. at the expense of many of
our countries of origin….” 3 Although Spanish is certainly an important aspect of Latinx identity,
it is not the only element. For many in the Latinx community, the use of Spanish is too
exclusionary to form an identity that spans across multiple communities of origin in the United
States. This is seen in the critique of the word ‘Hispanic’. The term ‘Hispanic’ refers to those
countries that speak Spanish or were colonized by Spain, but immigrants from Portuguese
speaking countries such as Brazil who are grouped together with the Spanish speaking

Ada María Isasi-Díaz En La Lucha/In the Struggle: Elaborating a Mujerista.
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004), 66.
1
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Díaz, En La Lucha, 67.
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community, do not identify as Hispanic. Thus, the use of ‘Latinx’ incorporates Portuguese
speaking countries. 4
For others, Latinx identity is rooted in racial and ethnic categories. For many, how they
identify, whether it be Mexican-American, Boricua, Puertorriqueño, white, or Black, will
determine how they are, “considered how authorized to speak on a given topic, or worthy of
recognition for a specific award…denied entry into a local social organization, or questioned
about their citizenship, or monitored closely while walking through a convenience store.” 5 Thus
some have argued that Latinx identity is a racial category because there are morphological
features that have been used, “as the basis of systematic patterns of discrimination,
marginalization, and violence that Latinx experiences in the United States.” 6 However, Latinx
identity as a racial category is problematic because there are no single, monolithic racialized
patterns that group all Latinx persons together. As Andrea Pitts argues,
“Given that persons who descend from various parts of Latin America do not
share any such racialized, biological features, this description of race will not
work for this group. That is, Latinxs can have a number of racialized identities

For this dissertation we will use the term Latinx in order to incorporate as many of the
communities who identify with a country or community of origin in Latin America. We will use
Latinx overusing Latino or Latina, unless we are speaking directly about a person who identifies
as male or female. We will use the ‘x’ ending in order to be inclusive of the LGBTQIA+
community as well as to bring attention to the use of ‘x’ in many of the indigenous communities
in Latin America. We will use the term “Hispanic” if an author uses it in the way they identify
those in the Latinx community.
4

Andrea J. Pitts, “Latinx Identity” in Latin American and Latinx Philosophy: A
Collaborative Introduction, ed. Robert Eli Sanchez, Jr. (New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2020),
221.
5

6
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that include Black, white, Asian, Indigenous, or any mixture of these racial
categories. Even within a given national boundary there is no racial unity that
picks out one specific racialized set of features that distinguishes the dominate
race in one country from another.” 7
Because no two groups in the Latinx community are always the same, to racialize Latinx identity
is to try to homogenize the Latinx community as a whole. Thus, Latinx as an ethnic category has
appeal.
Latinx identity as an ethnic category has become a standard way to understand the Latinx
community. Because those who identify Latinx share cultural, linguistic, and political features,
“ethnicity defines the lived concrete experiences of U.S. Latinxs.” 8 Some scholars understand
Latinx ethnicity through a family resemblance model because Latinx identity is rooted in situated
relationships of varying kinds including legal, genetic, and financial relationships. 9 For the
family resemblance model of discussing Latinx identity, “no one feature unites all and only
members of a family or Hispanic identity, and their borders are often shifting and flexible.” 10
The U.S. Census Bureau and many applications for U.S. institutions understand Latinx or
Hispanic identity in the terms of ethnic categories. Filling out college applications, young people
in the Latinx community always have the existential question of having to pick an ethnicity and a
race (i.e., Hispanic/Latino or White/Non-Hispanic). The problem with viewing Latinx identity as

7

Pitts, “Latinx Identity”, 226.

8

Pitts, “Latinx Identity”, 221.

See Jorge J.E. Gracia’s Hispanic/Latino Identity: A Philosophical Perspective (Malden
MA: Blackwell, 2000).
9
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solely an ethnic category is that it ignores how white communities in the United States racialize
the Latinx community to both enact racial violence on them and for them to be complicit in
racial violence on others.
To emphasize ethnicity over racial constructions of Latinx identity is to ignore the antiLatinx racism that occurs every day in the United States. For Laura Gómez, race for the Latinx
community engages two vectors, “on the one hand, one can assert and so essentially choose a
racial identity; but on the other, racial identities are given to us by others.” 11 One can identify as
one race but the next moment someone can disregard that choice. Such is the case with the
systematic violence that the United States has treated the Latinx community in its history. At
some points, the U.S. considered the Latinx community to be white. At other points, they
consider the Latinx community, “as a racial group that is other and inferior to whites.” 12
Certainly when Patrick Crusius attacked an El Paso Walmart targeting Latinx Americans and
killing 23 people, he did not consider the Latinx community to be white or equal. Bathrooms and
schools were segregated for the Latinx community until Hernández v. Texas, where the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection was applied to the Latinx community. Yet, even
within that court case, “the Hernández brief does not concede Mexican Americans are not white
but, rather, that they are a different kind of White.” 13 Whiteness, for many of the Latinx
community has been used as a tool for survival at the expense of being complicit with anti-Black
racist structures. Thus, Latinx identity should be seen not as either an ethnicity or a racialized

Laura Gómez, Inventing Latinos: A New History of American Racism (New York, NY:
The New Press, 2020), 3.
11
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Gómez, Inventing Latinos, 4.

13

Gómez, Inventing Latinos, 125.

4

construction but as an ethnicity that is racialized. That is to say that Latinx identity is a multifaceted and complex reality that is often saturated with ambiguity and paradox. Both ethnic and
racial logics are applied at different times for different reasons and are always historically
situated in relation to other racial and ethnic categories. Yet, even through varying racial and
ethnic categories, Miguel De La Torre and Edwin Aponte provide an excellent summary of
Latinx/Hispanic identity. They state:
there [was] no such thing as a 'typical' Hispanic. They are white with
blond hair and blue eyes, they are black with curly hair, and they are
everything in between. They have Native American features and/or Asian
features. They are Catholics, Protestants, worshipers of the Orishas
(African quasi-deities), Jewish, atheists, spiritualists, and followers of
Amerindian religious traditions. Some speak "pure" Spanish, others speak
Spanglish, while others only speak English. Still others converse in Cholo,
Mayan, Náhuatl or Pocho. Some have recently arrived in this country,
while the ancestors of others were here centuries before the formation of
the United States. They live in the blank despair of the barrio and in the
comfortable illusions of the suburbs. Some pick apples and grapes, others
pick stocks and bonds. 14
What De La Torre and Aponte illustrate is that Latinx identity cannot be situated into a single
monolithic narrative but is constituted by a multiplicity of interlocking and interrelational
narratives. Latinx identity is both a narrative that we tell ourselves and narratives told about us

Miguel A. De La Torre and Edwin David Aponte, Introducing Latino/a Theologies,
(Maryknoll, NY, Orbis Books, 2001), 14.
14
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either to be accepted or rejected. Latinx identity consists in fluid and flexible narratives that are
passed down to us and that we choose to continue.
For me, Latinx identity is rooted in the narratives, traditions, and histories of struggle
and hope, oppression and resistance, and love passed on to me from my grandmother and
mother. My grandmother grew up as an orphan in Juárez, Mexico. Her father was murdered and
her mother died shortly after. She got married and crossed the U.S./Mexico border to El Paso,
TX in the 1950’s. In El Paso she worked for Comet dry cleaning service. Because of her
undocumented status her job stability was precarious at best. She soon lost her job and had to
move to a small town in New Mexico named Alamogordo. 15 While in Alamogordo, she worked
at a Presto deep fryer factory and cleaned single-airmen and temporary housing at Holloman
Airforce Base. She had six children, four of whom would died before they reached the age of
twenty. Her marriage was abusive. My grandfather beat my grandmother and also my mom when
she was a child. My grandmother ended up divorcing my grandfather and raised her remaining
children on her own. It was not until 1996, after forty years, that my grandmother was able to
become a United States citizen. In the face of deep struggles, working multiple jobs, raising her
children, and facing many instances of discrimination, my grandmother was able to fight, have
hope, and enjoy her life. She taught Mexican dance at the local Church for the yearly fiesta and
helped prepare the over 5,000 pounds of food that fed the community during the fiesta. 16 She
was a staple at the local senior center where she danced every Saturday night. She saved and was

If the name Alamogordo sounds familiar the town was primarily known as being where
the first Atomic bomb was detonated at White Sands Missile Range.
15

For a history of the fiesta see “History of our Fiesta de La Familia” at
iccalamogordo.org https://www.iccalamogordo.org/history-about-our-fiesta-de-la-fami accessed
January 4, 2021.
16
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able to pay cash for every vehicle she owned. She fought, struggled, laughed, and loved until she
died in 2003. She never was able to get health insurance and was not able to have access to
preventative care to diagnose her liver cirrhosis until it was too developed. She died a week after
she was diagnosed.
My mother similarly struggled. Being a first generation Mexican-American, Spanish was
her first language. Even in a state with 48% Hispanic population, my mother faced incredible
discrimination. As a child she was made fun of because she spoke Spanish, she was called indio
(because of her dark complexion), and she was called a number of other racial slurs. She grew up
in extreme poverty and her early years were marked by abuse and violence from my grandfather.
When my grandmother divorced him, her family’s poverty increased and they had to go on
welfare and receive food assistance. Because my grandmother was constantly working my
mother cooked for her little brother when she was young. My mom told me it was a treat to get a
candy bar with food stamps once a month to split between the two siblings. People would drop
used, ill-fitting clothes on their doorsteps and she would face ostracism because of wearing them.
I recall my mom telling me a story about how an orthodontist would not let her get braces
because she was too poor and too Mexican.
As an adult my mother also faced discrimination. She continually felt what she called,
“the weight of whiteness”, the continual gaze of suspicion from white Americans wherever she
went. 17 This “weight of whiteness” had effects on her children. While walking through a mall
one day, my sister was approached by a white woman and asked if that “Mexican woman had

Coincidentally, this was also how Karen Teel of San Diego University titled a talk she gave at
Duquesne University in October 2016. See Karen Teel, “The Unbearable Weight of Whitness:
Christian Faith and Racial Justice.” Lecture. The Center for Interpretive and Qualitative
Research, Duquesne University. Pittsburgh PA. October 16, 2016.
https://edtech.msl.duq.edu/Mediasite/Play/0746c5a946844a6696c89d09451ed1841d
17
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kidnapped her.” Whether in Texas or in South Carolina, my mother felt the weight of the white
gaze on her. She once took my Grandmother out for her birthday and they were refused to be
seated because of the name “Garcia” on the reservation.
She also believed the weight of whiteness affected the way she was seen professionally.
As a medical professional, my mother struggled to find work in South Carolina. She was able to
get through phone interviews with the married name of Scruggs, but when she showed up for inperson interviews, her skin screamed Garcia and she was passed over. Despite being a medical
professional, her medical conditions such as liver cirrhosis and diabetes were never taken
seriously. A medical doctor was surprised at her medical expertise stating, “Mexicans are never
really good at going to the doctor, all they do is ask for things.” Racial stereotypes affected her at
the end of her life as well. When her liver disease worsened, doctors would not believe her
family that her deteriorating mental state was a result of encephalitis rather than being “cultural
noncompliance.” 18 She died in April 2020.
Despite the hard lives that my grandmother and mother lived, they always found joy in
what they were doing and always had a sense of humor. Their traditions and the stories they have
shared with me constitute not only a familial history but a way to look at the world. Their lives
and their narratives have constituted my identity as a Latino and has shaped the values and lenses
through which I look at the world. Some of those values are the importance of la lucha (the

A recent study among medical students and nursing students illustrated that, “the
majority of both nursing and medical students surveyed associated Hispanic and American
Indian patients with noncompliance, risky health behavior, and barriers to effectively
communicating health-related information.” Bean, M. G., Focella, E. S., Covarrubias, R., Stone,
J., Moskowitz, G. B., & Badger, T. A. (2014). Documenting Nursing and Medical Students'
Stereotypes about Hispanic and American Indian Patients. Journal of health disparities research
and practice, 7(4), 14.
18
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struggle for survival), the need for liberation from all oppressive structures that they faced and
that other Latinxs face, and most importantly, as Ada María Isasi-Díaz says, “Un Poquito de
Justicia.” 19
It is this quest for justice that has led me to write this dissertation and to frame it within a
quest for an ethic that can help bring justice to the Latinx community and to continue the
narratives of both my grandmother and mother. In writing this dissertation I seek to provide a
type of ethical analysis that can form a way of viewing the world that provides a normative
frame of ethics that is both rooted in the Latinx community, revealed through Latinx cultural and
religious practices, and judged by the economic, cultural, and political liberation of the Latinx
community in the United States. This dissertation will argue concepts rooted in Latinx social
ethics provides a corrective to acontextual and ahistorical, Euroamerican natural law frameworks
by positing natural law as a type of moral reasoning rooted in the contexts, histories, and
narratives of particular communities. Rooting natural law in the narrative practices of Latinx
communities not only reveals the need for justice for oppression against Latinx bodies from the
wider community, but also offers a corrective to ahistorical and acontextual Euroamerican
natural law frameworks. A natural law rooted in Latinx social ethics provides a prophetic
critique against systems of oppression that destroy the lives of Latinx communities. Latinx social
ethics is a privileged place for discerning the natural law not just for the Latinx community, but
for dominant Anglo-communities as well.

See Ada María Isasi-Díaz, Mujerista Theology: A Theology for the Twenty-first
Century. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 1996).
19
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Why Natural Law?
Natural law is essentially a moral construction of reality. Through positing a
representation of reality, natural law seeks to establish a moral realism that makes moral claims
that are verifiable as an honest representation of reality. It is well known that the natural law
tradition has been used to oppress the Latinx community and is a framework complicit in the
Empire building of European and American colonialization. While natural law has been used to
justify colonialism and Euroamerican oppressive structures, this dissertation argues that what is
operative in this use of natural law is one particular construction of the natural that seeks to
establish monolithic moral precepts that dominant groups have used, “to suit their needs and
protect their privilege.” 20 In establishing such a natural law (which we will call Euroamerican
natural law), its proponents provide a moral construction of reality that is based on acontextual,
ahistorical, and autonomous moral precepts. Drawing from Hispanic and Latinx resources we
will argue that there is an alternative understanding of natural law that contests Euroamerican
natural law frameworks. A natural law that is rooted in Latinx epistemologies, contexts, and
narrative structures that leads to an understanding of natural law as a type of contextually
contingent moral reasoning. Through the incorporation of categories found in Latinx social
ethics, we will offer a correction of natural law frameworks based on acontextual moral precepts
by illustrating that such constructions are not only inaccurate representations of Thomistic
natural law but also that such constructions of natural law exclude perspectives of wider
humanity, negating its supposedly universal claims. Rather by incorporating concepts of Latinx

Miguel De La Torre, Latino/a Social Ethics: Moving Beyond Eurocentric Moral
Thinking. (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010), xi.
20
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social ethics, we will present a natural law that takes seriously the contexts, histories, and
narratives of particular communities as the sites of moral reasoning. Thus we will make the claim
that discerning natural law through the contexts of Latinx narratives constructs a truer
representation of moral reality.
One might ask that if natural law has been used by Euroamerican frameworks to engage
in Empire building and colonialization, why still use it as an ethical framework and why engage
the ‘natural’ at all? There are three reasons why natural law is still a viable framework for Latinx
ethics. First, a Latinx natural law, presents a way to view the world that is truer to reality than
Euroamerican natural law frameworks. While Euroamerican natural law frameworks present
natural law as prescribing specific moral principles that result in intransigent, incommensurable,
ahistorical, and acontextual binaries such as the universal versus the particular and the natural
world versus human nature, a Latinx natural law is, rather, open, dynamic, accommodating to
ambiguity, and rooted in history and narrative. While Euroamerican natural law sees the good as
primarily a thing to be grasped through immediate contemplative apprehension, Latinx natural
law sees the good as the action of journeying through life. While Euroamerican natural law sees
morality as the establishment of unchangeable moral precepts, Latinx natural law is a type of
moral reasoning that is context dependent and historically situated. While Latinx natural law
provides an alternative view of reality, humanity, and the natural world, it is still a view of the
world that has a claim toward realism. That is, Latinx natural law will claim to be a truer sense of
reality and the world than the constructions of nature provided by Euroamerican natural law.
The second reason to still use natural law is that it is, regardless of how one might wish it
to be, the narrative of natural law is integral to Latinx history and reality. Central to Latinx
theology is the understanding that the world is filled with intermixture, mestizaje. Latinx identity

11

is rooted in the physical, epistemological, and existential mestizaje as the result of the first
encounter between Latin American Indigenous communities and Spain. The violence of the
Spanish against the Indigenous community resulted in a clash of worldviews that, despite Spain’s
best efforts, resulted in a new community that has both European and Indigenous roots. Thus, as
Miguel De La Torre argues,
the best of mestizaje, our cultural mixture, recognizes the European part
of our identity and the ambiguity and irony this creates when we deal with
Eurocentric ethical paradigms. Hispanics recognize that even what we
should reject in our identity is part of who we are as a people. This
challenge is how to delineate and reject those parts of Eurocentric ethics
with which there can be no compromise or reconciliation (e.g., complicity
with the U.S. Empire) and move beyond those segments of Eurocentric
analysis with which we can converse.” 21
I argue that the Spanish natural law framework is a type of ethics that not only makes part of the
Latinx ethical mestizaje, but is also a type of natural law thinking that can be used to work for
justice in the Latinx community. As we will see, the type of natural law employed by the Spanish
school of Salamanca which included Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, and Bartolomé de
Las Casas, was a type of natural law thinking that subverted the imperial efforts of Spanish
colonization for the sake of the Indigenous community. Such natural law thinking that is part of
Latinx history can and should be negotiated for current Latinx natural thinking.

21

Miguel De La Torre, Latino/a Social Ethics, xii.
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The third reason that natural law is still a possibility for a Latinx social ethic is that it is
able, once done from a Latinx perspective, to make normative claims of morality that is not only
inclusive of marginalized communities but binding on dominant Euroamerican communities.
Since a Latinx natural law is a mixture that is rooted in not only its new reality but also the natural
law traditions of Aquinas, natural lawyers who work from a lineage of Aquinas should
acknowledge the interpretation of Latinx natural law as consistent with Aquinas and other
scholastic natural lawyers’ thought. In the same way that Latinx popular Catholicism is closer to
Aquinas’ daily practice than the post-tridentine Catholicism of Northern Western Europe and the
North Eastern United Sates, a Latinx natural law theory is more akin to Aquinas thought than the
Euroamerican natural law theories presented by both the American legal tradition and the
proponents of the “New Natural Law.” 22 Such a theory of natural law that has its roots both in the
European, scholastic, and Thomistic traditions and the new reality of Latinx identity should be
able to make a normative claim on both.
While we will be making a claim that natural law is useful for a Latinx social ethic, we
will also draw from the other side of the mestizaje, the Latinx cultural reality to discuss ways in
which such a reality not only contributes to natural law in general but betters it by including a
voice of moral reasoning that further completes its efforts to make normative claims. Namely, we
will be drawing from Latinx narratives to discern the frame in which natural law theory can
better include all people through incorporating a mestizaje epistemology, a methodology of
cuentos as casuistry, and a historically situated restorative framework of justice. By including

For an understanding of how Latinx popular Catholicism is more consistent with the
Catholicism of Aquinas see, Orlando Espín, “Popular Catholicism Among Latinos” in The Faith
of The People: Theological Reflection on Popular Catholicism. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press,
1997).
22
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these cultural elements of Latinx social ethics, natural law can provide helpful contributions for
liberative ethics.

The Way Forward
This dissertation will take the form of two conceptual parts. Chapters one and two will establish
the context of Latinx history in relationship to natural law and its various constructions of moral
reality. We will discuss natural law in its Euroamerican frameworks and its Spanish iterations as
having effected Latinx political realities in the United States. Because Latinx reality is rooted in
mestizaje, a natural law reflection requires understanding the multifaceted and pluricentric spaces
where Latinx natural law developed. Chapters three through five will focus on drawing from
Latinx culture, traditions, and narratives to frame a specifically Latinx iteration of natural law.
Through focusing on both the history of the Latinx community’s relationship to natural law and
the unique contributions to natural law from Latinx social ethics, we hope to establish a uniquely
Latinx natural law that will lead toward liberative practices of justice in the face of anti-Latinx
racism and systematic oppression of the Latinx community.
Chapter one will discuss the distinctly Euroamerican framework of natural law. First, we
establish that the ‘natural’ is not a neutral state of being but rather a construction. Noting that the
‘natural’ is a construction we illustrate that it has been used by Euroamerican natural law
tradition to posit a particular community’s experience (white, Northern European, and American)
as normative over all other communities. In other words, the Euroamerican natural law tradition
tries to universalize its particular position over and against all other frames of thought. In
particular, we will focus on how the American legal understanding of natural law is rooted in the
thought of Grotius, Locke, and Kant and how each of their natural law positions are uniquely
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oriented to preserving white privilege, land, and reason over and against Indigenous
communities, Latinx communities, and people of color in general. Grotius, Locke, and Kant
present a construction of nature that separates nature from culture bringing about a global,
extractivist capitalism that seeks to acquire private property by taking land from Indigenous
communities. They also present a natural law that universalize their particular social location as
normative for all people enacting an epistemic imperialism. Finally, they presume an
autonomous reason that is a construction of the self that is rooted in racist constructions of
reason. Following the enlightenment construction of autonomous reason, we will discuss the
ways new natural law follows the same trajectories as enlightenment reason in that they seek to
construct an autonomous frame of morality ignoring the contextual roots of practical reason and
the need for speculative reason. In so doing, they provide a list of basic goods that ignore the
goods rooted in contexts that include the Latinx community. In describing these basic goods,
new natural lawyers try to establish moral precepts deriving from acontextual moral goods. The
end of the chapter will look at revisionist and contextual natural law that seeks to root natural
law in a context dependent moral reasoning rather than specific moral precepts. This context
dependent moral reasoning is rooted in the contribution from feminist, Black, and queer natural
law that seeks to establish a natural law that is open, dynamic, and rooted in history.
While revisionist and contextual natural law seeks to establish a framework to discuss
natural law that is open, dynamic, and contextually conscious, there is an absence of a discussion
of Hispanic discussions of natural law. There are few discussions of natural law that discuss the
natural law theories of Spanish thinkers such as Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, and
Bartolomé de La Casas. These theologians offer a frame of natural law that often subverted the
aims of imperial colonialism from Spain. They root their natural law on the right of Indigenous
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communities to determine their own frame of governance. Natural law, rather than rooted in
individual property, is rooted in the sociality of humanity and is derived from the
commonwealth. These thoughts led to the only reflection by a colonial power on whether or not
colonialism was ethical within the 15th and 16th centuries. These reflections in Valladolid, Spain
between Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda present two types of natural law, one that
subverts imperial power for the sake of the Indigenous communities in South America and the
other that justifies Spanish imperialism. This chapter is a chapter of ressourcement, that seeks to
resource the subversive natural law that sought to protect and empower the indigenous
communities of South America from imperial Spanish power. In resourcing this subversive
natural law we illustrate how natural law can work even within the frame of imperial power for
its own subversion by emphasizing the communal nature of natural law’s understanding of
dominion, natural law being part of the imago dei, and natural law standing alongside and
including the perspectives of the Indigenous community.
Chapter three focuses on the development of a particularly Latinx understanding of
natural law and its frame of moral epistemology, synderesis. We discuss how for scholastic
natural law, synderesis was understood in a variety of different frames but ultimately resulted in
an understanding that a natural law moral epistemology ended with the immediate and infallible
apprehension of the good as the first principle of practical reason. It is only in the application in
the first principle of practical reason that context allows for nuanced understanding and
flexibility in natural law. While Latinx social ethics appreciates the nuance for the application of
the first principle of practical reason, a Latinx synderesis would understand the apprehension of
the good through the frame of mestizaje. While mestizaje has been traditionally understood as the
mixture biological and cultural mixture resulting from Spanish violence on indigenous
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communities, Latinx theologians have taken mestizaje to be an epistemological starting point to
understand the world. While Eurocentric natural law often understands the good through stark,
intransigent binaries, a mestizaje moral epistemology understands the notions of good and evil
through a more nuanced and context dependent lens that not only subverts the binaries of the
universal and particular but posits that it is through the particular experiences of the Latinx
community that the universal can be understood. We will argue that by adopting a mestizaje
moral epistemology one can include more voices in moral decision making, understand moral
reasoning as a journey rather than an immediate apprehension of the good, and privilege
narratives that have traditionally been marginalized. By adopting mestizaje as a type of
synderesis one can contest the notion that the universal must be univocal. The end of the chapter
will see how mestizaje is employed through Latinx literature as a test case. To theorize about
mestizaje without seeing it employed in a specific context would be to perpetuate a type of
epistemology that posits the abstract universality that mestizaje seeks to combat. Thus, we will
look at the work by Junot Diaz, The Brief and Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao, as an example of
how mestizaje as a type of synderesis subverts the various binaries posited by Eurocentric
synderesis.
By looking at specific experiences and specific stories provided by a mestizaje oriented
synderesis, we will work out a method of moral reasoning by employing casuistic thinking that
takes seriously the multiple types of cuentos, or narratives that make up Latinx identity. First, we
will provide a background on casuistry and its uses in medieval scholasticism, how it came into
disfavor, and how it has gained a resurgence among varying virtue and narrative ethicists. We
argue that casuistry is useful because it attends to context and story as a site of moral reasoning.
We will then navigate through the different interpersonal, cultural, and communal narratives that
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shapes Latinx social ethics. Through attuning to these different cuentos and narratives that shape
the everyday lives of the Latinx community, we are actually engaging in a natural law casuistry.
Through engaging in these narratives that shape the Latinx community one is able to engage the
social, cultural, and political conditions that give rise to ethical reflection in the Latinx
community and understand that for the Latinx community the quest for the good life as a process
of story-telling and path-making. In particular, we will engage in the narratives of Latina and
Hispanic women as a source of moral reflection. We will end our chapter on cuentos as casuistry
by engaging Ana Castillo’s groundbreaking novel So Far From God as a site of ethical
reflection. We will argue that So Far From God serves as an allegory for the moral agency of
Latinas and Xicanas and that by placing these women within the genre of “saint’s lives”, Castillo
shows that the lives of everyday Latinas are more realistic saints than the ones that have been
paradigmatic for the Church and Anglocentric narrative casuistry.
Our last chapter will focus on the issue of justice when it comes to the specific situation
of Latinx undocumented immigrants in the U.S. immigration crisis. We will illustrate how
contemporary theories of justice rooted in structural and abstract frameworks are not able to
bring about justice for the undocumented Latinx community. We will discuss John Rawls’
understanding of “justice as fairness” as unable to address the specific claims for justice by the
Latinx community. Because Rawls seeks to establish an original position through a veil of
ignorance, he unintentionally asks the Latinx community to forget injustices done to them that
requires restitutions. We will also discuss critics of Rawls in the communitarian frameworks of
justice. We will argue that while the communitarian frameworks seek to discuss distributive
justice from the context of community, they establish idealized, independent, and autonomous
communities that do not adequately accept responsibility for how their communities have
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perpetuated injustice against the Latinx community. Communitarians respond to immigration
through hospitality not justice. We will then discuss the capabilities approach developed by
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. While their ideas of justice are rooted in capabilities
provided by real communities to real people, they fail to negotiate a framework legislating who
is responsible for providing basic capabilities. We will then draw on the work of Trisha
Rajendra’s understanding of justice as responsibility for relationships. For Rajendra,
responsibility toward relationships illustrates how telling the right kind of stories is essential
when discussing the U.S. immigration crisis. We will further Rajendra’s understanding of justice
as responsibility by addressing the question of what people are responsible for in the context of
relationships. Here, we draw on Aquinas’ natural law understanding of justice as giving each
person their due to address the restitution needed for the Latinx community. When it comes to
the complex history of U.S. relations with Latin American countries, a Latinx natural law
understanding of justice suggests that restitution and reparation be made to the Latinx
community before structural, distributive, and capability-based understandings of justice can be
enacted. Not only does there need to be economic and political restitution made to the Latinx
community but also cultural reparation needs to be made. Here we understand justice as giving
one their due as a social virtue that understands that the entangling of multiple contexts and
stories between Anglo-Americans and the Latinx community requires mutuality and respect for
each other’s culture.
Through this dissertation, we seek to establish a Latinx natural law framework that is
rooted in Latinx contexts, history, and culture and is derived from Latinx experience and
identity. By negotiating the narratives of natural law and the Latinx community we hope to
illustrate how natural law is a valid ethical framework for Latinx social ethics. Through
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emphasizing mestizaje as moral epistemology, cuentos as casuistry, and a Latinx natural law
understanding of justice as restitution, reparation, and a social virtue, we hope to formulate a
frame of natural law done Latinamente. Most importantly, by understanding natural law through
the history, tradition, and stories of the Latinx community, I hope that I can continue the legacy
of my grandmother and mother in keeping Latinx identity as offering a valid frame of viewing
the world.
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Chapter 1: Euroamerican Constructions of the Natural
Introduction
When discussing natural law and what ‘natural’ means within its definition, it is important to
discuss outright that although ‘natural’ has been used as a universally recognizable concept, it is
actually a framework of knowledge within particular communities. The word ‘natural’ is a
narrative told that is supposed to represent reality. What constitutes the natural is constructed by
a society's effort to seek normative ethical frameworks, usually from positions of power. Related
to the concept of nature is the category of human nature and the questions that come with it such
as the interrelationship between human nature and the natural world and what constitutes human
nature itself. While both nature and human nature were once thought of as static concepts in
enlightenment modernity, the dynamics of what constitutes the grand narrative of human nature
and the natural world has undergone revision within postmodernism. As Michel Foucault
famously states in The Order of Things,
Though the notions of nature and human nature have a certain importance
in the Classical age, this is not because the hidden and inexhaustibly rich
source of power which we call nature had suddenly been discovered as a
field for empirical inquiry; nor is it because a tiny, singular, and complex
subregion called human nature had been isolated within this vast field of
nature...but if we follow the archeological network that provides Classical
thought with its laws, we see quite clearly that human nature resided in
that narrow overlap of representation which permits it to represent itself to
itself...and that nature is nothing but the impalpable confusion within
representation that makes the semblance there perceptible before the order
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of the identities is yet visible. Nature and human nature, within the general
configuration of the episteme, permit the reconciliation of resemblance
and imagination that provides a foundation for, and makes possible, all the
empirical sciences of order.” 23
For Foucault, nature is that which is repeated by a society as nature. Nature exists in its repetition
and representation of itself. While Foucault’s definition of human nature, or lack of definition,
has proven troublesome for some natural law theorists, it provides a starting point for engaging
the Eurocentric natural law tradition from a Latinx perspective. Namely, that for much of history,
human nature has been defined by a particular group and universalized to construct a hegemonic,
colonial framework over the rest.
Because the natural is constructed by its repetition and representation of itself, it is
important that for those who want to engage in the natural law tradition that they “must
distinguish among the competing accounts of nature, yet these competing accounts of nature are
embedded in particular contexts with particular narratives that shape the use of the term.” 24
Understanding the natural as a construct of particular communities does not mean that the
understanding of nature must be abandoned, but rather that one must pay attention to who has the
power in defining the natural. It is important, in discussing natural law, to understand that the use
of the term ‘nature’,
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Is thus not a neutral entity, having the status of an ‘observation statement;”
it involves seeing the world in a particular way--and the way in which it is
seen shapes the resulting concept of ‘nature.’ Far from being a ‘given’, the
idea of ‘nature’ is shaped by the prior assumptions of the observer...if the
concept of nature is socially mediated--to whatever extent-- it cannot serve
as an allegedly neutral, objective or uninterpreted foundation of a theory
or theology. Nature is an already interpreted category.”25
To understand nature as a neutral observational category is to hide the way that nature has been
used to justify racism, sexism, classism, heteronormativity, and Eurocentrism. If natural law’s
primary task is to identify universalized categories that privilege a particular type of person over
and against others, then such a natural law must be abandoned. Yet, for those who wish to take
seriously the possibility of a moral realism that takes into account the very real power dynamics
that often oppress a particular group of people, then it is necessary to unmask the neutrality of
the term natural and to see how it works to the advantage of those with power. What is needed is
a type of natural law that leads to the liberation of marginalized people groups, that gives the
epistemic privilege to these groups within their specific context, and ways that determine the
how ‘nature’ has been used to oppress these groups. From there, one can discern the
marginalized conception of nature that can be used to function liberatively in contradistinction to
hegemonic natural law.
In order to work towards a Latinx natural law, it is important to first unmask the ways
that Eurocentric natural law has been used to enact physical, systematic, epistemic and cultural
Alister McGrath, A Scientific Theology vol 1: Nature (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
2001)113. As Quoted by Boyd, Craig A. A Shared Morality: A Narrative Defense of Natural
Law Ethics. (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2007), 38.
25
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violence to marginalized communities, in particular, Black, Indigenous, and Latinx communities.
Regardless of whether the effects of Eurocentric natural law are intentional or unintentional, the
use of natural law has been used to suggest that Euro-American supremacy is the natural state of
things and that epistemic frameworks, especially Latinx moral frameworks, are unnatural leading
to the dismissal of the Latinx community in nearly every aspect of life in the United States.

The Euroamerican Natural Law Tradition
The United States is no stranger to masking the way natural law has been used to justify its
colonial and imperial interests in relation to the rest of the world. On July 18, 2019, the U.S.
State Department under Secretary of State Mike Pompeo started a Commission on Unalienable
Rights. The commission’s task was to reintegrate and resource the human rights tradition into the
American natural law tradition. 26 A year later, the commission published a Report on
Unalienable Rights. It focused on the United States’ contributions to the human rights tradition
including the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) drafted by
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. 27 The report states that the U.S. was an integral part of

A federal register notice on May 30, 2019 states, “The Commission will provide fresh
thinking about human rights discourse where such discourse has departed from our nation's
founding principles of natural law and natural
rights.”https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/30/2019-11300/department-of-statecommission-on-unalienable-rights
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the drafting of the UDHR and building a consensus around the universal validity of human
rights. Yet despite the United States’ support, “many people doubted the worth of a non-binding
declaration affirming ‘faith in fundamental human rights’ and ‘in the dignity and worth of the
human person.’ That faith had been sorely tested in recent memory.” 28 Bemoaning the affronts to
the human rights tradition, the commission views itself as an avenue to reassert the United States
as a center of influence within the realm of human rights.
In defining unalienable rights, the report states that
Unalienable rights are universal and nontransferable. They are prepolitical in the sense that they are not created by persons or society
but rather set standards for politics. They owe their existence not to
the determinations of authorities or to the practices of different
traditions but to the fundamental features of our humanity. They
are not founded merely on custom, law, or preference. Human
beings never lose their unalienable rights — though they can be
violated — because such rights are essential to the dignity and
capacity for freedom that are woven into human nature. 29
Much of the commission's report is centered on the idea that it is the particular American
iteration of human rights that should take precedence. The iteration of American understanding
of unalienable rights is grounded in three areas: protestant Christianity, classical Rome, and
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classical liberalism. 30 The report states that the American grounding in unalienable rights does
not give it the ability to force regime change but does,
give the United States an interest in supporting liberal democracy as the
form of government best suited to protecting rights; in promoting a freer
and more open international order, one that is friendlier to claims of
human rights and democratic self-government; and in standing with
peoples everywhere who seek the dignity that comes from living under a
government that respects individual freedom and equality under law. 31
Yet, despite the fact that the report states that Unalienable Rights are “pre-political”, “not created
by persons or society”, and not founded on “custom, law, or preference”, the commission fails to
see the contradiction of placing natural law and natural rights tradition squarely in the United
States’ constitutional and political tradition. Moreover, with unalienable rights being prepolitical, it is also ironic that by placing unalienable rights in the U.S. tradition of natural law, the
U.S. State Department can justify foreign policy decisions that support “liberal democracies”. 32
With the theoretical justification for interventionist policies by assuming that liberal democracies
are the form of government most apt for securing human rights and the centering of the human
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Despite claiming that the Commission of Unalienable Rights is serves in an advisory
capacity and is supposed to “focus on principle and not policy formulation” (Report, 7), the
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right tradition within the realm of U.S. political theory, the U.S. can also justify shielding itself
from critique for its own human rights abuses. 33 In an open letter response to the report by over
200 Non-Governmental Organizations, scholars, and activists, the Report of the Commission on
Unalienable Rights, received the critique that, “Americanization of the human rights framework
is both unnecessary and harmful.” 34 So while at the same time that the report is advocating for an
understanding of human rights that is not rooted in a particular tradition, it universalizes its own
particular tradition of human rights. The very methodology in which the report draws primarily
on the Declaration of Independence and the philosophical principles of the founding fathers
undermines its attempt to discuss the universality of unalienable rights. By using the declaration
and the founding documents of the United States, the report presupposes a human nature that was
culturally specific while claiming that it was universally valid.
To root rights language in a particularly American iteration of natural law and natural
right theories is to universalize a strand of natural law that was primarily rooted in arguments of
possession and dominion of land, raw material, and trade that was often at the expense of
communities of color and the Latinx community. These traditions have a wide and varied
background. Yet, it is necessary to look at some representatives of this tradition to illustrate that
by grounding rights and natural law language in these traditions, the U.S. justified the African
In September 2020, Mike Pompeo under the executive order of Donald Trump issued
sanctions against two lawyers for the International Criminal Court because of their effort to try
the U.S. for potential human rights abuses in Afghanistan. Pompeo stated that the international
criminal court was making, "illegitimate attempts to subject Americans to its jurisdiction.” See
Laurel Wamsley, “Trump Administration Sanctions ICC Prosecutor Investigating Alleged U.S.
War Crimes” NPR.org September 2, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/09/02/908896108/trumpadministration-sanctions-icc-prosecutor-investigating-alleged-u-s-war-crim
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Slave Trade, the destruction of Native American Land, and unjust policies towards the Latinx
community. As Richard Tuck states, "...From its inception the language of rights had an
ambiguous character, and already by the fourteenth century it was possible to argue that to have
a right was to be the lord or dominus of one's relevant moral world, to possess a dominium that is
to say, property. To have a strongly individualistic theory of rights was inevitably, given this
political language, to have a possessive theory." 35 This possessive theory that forms and shapes
the American natural law tradition is the cognitive and epistemological weapon that has been
used for exploitation of a number of different communities of color. Such a natural law
background that undergirds the founding principles of the United States emphasized a
construction of human nature that is rooted in abstract individualism, the antagonism between
human (often rendered culture) and the natural world, and autonomous acontextual frameworks
of reason.

Enlightenment Antecedents
When we look at an analysis of natural law that is prevalent in the legal and academic
traditions in the United States, we see that much is owed to enlightenment thinkers and the way
they constructed their understandings of human nature and law. The foundational documents of
the United States such as the Declaration of Independence draw directly on the political and
philosophical theories of John Locke who, in turn, drew heavily from Hugo Grotius and the
enlightenment-modernist tradition. The works of Grotius and Locke form the foundation of

Richard Tuck, Natural Right Theories: Their Origins and Their Development,
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American legal institutions and jurisprudence. 36 Academic institutions in the U.S. also draw
frequently on the epistemic theories of Immanuel Kant as a way to engage in the natural sciences
as disinterested and neutral observers. Kant’s moral theory is often juxtaposed against natural
law because of his emphasis on duty. Yet, Kant works from a latent construction of human
nature that separates reason from sentiment, context, and history that is generally accepted by the
North American academy and new natural lawyers. Enlightenment thinkers such as Grotius,
Locke, and Kant constructed ideas of the natural that privilege a Eurocentric epistemology in
three primary ways. First, they construct an understanding of nature that focuses primarily on
separating humanity from the natural world which justifies global capitalist extractivism through
the acquisition and defense of private property. Second, they universalize their particular social
location as normative for all people, creating an epistemic imperialism. Third, they presume an
autonomous construction of the self that situates the natural as a way to secure individual rights
over and against rights of communities and rights of the earth itself.

Grotius
The primary cultural backdrop from which John Locke developed his influential theories that
would form and shape the American legal tradition is the thought of Hugo Grotius. Grotius,
writing in the 17th century, fundamentally changed natural law theory and humanistic
jurisprudence to include the idea of natural rights in such a way that, “particularly with regard to

Most discussion of natural law in the U.S. is rooted in discussions about Aquinas. Yet,
there is a clear break between Aquinas and the liberal protestant roots of the American natural
law tradition.
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property, are thus firmly grounded in colonial goals.” 37 Grotius’ ideas on property and
punishment have created a cultural backdrop that grounds the disenfranchisement of Native
Americans, undergirds theories that justify the slavery of African Americans and functions to
justify strict border policies that adversely affects Latinx communities.
Central to Grotius theories is the role of Ius and Dominium as defined interrelationally.
Prior to Grotius, there were debates on whether the definition if Ius should be considered a type
of Dominium, or property. 38 Grotius understood that Ius as a right and a faculty of liberty that
allowed one to arbitrate the use of one’s own property, defend oneself, and defend one’s
property. Writing primarily to defend the Dutch’s acquisition of a Portuguese trading ship which
prohibited Dutch trade in East India, Grotius developed a theory in which one was able to
acquire private property through labor or through setting boundaries. 39 Grotius’ major work
responding to this international situation was Mare Liberum. In Mare, the sea was not something
one could acquire through labor (you cannot make the sea into anything), nor was it something
one could put a border or boundary on (the sea is constantly moving). Thus, to prohibit its free

Barbara Arneil, "John Locke, Natural Law, and Colonialism." History of Political
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navigation or use would be justification for war because such an act would be an affront to
natural law’s insistence that it is humanity’s nature to acquire property. 40 Grotius states,
Freedom of trade, then, springs from the primary law of nations, which
has a natural and permanent cause, so that it cannot be abrogated.
Moreover, even if its abrogation were possible, such a result could be
achieved only with the consent of all nations. Accordingly, it is not
remotely conceivable that one nation may justly impose any hindrance
whatsoever upon two other nations that wish to enter into a contract with
each other. 41
Thus Grotius, “had provided a useful ideology for competition over natural resources in the nonEuropean world, [that is the] right to take what they wanted and protect [it].” 42 Grotius thus
provided a theory in which property acquisition is the natural state of humanity and any
prohibition that stops that property acquisition is contrary to the natural law. 43
Not only does Grotius develop a theory that is rooted in humanity's natural ability to
acquire property, but Grotius’ theory views humanity’s moral agency as one that is itself

Grotius' arguments are found primarily in his text De Iure Praedae in manuscript and
its circulated chapter Mare Liberum.
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property. For Grotius, liberty is something that humanity could possess and trade if necessary.
Liberty as a faculty of possession is integral to Grotius theory of punishment and to his just war
theory found in De Iura Bellis ac Pacis. In Grotius’ political theory, when one party functions as
an aggressor toward another party's property or their ability to acquire property, there exists a
state of war. Since, in the state of war what is at stake is one another’s rights to property, the
loser of such a war is entitled to reparations through the property of another. If the life of another
person is threatened and life is considered a type of property, then the reparation against the
aggressor is the life of the aggressor. Since a person’s life is their property, Grotius suggests that
punishment could be exacted on the aggressor by taking the aggressor’s life or by taking their
life as a form of payment through slavery. Grotius states,
[It] is not contrary to nature to despoil him whom it is honourable to kill. .
.. Therefore, it is not strange that the law of nations has permitted the
destruction and plunder of the property of enemies, the slaughter of whom
it has permitted. . .. It must be noted furthermore that such acts are
permissible also against those who have surrendered. 44
Yet not only is it not against the law of nature to take an aggressor’s life but also to put them and
their family into perpetual slavery. Grotius states, “Not only do the prisoners of war themselves
become slaves, but also their descendants forever, that is to say those who are born of a slave
mother after her enslavement.” 45 Thus, for Grotius if a person’s liberty functions as their
Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace. trans. Stephen C. Neff. [Electronic
Resource]. (Student ed. Cambridge University Press, 2012), 357.
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property and that person endangers another person’s property, that person’s liberty and their
family’s liberty is forfeit and can be seized. Not only can this punishment and enslavement be
enacted between individual parties but is also transferable to interactions between nations.
Barbara Arneil illustrates that it's at this point that Grotius not only changes natural law into a
theory of property rights but also changes the law of nations (Ius Gentium) from being a law that
is common between nations but to becoming the law that governs the property rights of
nations. 46 Through Grotius’ theory of punishment, nations can enslave other nations in
perpetuity. As Richard Tuck states regarding Grotius theories in De Iure Belli, “we can easily see
how it should have been taken up by theoreticians of absolutism, why Felden should have said
that it ‘destroys civil society, which is a community of free men, and makes it an aggregation of
slaves.” 47 Felden’s comment that Grotius’ theory makes civil society an aggregation of slaves is,
in fact, what happened. Grotius’ theories of property and punishment have been used to justify
the atrocities of the African slave trade and the destruction and acquisition of Native American
property. 48 Grotius' theory of property provided colonial justification to acquire Native American
land because it was seen to neither be used through labor nor did it have boundaries that serve as
the acquisition of property. Grotius’ theory of punishment provided the justification for the

surrendered. In addition, the devastation by fire of enemy lands, pillaging of villages, even
looting of churches, was permitted. As for raping women, “Sometimes you read that it is
permitted, sometimes not.” Grotius thus set up an argument within which the very practices that
he deplored seemed to be permitted by the law of war and perhaps by natural law too.
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Arneil writes, “For in colonizing the New World, theories to justify war and the
appropriation of land legitimize the actions taken by European settlers towards their native
counterparts.” Arneil, “John Locke, Natural Law, and Colonialism”, 591.
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African slave trade in which slaves were seen to either forfeit their freedom through a state of
war or were the descendants of a nation that was enslaved as a result of the state of war and were
thus slaves in perpetuity.
Grotius’ natural law, rooted in property and punishment, provides the cultural backdrop
for natural law and rights theorists that form and shape American colonialism and the slave
economy, in particular, John Lock. Locke adopts much of Grotius’ theory of property and adopts
his understanding of a state of war. While Locke does not adopt Grotius’ theory of punishment’s
propensity to enslave the children of a slave, his personal actions regarding his own involvement
in the slave trade in the Carolinas illustrates either a major blind spot in his own theories or the
systematic exclusion of people of color from his theories of liberty.

Locke
John Locke’s theories of property and labor are highly influenced by Grotius. Following
Grotius, Locke believed that to engage in the political one must first engage in an understanding
of human nature. 49 For Locke human nature is understood as, “a state of perfect freedom to order
their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of
the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.” 50 The
only limit placed on humanity in its natural state is that which is outside of himself labeled, ‘the

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C B. Macpherson (Indianapolis, Ind.:
Hackett Pub. Co., 1980), 8. Locke states, “"To understand political power right, and derive it
from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in…”
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Locke, Second Treatise, 8. One can make the assumption that Locke draws primarily
on Grotius’ understanding of Freedom as a faculty that one possesses as a sovereign of their own
moral agency.
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law of nature’. Here, we already see a constructed ontological antagonism that positions
humanity and its ability to dispose of its possessions as it sees fit and the law of limits that is
rooted in the natural world, or law of nature. Essential to Locke’s understanding of natural law is
the role that equality and reason play in the original state of nature. 51 Yet, Locke’s understanding
of equality and reason is rooted in a person’s equal opportunity to acquire property and to use it
according to their individual reason. Locke's fundamental state of nature is for humanity to
acquire property for their sustenance and their wellbeing. One acquires property through its use.
While according to Locke, “The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and
comfort of their being”, once that land is mixed with the labor of that person, it thus becomes his
own property. 52 A person’s labor and freedom, according to Locke, are the only things that are
properly theirs, and whatever has been removed from the state of nature and mixed with labor
becomes his or her property.
While Locke does not follow Grotius theory of punishment exactly, he does view the
condition of slavery in relationship to “just war” in the same spirit 53. For Locke, the state of war
exists between two parties when one party threatens the property of another party. Thus a person
can defend themselves and their property. The resulting state of war can be dealt with harsh
violence because those that threaten property or the free acquisition of property, “are not under

“Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with
authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature.” Locke, Second Treatise, 15.
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Locke, Second Treatise, 18.

Locke’s understanding of Punishment is rooted in retribution and reparation. Locke
states, “only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate what is
proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint.”
Locke, Second Treatise, 9. Locke frames his understanding of slavery in relation to “just war”
rather than direct punishment.
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the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so
may be treated as beasts of prey…” 54 The retribution against an aggressor, can result in death or
slavery. As Farr suggests, Locke’s just war grounds the principles of his abstract permission of
slavery where,
Justly, his captor may put him to "service" in lieu of death. His power and
authority-- his dominion-- over the captive-now-slave is "absolute" and
"arbitrary." The slave's condition, when justified, contrasts dramatically
with a person or a people who deserve their rights and freedom under the
law of nature or the laws of civil society. 55
The arbitrary and absolute power is echoed in the drafting of the Fundamental Constitution of
Carolina in which Locke was a primary author. The fundamental constitution gave two
instructions on slavery. The first instruction was that slaves were to be allowed whatever Church
suited them. The second instruction was that slave owners were to have “absolute power and
authority” over his slaves. 56 Not only was Locke integral in drafting these founding documents
for the Carolina colonies, he also directly benefited from their exploitation of and use of
slavery. 57
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Locke, Second Treatise, 14.

James Farr, “Locke, Natural Law, and New World Slavery." Political Theory 36, no. 4
(2008): 496.
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“The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669” in The Avalon Project:
Documents in Law History, and Diplomacy. Yale Law School.
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nc05.asp accessed 9/28/2020. For a discussion on
Locke’s involvement in the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina in relation to Locke’s
understanding of slavery see Farr’s “Locke, Natural Law and New World Slavery”, 496-500.
56

Locke served under the Board of Trade and Plantations, worked as Secretary for the
Lords Proprietors of the Carolinas, and invested in the slave trade directy through the Africa
Trade Company and Bahamas trade. See Farr, “Locke, Natural Law, and New World Slavery”,
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Despite Locke’s fundamental involvement in the colonization of the Carolinas and the
direct investment in the African slave trade, Locke did not discuss either one in his Second
Treaties on Government. And in fact, he argues against perpetual slavery as employed by
Grotius. Locke’s silence on the African slave trade in his political philosophy has led to a debate
as to whether or not there is a general disjunction between Locke and his political theories and
his political actions or whether there are more malicious forces at play. 58 For example, Locke
does not write about racial theories to justify the African slave trade. 59 However, Locke’s
involvement with the African slave trade is damning and as such, “Given the depth of his
informed involvement in new world slavery, Locke's hands are dirty. Knowing that those hands
wrote the Two Treatises and contributed to the Fundamental Constitutions, it is not unreasonable
to assume a connection between them and, more generally, between Locke's political theory and
colonial practice.” 60 As George Tinker states,
If we read the Two Treatises carefully, it is clear that Locke never
intended to include African peoples in his tirade against slavery. Indeed,

497n8. Farr draws from Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1957), 115n3; and Roger S. Woolhouse, Locke: A Biography (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 111, 463.
See Wayne Glausser, "Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade," Journal of
the History of Ideas 51 (1990): 199-216; Jennifer Welchman, "Locke on Slavery and Inalienable
Rights," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (1995): 67-81; William Uzgalis, "The Same
Tyrannical Principle': Locke's Legacy on Slavery," in Subjugations and Bondage: Critical
Essays on Slavery and Social Philosophy, ed. Tommy L. Lott (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1998), 49-79.
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“But nowhere did Locke attempt any such theory. He did not endorse or anticipate the
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his condemnation of slavery has nothing at all to do with the slave trade in
which he was himself so deeply invested. Rather, it had more to do with
the nature of civil government in England and his political dispute with an
ardent royalist political writer. 61
Even though Locke’s political and philosophical writings limits the “just war” slavery of Grotius,
Locke simply did not believe that his own arguments were applicable to people of color. For
Locke, they were simply not a consideration. One may not be able to prove malicious intent
when it comes to Locke’s political theories but the erasure of people of color from the discussion
is an epistemological violence that leads to the physical violence of slavery, genocide, and the
appropriation of native lands.
For the Latinx community, and in particular the Mexican American community, Locke’s
and Grotius’ natural law theories concerning property and just war have major implications.
Locke’s theory of property and just war not only was used to justify the colonization of the
Carolinas and the original colonies of the United States, but similar arguments that were more
racially charged were used to justify colonial expansion of the United States into the already
colonized lands of Northern Mexico. James K. Polk not only used both Locke’s and Grotius
theory of property to justify American territorial expansion into lands that would become the
American Southwest, but also used Locke’s and Grotius theory of “just war” to advocate for the
Mexican-American War. 62 Polk viewed the lack of clear borders between Mexico, Texas, and
George E. Tinker “John Locke on Property.” In Beyond the Pale: Reading Ethics from
the Margins, (Louisville, Ky, Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), 51. Locke writes his Two
Treatises in response to Robert Filmer's Patriarcha.
61

For the three stages that led to the Mexican-American war see Scott A. Silverstone,
"The Mexican American War and Territorial Expansion." In Divided Union: The Politics of War
in the Early American Republic, (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 157-201.
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the United States as an opportunity for territorial expansion. By using Grotius and Locke’s
understanding of property as acquisition through either the role of boundaries or labor, the lack
of clear indicated boundaries and presumably lack of Lockean conception of agricultural labor,
the Mexican territory was available to be acquired by the United States. Using anti-Mexican
rhetoric that painted the Mexican people as unable to govern themselves, Polk was able to justify
war because the Mexican government had prohibited the United States’ acquisition of
undeveloped property. 63 Not only have Locke and Grotius’ theories been influential in the
establishment in colonial America but they proved integral to the justification of territorial
expansion of the United States under the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny.
Locke and Grotius' theory of property rights and just war continues to have cultural
significance three centuries later in the United States’ treatments of Latinx migrants. Rather than
seeing migrants from Latin America as free peoples who wish to use their liberty to pursue a
better life, Latin American migrants are portrayed as aggressors that pose a threat to the land that
has been mixed with white labor and white boundaries. Rhetorically, Latin American migrants
has been described as invaders and threats to white American property. Rhetoric rooted in Locke
and Grotius just war theory has led to violent atrocities such as the 2018 Pittsburgh Tree of Life
shooting killing 11 people and the 2019 El Paso killing of twenty-three people at the Cielo Vista
Walmart. Both shooters justified their shootings by viewing migrants as invaders and those who
helped migrants as betraying their white American property.

Moises Sandoval, On the Move: A History of the Hispanic Church in the United States.
Rev., 2nd ed, (Orbis Books, 2006), 26. For a rhetorical analysis of Polk’s presidency see Karlyn
Kohrs Campbell, “James Knox Polk, the First Imperial President” in Before the Rhetorical
Presidency. 1st ed. Presidential Rhetoric Series, no. 19. (College Station: Texas A&M University
Press, 2008).
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Kant
If Grotius and Locke are integral to the development of American legal and political
institutions, then Kant is responsible for the majority of the U.S. ethical and academic
frameworks. While many would not consider Kant as a representative of natural law, at least by
the standards of the late enlightenment's iterations of natural law, Kant seriously speculates about
the conditions of a universal morality based on an understanding of humanity’s natural capacity
to reason. 64 Not only does Kant speculate on the possibility of a universal morality rooted in his
understanding of reason, these constructions of reason are later racialized by Kant. Kant's
theories on property rights, based on this racialized understanding of reason, are used to justify
taking indigenous land through his speculating on humanity’s ‘primitive’ or ‘savage’ nature.
First, we must illustrate that despite Kant’s hesitancy in using the category of the natural
(constructed against the category of the cosmopolitan), his understanding of human nature in
regard to reason is not far from natural law frameworks that construct humanity’s nature as
reason. 65 Second, we must discuss Kant’s views on reason as being explicitly tied to his
racialized constructions of the natural world. And finally, it's important to discuss Kant’s
racialized constructions of reason are used to epistemologically justify the property theft and
epistemological violence against indigenous communities and communities of color.

“In Kant, for example, to speak of autonomy of mind is synonymous with affirmation
of the self’s subjective intentional spontaneity as rational.” Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze, On
Reason: Rationality in a World of cultural Conflict and Racism. (Durham, SC: Duke University
Press, 2008), 87.
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Here I am referring to Jean Porter’s main argument in Nature as Reason: A Thomistic
Theory of Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005). She states that the scholastic
conception of natural law sets humanity within the context of the natural world by stating that the
natural function of humanity within that natural world is to exercise its reason. The nature of
humanity is explicitly tied to its reason.
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Despite the typical understandings of Kant’s ethical frameworks as rooted in duty and
categorized as deontological, Kant’s speculation on a universal morality in the categorical
imperative shows strong affinities to natural law’s understanding of the human person as rooted
in a rational nature. 66 Kant’s ethical framework seeks to establish an autonomy of morality that is
not derived from an agent's emotions or desires nor from “an appeal to what the scholastics have
regarded as the province of speculative reason, including the metaphysical or theological truths
as well as facts about the natural world…” 67 The good, therefore, cannot be derived from an
outside construction or as a means to something else, lest that good be considered simply
hypothetical or instrumental. 68 In order for something to be considered categorically good, it
must be good in itself. The good must derive from a logical necessity of reason. For Kant, the
only thing that can be categorically good is good will itself. 69 For something to be willed as a
good in itself, it must be the result of his categorical imperative to, “act only according to that
maxim by which at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” 70 For Kant, the

Porter believes that although many modern philosophers reject Kant’s metaphysics that
grounds his ethics, nevertheless, “the most influential contemporary theories of the natural law
fall within the parameters of a Kantian account broadly construed.” Porter, Nature As Reason,
236.
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“A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for
the attainment of some proposed end, but simply virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself,
and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in
favor of any inclination, pay, even of the sum total of all inclinations.” Immanuel Kant
“Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals” in Ethics: The Essential Writings. Ed.
Gordan Marino. (New York, NY: Random House Publishing, 2010), 192.
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Readings in Moral Philosophy. Ed. James Rachels (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 78.
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effects produced by such a universality of law are what he calls nature. And thus, Kant’s second
iteration of the categorical imperative takes on the language of natural law. Kant states “[By
analogy], then the universal imperative of duty can be expressed as follows: act as though the
maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature.” 71 Kant’s
understanding of nature is thus nuanced. Rather than seeing nature as an empirically quantifiable
grounding for the construction of the will, Kant’ refers to nature in its, “essential freedom as a
noumenal being, and to those elements of physical nature that must be pursued in order to satisfy
conditions necessary for human cooperative existence.” 72
For Kant, the nature that is proper to humanity is an autonomous reason that is rooted in
the subject. The natural or created order that functions outside the autonomous subject cannot be
a framework in which to engage ethics. 73 If the end of ethics is happiness, as it was described by
Aristotle, then instinct rather than reason should be the guide for ethical action. 74 Yet, as Kant
describes, sometimes the ethical thing does not necessarily correlate to human happiness or
comfort, because ethics is rooted in willing the good. An ethical action sometimes requires one
to sacrifice their comfort or their happiness for the sake of duty. Thus, the use of reason guides
the will to pursue ends that are “good in themselves” and such a will cannot be easily
manipulated by outside forces. 75 Kant’s project for the autonomy of morality is rooted on the
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“...reason generates moral norms through a self-reflective and discursive unfolding of
its own exigencies” Porter, Nature as Reason, 236.
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capacity that a human, through reason, can guide the will rather than it be guided
heteronomously.
Despite the fact that Kant tried to establish a universal autonomous morality based on an
autonomous reason, modern scholars have pointed out that not only is Kant’s construction of
reason far from autonomous and culturally specific to western Europe, but that his constructions
of reason are rooted in racist pseudoscience of the late enlightenment. Decolonial thinkers have
illustrated that Kant’s attempts towards a universally applicable morality are in fact limited by
his own experience. 76 Walter Mignolo states,
“Kant operates under the assumptions that knowledge is objective without
parentheses and that the knower (or observer) can establish objectively
that there is a correspondence between the description (in words or in
cartography) and the world described. The knower occupies a place, the
place of knowing. And--according to the premises of truth without
parenthesis-- the place of knowing is beyond political histories and beyond
body-political subjectivities....” 77
Through ignoring the geopolitical space, the politics of the body, and history which he occupied,
Kant constructed a morality based on a demand to be followed in his construction of a morality

Comparing the difference between Foucault and Kant in relation to Locke’s
understanding of tabula rasa, Boaventura Santos states, “But, in the place of tabula rasa, they
both put forward presuppositions or a prioris that, according to them condition all contemporary
human experience. They were unaware that all that experience was an intrinsically truncated
experience, for it had been constructed to disregard the experience of those that were on the other
side of the abyssal line--colonial people.” The End of the Cognitive Empire: The Coming of Age
of Epistemologies of the South. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 4.
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of imperatives. Mignolo rightly states that the method of Kant’s convictions are also methods of
control against which there is no argument, “Kant characterized the CI (Categorical Imperative)
as an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must always follow
despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary...Kantian imperatives
justified what modernity/coloniality achieved: management, control, and unidirectional
cosmopolitanism.” 78 The decolonial critique of Kant is that in positing his particular moral
theory based on his autonomous construction of reason as universally applicable, he subjugates
the knowledge of Indigenous and marginalized communities and in doing so negates universality
in general. Anibal Quijano points out, “Nothing is less rational, finally, than the pretension that a
specific cosmic vision of a particular ethnicity should be taken as universal rationality, even if
such an ethnicity is called Western Europe because this actually pretends to impose a
provincialism as universalism.” 79 Not only is Kant’s understanding of autonomous reason
suspect because it ignores his own social location, but Kant is blind to the ways in which his
constructions of reason are rooted in the racist pseudoscience of the time.
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze has illustrated that, despite Kant’s claim that his construction
of moral reasoning is rooted in a priori categorical imperatives, Kant connects reason explicitly
to the racialized pseudoscience of the time. Eze contends that Kant’s racism not only exists in his
non-philosophical works such as his Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime, his Natural
History, and his Lectures on Physical Geography, but also permeates his transcendental
78
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philosophy. Eze states, “Kant’s racial theories belong in an ‘intimate’ way to his transcendental
philosophy, or at least cannot be understood without acknowledgement of the transcendental
grounding that Kant explicitly provides them.” 80 Looking at Kant’s thought in Observations on
the feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764), he believes that certain characteristics are
naturally attributed to different cultural groups in western Europe... 81 Later, Kant attributes
different characteristics to particular racist constructions. In Kant’s lectures On Physical
Geography, Kant provides a particularly damning quote in regard to his racist beliefs when he
states, “Humanity is at its greatest perfection in the race of the whites. The yellow Indians have a
meagre talent. The Negroes are far below them and at the lowest point are a part of the American
people’s.” 82 In another quote from Observations, Kant explicitly connects a person’s race to their
knowledge stating, “...this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he
said was stupid.” 83 These essentialized racial characteristics established by Kant are translated
into the moral sphere. As Eze states,
“Unreflective mores and customs (such as supposedly practiced by the
non-European peoples listed by Kant) are devoid of ethical principles

Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, “The Color of Reason’ in Eze (ed.), Post colonial African
Philosophy: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 129. As quoted in Thomas E. Hill Jr.
and Bernard Boxill, “Kant and Race” in Race and Racism. Boxhill (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 452.
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because these people lack the capacity for development of “character”,
and they lack character presumably because they lack adequate selfconsciousness and rational will, for it is reflectivity (the ‘ego concept;) and
rational principled will which make the up building of moral character
possible through (educational) process of development of goodness latent
in/as human nature. 84
Despite Kant’s obvious racism, there is debate on whether or not Kant’s racist theories are a
result of “inconsistent universalism” or “consistent inegalitarianism” and whether or not Kant’s
racialized theories have changed over time. Pauline Kleingeld argues that Kant, “ drops his
hierarchical account of the races in favour of a more genuinely egalitarian and cosmopolitan
view.” 85 Similarly, Thomas Hill and Bernard Boxill argue that, “while it is important to notice
and block the influence of aspects of Kant’s writing that reflect or might encourage racism, the
charges of racism do not reach Kant’s deep theory or undermine its potential for guiding
deliberation about the problems of race.” 86 Despite efforts to rehabilitate Kant by looking at how
Kant might have toned down his racial hierarchical theories in his later works and efforts to
separate his works in anthropology from his works in “pure” philosophy, Kant’s theory of rights
found precisely in his later work illustrate just how his theories of race undergird the frameworks
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that would deprive Indigenous communities of land because of Kant’s conjectures on
essentialized racial categories. 87
Similar to Grotius and Locke, Kant’s view of right is rooted in the understanding of
private property. Yet, instead of viewing a person’s right to property vertically in relation to a
person’s ownership to a thing, Kant views property rights horizontally as an agreement between
people. Kant suggests that an object does not come into one's possession through the relationship
between the subject and the object, but through a general agreement between individuals in
social relationships. 88 The understanding that property is rooted in a sort of social contract (Kant
would not use these words), is why Pauline Kleingeld believes that Kant walks back his racism.
She states, “The very fact that Kant regards Native Americans, Africans and Asians as (equally)
capable of signing contracts, and as persons whose interests and claims present a normative
constraint on the behaviour of European powers, indicates a shift in perspective.” 89 Yet,
Kleingeld’s idealistic version of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is undermined precisely in Kant’s
construction of provisional and conclusive possession of property in an effort to push people into
his vision of cosmopolitanism. As Alan Kelner illustrates, Kant’s understanding of rights is
rooted in racist constructions of nature where, for Kant, the state of nature is one where a person

Eze suggests that scholarly forgetfulness of Kant’s racialized theories is a result of an
“overwhelming desire to see Kant only as a ‘pure’ philosopher.” Eze “The Color of Reason”,
104.
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([1797] 1996, [6:261] 413, [6:265] 417, [6:268] 419) “conceives of property not as
a relation between a person and a thing—an “absurd way of representing it”—but rather as a
relation between individuals.17 Kant ([1797] 1996, [6:261] 414) construes it as an omnilateral
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is in a condition that is not “rightful.” 90 Kant understands this state of nature as primitive and
savage and thus this state of nature must be exited either by persuasion or by force. While people
have a provisional right to their property, that right becomes conclusive when one exits the state
of right-less primitive nature into a social agreement that brings about the enforcement of
property rights through social conditions enabling the use of force. Yet, if a person refuses to exit
the state of nature in order to bring about such a social condition, for Kant, force is permitted so
as to bring people out of the primitive state of nature. This is where Kant’s racist constructions
and characterizations become dangerous. For Kant, while it is possible for Native Americans,
Africans, and Asians to enter into a contract that safeguards property, Kant’s racist
characterizations portray these communities (the Native American community in particular), as
unwilling or unable to enter into these contracts. As Kelner states,
So long as indigenous peoples remain in the state of nature—and Kant
clearly thinks they do—their possessions and everyone else’s are merely
provisional. Kant seems clearly to think there cannot be a portion of the
earth that does not recognize property (i.e., isn’t a state). Nonstate peoples
threaten the status of property claims for states insofar as property is
conclusive only when “such a contract” extends to the entire human
race. 91
Kant’s theory of rights ultimately is rooted in his essentialized and racialized construction of
human nature and his theory has real world effects for Indigenous communities and Latinx
communities.
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Kant’s thought on human nature has three movements. Kant’s first move was to assert
that his provincial knowledge rooted in the northwestern European enlightenment constituted an
objective and universalized understanding of reason superimposed onto all people. His second
move was to equate reason and moral character to racial hierarchy. And finally, Kant’s theories
were used to advocate a cosmopolitanism that used his constructions of a state of nature to
disenfranchise Indigenous communities from their land. What is particularly troublesome is that
while Kant viewed himself as advocating for a moral system that was supposedly neutral, that
neutrality became the guise for hegemonic discourse about morality as a whole. To question then
the moral framework of Kant is to question reason itself and subsequently to rhetorically position
oneself as one who is unreasonable.

New Natural Law
Following the Kantian effort to establish an autonomous morality, new natural lawyers such as
Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and Robert George separate reason from nature in the same way as
Kant seeks to establish categorical imperatives. They define the natural as descriptive of the
world in which people inhabit. They suggest that moral force cannot be derived from the
observations of the natural world and that basic goods are rooted in autonomous reason without
any adherence to speculative truth. Goods, as they are found in the natural world or derived from
observations, are premoral. According to Craig Boyd,
“What Grisez and Finnis propose is that the various goods of life can be
grasped by the theoretical reason in a ‘premoral sense,’ a sense that will
avoid the embarrassment of moving from is to ought. In contrast to the
theoretical use of reason, the practical use of reason moves us to action, as
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when we decide that ‘I must demonstrate mercy to this person now.’
Theoretical reason grasps the truth that ‘it is good to help those in need,’
but this is merely a premoral assessment of the good. Practical reason
moves humans to action and requires that I engage in the particular act
now.” 92
For Finnis and Grisez the possession of the pre-moral understanding of a good does not rest on
any speculation about human nature. For Finnis and his reading of Aquinas, “the way to discover
what is morally right (virtue) and wrong (vice) is to ask, not what is in accordance with human
nature, but what is reasonable.” 93 Again, Finnis states, “Thus it is simply not true that ‘ any form
of natural-law theory of morals entails the belief that propositions about man’s duties and
obligations can be inferred from propositions about his nature.” 94 This statement comes with a
few implications. Finnis first separates reason from humanity’s nature, thus perpetuating the
separation of nature from humanity. Reason is therefore seen as autonomous and unrelated to
making any statement about humanity. Secondly, this statement negates a teleological
understanding of humanity based on any speculative knowledge about human nature grounded in
any sort of metaphysical presuppositions.
Yet, despite the fundamental negation of any speculative knowledge or statements about
human nature as grounds for moral obligation, Grisez and Finnis describe a set of basic practical
principles that form basic goods that are ultimately rooted in conceptions of human nature. That
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is, Finnis and Grisez lay out human goods that they consider to be a priori to human nature, that
in actuality of their pursuit latently presume things about human nature. Finnis states
There is (i) a set of basic practical principles which indicate the basic forms
of human flourishing as goods to be pursued and realized, and which are in
one way or another used by everyone who considers what to do, however
unsound his conclusions; and (ii) a set of basic methodological requirements
of practical reasonableness (itself one of the basic forms of human
flourishing) which distinguish sound from unsound practical thinking and
which, when all brought to bear, provide the criteria for distinguishing
between acts that (always or in particular circumstances) are reasonable-allthings-considered (and not merely relative-to-a-particular purpose) and acts
that are unreasonable-all things considered, i.e. between ways of acting that
are morally right or morally wrong--thus enabling one to formulate (III) a
set of general moral standards.
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Yet these basic principles that indicate basic ideas of human goods and human flourishing presume
a teleological presupposition of the human pursuit of happiness. To say there is a basic human
good is to latently say that humans desire and pursue the good.
Furthermore, the list of goods that Finnis and Grisez propose as a priori and basic,
presuppose more specific claims of human nature. Finnis proposes the basic goods of life,
knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and
religion as basic goods. These goods are basic in such a way that, “means ‘first, each is equally
self-evidently a form of good. Secondly, none can be analytically reduced to being merely an
95
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aspect of any of the other, or to being merely instrumental in the pursuit of any of the others.” 96
These goods cannot be derived without at least postulating that for these goods to be basic that
they at the same time are integral to being human. Religion as a basic human good posits that
humans, by nature, value religion. For knowledge to be a basic good presumes that humans possess
a set of attributes that separate their knowledge from other animals.
Additionally, Finnis not only provides a list of basic goods, but provides a list of basic
requirements of practical reasonableness that are needed to pursue these basic goods. This list of
requirements include: a coherent plan for life, no arbitrary preferences among values, no arbitrary
preferences amongst persons, detachment and commitment, efficiency within reason, respect for
every basic value in every act. 97 These requirements of practical reason, once again, rest on
presumptions about human nature. To make a coherent plan of life is to posit that humanity works
out their actions in the context of teleological ends and such ends usually rest on metaphysical or
religious speculations on the end of humanity. No arbitrary preferences among values and of
persons presume a fundamental commitment from humanity to the ideas of freedom and equality.
Notice how equality is not a fundamental human good for Finnis but is rather one of the
requirements for practical reasonableness. This makes his argument for practical reasonableness
as a basic human good hard to follow. One can ask what comes first, basic human goods, or the
conditions that make their pursuit under the good of practical reasonableness possible. Regardless
of which comes first, the list of basic human goods or the conditions that make their pursuit
possible, both require postulations on human nature that both make the pursuit of these goods and
the conditions in which humanity pursues them possible.
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One problem with the new natural law theory’s relation to the natural in natural law is
that it refuses to construct an ethical theory by actually attuning to what constitutes the natural in
humanity. By constituting their natural law theory in the context of autonomous practical reason,
they do not make any claims that would posit that humanity’s nature is one that is constituted by
humanity’s use of reason (regardless of what type of reason employed). By placing value on
autonomous practical reason, the new natural law theorists posit humanity as operating in both
the realm of practical reason and speculative reason.
In constructing an ethic that rests on the value of practical reason alone to the exclusion
of the speculative, new natural lawyers drastically misunderstand the role of speculative reason.
According to Stephen A. Long, speculative reason is a precondition of practical reason. Since the
new natural lawyers use Aquinas to suggest that morality is not based on speculative reason or
metaphysical speculation, Long’s critique of new natural law begins with a critique of their
reading of Aquinas. 98 Instead of positing that Aquinas does not believe good and evil are fixed in
metaphysics and speculative reason, Long believes that Aquinas’ epistemology is rooted first in
speculative reason that gives rise to practical reason. Speculative reason presents a truth as
known whereas practical reason is rooted in operation. Long states,
Inasmuch as the practical intellect knows truth “just as the speculative”
but is distinct from the speculative only in “directing the known truth to
operation,” it would appear that the notion of a truth with no speculative

See Finnis, New Natural Law, 33-34. “Nor is it true that Aquinas' good and evil are
concepts analysed and fixed in metaphysics before they are applied in morals. On the contrary,
Aquinas asserts as plainly as possible that the first principles of natural law, which specify the
basic forms of good and evil and which can be adequately grasped by anyone of the age of
reason (and not just by metaphysicians), are per se nota (self-evident) and indemonstrable. They
are not inferred from speculative principles.”
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content whatsoever is alien to the thought of Aquinas: a contradiction in
terms. 99
Aquinas believes that to know the identity of a thing is to employ speculative reason, while
practical reason engages in the operation of such a thing. For Aquinas, to know how to use a
thing, one must know what a thing is. Thus, to know a thing as good one must first speculate on
the nature of a thing. As such, the claim that for Aquinas, “the first principles of practical reason
[to know good and avoid evil] are not fixed in speculative reason” is to negate Aquinas’ theory
of knowledge. For Long’s reading of Aquinas, “Nonetheless at root this practical knowing is
speculatively adequated.” 100 Thus, Long’s ultimate critique of the new natural law theory is that
The basic goods schema of the new natural law theory in effect
promulgates a category of truth with no speculative content, while at least
for St. Thomas Aquinas the apprehension of speculative content—even by
the practical intellect—is required by the very nature of knowledge
itself. 101
New natural law theory’s emphasis on practical reason is thus an impossible solution primarily
because to engage in practical reason is to latently presuppose speculative reason.
Russell Hittinger provides an excellent example of how new natural law theorists latently
use speculative reason to engage their ethics supposedly based solely on practical reason.
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Hittinger suggests that for Grisez to engage in his arguments in bioethics concerning the
preservation and reproduction of human life that Grisez latently speculates on the nature of life
itself. As Robert P. George states, “A basic understanding of the integral organic function of the
human body (i.e., of being alive) is a condition of any judgement, including any practical
judgment about the status of life and health as basic goods.” 102 To make any judgement about
human reproductive rights or end of life care, there must be a speculative commitment on what
constitutes life and what constitutes a life worth having. It is in the field of medical ethics, in
particular, that moral precepts and competing notions of the good come to a head in such a way
that clear moral precepts based on practical reasonableness becomes an impossible demand.
The new natural law’s theory’s commitment to self-evident principles of practical reason
and refusal to discuss any conditions of human nature in which to ground the good is a
continuation of the man/nature dichotomy that was brought about through enlightenment
speculation. The enlightenment construction of man against the natural world has either led to
the rejection of natural law frameworks or the reworking of frameworks to exclude
understandings of the natural as it is presented in the created world. In an effort to separate
human nature from that of the natural world enlightenment thinkers,
dissolved thereby the conjunction between the is, as such, and the ought.
But in their arguments against the uniformity and stability of reality, the
proponents of the romanticism, vitalism, and evolutionism that may be
subsumed under the shorthand label of "history" seemed to deny any
general structure in the non-natural sector of reality germane to human
morals and to expound a doctrine of eternal flux; while, correspondingly,
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the utilitarians, social theorists, and social scientists who shared in the
exaltation of "society" seemed to deny any universal or absolute basis for
morality and to expound a doctrine of social relativism. 103
So, to address the is/ought distinction in an effort to establish an autonomous morality, the result
was either a monolithic construction of reality that was untenable with the pluriformity of reality
or a doctrine of social relativism. In the same way, practical reason alone became a priority for
the new natural lawyers so that they can avoid the “naturalistic fallacy” but in reality displaced
humanity from its social, historical, and narratival contexts as well as its lived experience in the
created world. Humanity, for new natural lawyers, must be separated from any speculative
content about its nature and must be removed from its positionality in the created world in order
to engage in the ethical, despite the fact that ethics happens in the contexts of human
relationships and humanity’s relationships to the created world. Ethics happens in the narratives
of real lives and the real world.
The resulting effect with the negation of metaphysical and natural speculation to establish
an autonomous practical reason was to simply superimpose a construction of reason based on
Kantian universals as normative for the whole of humanity. Thus, new natural lawyers fall into
the same trap as their enlightenment counterparts, an epistemic hegemony that does not attend to
the nuances of a variety of human cultures or narratives. The negation of human nature as it
exists within the created world positioned epistemic structures that have told a narrative that
justifies extractivist capitalism where humanity, as an autonomous subject, can therefore
consume objects without regard to the interrelated effects of such consumption. The new natural
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lawyer’s understanding of premoral goods also functions within a framework of epistemic
domination. By positing that goods are premoral the consumption of these goods can also be
understood to be premoral. Thus, following a Lockean and Grotian understanding of liberty as
dominion, one can posit that any threat to the free consumption of these goods is a threat to
humanity’s natural right to property. Thus, new natural lawyer’s premoral goods and
construction of the autonomous subject can be used to epistemically justify neo-colonial policies.
A primary example in which the confluence of sovereignty as established by Grotius and
Locke, Kant’s theory of right, and new natural law’s understanding of autonomous pre-moral
goods has affected and permeated the American legal system is through the enumeration of the
Plenary Power Doctrine in immigration law. Derived from the Chinese exclusion case that
upheld the Scott Act of 1888, an act that prohibited Chinese laborers from returning to the
United States, Chai Chan Ping v. The United States gave the U.S. legislative system the power to
determine its own borders as well as have power to enact immigration law that could abrogate
prior U.S. treaties. 104 Some believe that the court’s claim to sovereignty was not used to deny
people rights enumerated in treaties but to solve a question of the federal government’s power to
enact immigration policy. 105 However, I argue that it is rather a battle between conceptions of
what constitutes a right and which conception of rights matter in the U.S. legal system. Based on
a conception of objective rights versus subjective rights, in the case of the Plenary Power
The details of the case were that a Chinese immigrant named Chae Chan Ping went
home to China under the Burlingame Treaty, which gave Chinese immigrants the ability to travel
to and from China to the United States, to return to the United State’s and be detained because
the Scott Act of 1888 abrogated the Burlingame Treaty. Chae Chan Ping was detained and then
appealed his detention all the way to the Supreme Court. The court ruled against Chae Chan
Ping.
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Doctrine, the concept of subjective rights as a right of dominion took precedence over the
understanding of the natural right that derives from promises in relationships. 106 As such, a
nation’s rights to define their borders and enumerate immigration policies take precedence over
the objective and passive rights given by the relationship found in a contract. Part of the reason
that Doctrine of Plenary Power took precedence is the prevalence of a rights and natural law
theory, derived from Grotius, Locke, and Kant that focuses primarily on subjective rights and
goods that are acontextual and seek to exist outside of relationships.
The judicial concept of sovereignty in the plenary power doctrine was not so much a
doctrine that protected American citizens but was one that protected white American citizens.
The plenary doctrine was used to deport Mexican-Americans to Mexico in the 1930’s because
the prevalence of Mexican-American workers was perceived as a threat to white workers in the
Southwest. Despite becoming citizens in 1848 as a result of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo at
the end of the Mexican-American War, 500,000 Mexican-American citizens, born in the
contiguous United States, were deported to Mexico. 107 In 1931, the federal government
conducted raids and detained American born citizens of Mexican descent. State and local
governments followed suit. 108 Despite having a legal claim to be in the United States, both by

Here I follow Richard Tuck’s understanding of passive and active rights and their
corollary of objective and subjective rights. A passive right is one which is given to you by
someone else and is therefore objective in the sense that it can be discoverable in relationships
implied through contracts. An active right or subjective right is one that one possesses.
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treaty and by birth-right citizenship, the plenary doctrine or the role of the State to determine
citizenship, immigration, and faithfulness to treaties was rooted in the concept of protecting
property for white citizens. The same racial hierarchies that were explicit in Kantian
understanding of public right remained implicit in American legal reasoning in the repatriation of
Mexican-American Citizens.
Even in court cases that seem to contest the plenary power doctrine such as a recent case
Herrera v. Wyoming that upheld the right of Crow tribes to hunt in the territory they ceded
constituting the state of Wyoming and Big Horn National Forest, the legal reasoning upholding
that right is based on subjective rights of dominion rather than objective rights that come from
relationships like treaties. For Herrera v. Wyoming, the question at hand was not whether the
Crow people had the right to hunt because of an 1868 treaty that allowed them to, “have the right
to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found thereon,” but
rather whether or not the forming of a state or national park constituted occupation of such a
land. 109 The court held that the Crow’s hunting rights were not to be abrogated because the land
was not considered occupied. Yet, the reasoning was rooted in the understanding of property
rights formulated by Grotius, Locke, and Kant, and the principles employed were those that
primarily considered moral principles not derived from relationships but were rooted in
acontextual definitions of what constituted occupation and which legal case was drawn for
precedent. 110 One could then argue that the plenary doctrine was upheld even more so because
the frame of argument was not based on whether or not the federal government should honor
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previous treaties, but rather reinforces the government's right to supersede relational rights in so
far as the correct steps are taken, e.g., correctly constituting occupation.
The legal reasoning of the United States owes much of its framework to the thought of
Grotius, Locke, and Kant’s understanding of natural law and new natural law’s understanding of
pre-moral goods, property rights, and autonomous moral reasoning. This legal reasoning,
presumed as neutral and autonomous, has constituted frameworks that have justified the
destruction and taking of Native American land, disenfranchised African American communities,
and marginalized Latinx communities. In so far as the Latinx community is concerned, such
legal reasoning that denies the rights derived from relationships constituting the plenary doctrine
provides legal justification for arbitrary and cruel immigration laws. Through emphasizing a
moral reasoning and natural law that is generated from the separation of humanity from its
context, the U.S. tradition of the natural has masked its use of natural law and natural rights
under the guise of neutrality and the application of general moral principles, regardless of the
fact that those principles are rooted in a history that has emphasized the enslavement of people
and the theft of land. What is needed is a natural law and rights theory that emphasizes the role
of context, the role discernment, and that places real human relationships as primary when
discussing moral reasoning.

Revisionist and Contextual Natural Law Theories
Recently, there have been efforts to retrieve a natural law and human rights framework that
contests the commitments of a natural law construction that bases itself on autonomous,
acontextual, and precept based moral reasoning. Jean Porter has spent a significant amount of her
career retrieving natural law in a way that takes seriously the scholastic context in which it
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originated and takes seriously the claim that natural law is a type of moral reasoning as opposed
to a set of specific moral precepts. Within the realm of human rights language, Linda Hogan
contributes to the discussion of the validity of human rights language by arguing for placing
rights language in the context of multicultural, pluricentric, and relational frames as opposed to
the abstract concepts of human nature rooted in Western individualism. Both Porter and Hogan’s
contributions to discerning natural law or human rights language within the multifaceted contexts
in which the human person exists, opens up space for a discussion of natural law rooted in the
Latinx narratives.
Revisionist Natural Law
Jean Porter
Jean Porter argues against new natural law’s emphasis to frame natural law as providing specific
moral precepts immediately recognizable by the autonomous function of practical reason. She
does this by reinterpreting Aquinas’ understanding of natural law within his wider scholastic
context. In particular, she critiques Grisez and Finnis interpretation of Aquinas’ ST I-II 94.2. 111
Grisez and Finnis read Aquinas’ three inclinations found in I-II 94.2 as the establishment of
precepts that protect pre-moral goods. They argue that anything that would prohibit the pursuit of
these goods, i.e., procreation, living in society, is an intrinsic evil. Yet, Porter argues that
Aquinas’ list of inclinations is precisely what he claims them to be, inclinations. To give these

Aquinas’ ST I-II 94.2 asks whether or not natural law contains several precepts or one
only. Here we get Aquinas’ first principle of practical reason, that “good is to be pursued and
evil to be avoided.” We also get the list of Aquinas’ three inclinations. The first is that man is
inclined toward the good as it relates to all substances, e.g., self preservation. The second is that
humanity is inclined toward the good unique to all animals, e.g., procreation and education of
offspring. Third is that which is particular to humanity specifically, e.g., know the truth about
god or live in society.
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inclinations the status of moral precept would be to go further than Aquinas would regarding the
goods that are established by these inclinations. For Porter and for Aquinas, the goods
established by Aquinas’ inclinations are not specific enough to dictate specific moral actions let
alone be brought to the level of moral precepts that dictate principles of nonmaleficence. Porter’s
particular example is that while the first inclination under the first principle of natural law is to
protect life, and thus establishing for Finnis and Grisez the inviolability of life, Aquinas
understands that within certain contexts some encounters require the taking of human life (i.e.,
self-defense, war, etc.). 112 What this example does for Porter is establish her general thesis that
natural law can never be specific enough to provide specific moral precepts that govern moral
actions. The general principle of natural law to do good and avoid evil, must always be
interpreted within the context in which the question is posed. Porter argues that Aquinas
addresses the question of whether or not natural law is the same for all people and is immediately
accessible to all knowledge in I-II 94.4. Here, Aquinas states
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles is
the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain
matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general
principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to
rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both
as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to
generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some

Porter illustrates that this is also a primary example for a proportionalist reading of
Aquinas. See Porter, Jean. “Moral Rules and Moral Actions: A Comparison of Aquinas and
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obstacle, and as to knowledge since in some the reason is perverted by
passion or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature… 113
For Porter and Aquinas, the first general principle of practical reason, to do good and avoid evil,
is accessible and the same for all in so far as it remains a general principle. When the context
demands a moral action, a certain level of discernment on what constitutes a good or evil within
that specific context requires a level of discernment. 114 Porter believes that this framework is
normative for the scholastic tradition. For the scholastics, “they identify the natural law in the
primary sense with a capacity for moral discernment or the fundamental principles through
which such a capacity operates.” 115 Thus, for Porter, natural law, its general principles, and
inclinations function as the foundation for a type of moral reasoning that takes into account the
general inclinations of human nature, in its desires and orientations, as well as the cultural
context in which a person finds themselves.
Central to Porter’s argument that natural law is a type of moral reasoning that takes
seriously the normative role of context is the fact that natural law itself is formed within a
theological and scholastic context. Continuing her discussion on Aquinas’ Summa Theologica III 94.2, Porter illustrates that Aquinas was not simply positing his own theory of the first
principles of practical reason in order to establish specific moral precepts, but rather was
synthesizing the scholastic milieu of definitions of natural law. Porter illustrates that Aquinas’
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understanding of the inclinations were a synthesis of other scholastic formulations of natural law.
Porter states
The first inclination which we share with all other creatures is associated
with the natural law understood as a universal tendency towards existence
or goodness mentioned by Roland. The second inclination, which we share
with other living creatures, is associated with Ulpian’s natural law, to
which pertain reproduction and the care of the young. Finally, the properly
human natural law, including those precepts relating to life in society and
worship of divine being, are associated with distinctively human
inclination to live together and to engage in intellectual activity, which
were central to Cicero’s conception of the natural law and were
subsequently incorporated into scholastic reflection by early canonical
commentators on Gratian’s decretum. 116
Rather than positing a system of natural law that does not take into the account the metaphysical
or speculative notions of what constitutes the natural in the natural law as described by Finnis,
Porter illustrates that Aquinas’ aim was to synthesize the received tradition into a single
framework of knowledge. 117 In fact, the general project of scholasticism was to, “bring together
Jean Porter, “Does the Natural Law Provide a Universally Valid Morality?” in
Intractable Disputes About the Natural Law: Alasdair MacIntyre and Critics. Ed. Lawrence
Cunningham (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 67.
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Finnis famously states, “On the contrary, Aquinas asserts as plainly as possible that
the first principles of natural law, which specify the basic forms of good and evil and which can
be adequately grasped by anyone of the age of reason (and not just by metaphysicians), are per se
nota (self-evident) and indemonstrable. They are not inferred from speculative principles. They
are not inferred from facts. They are not inferred from metaphysical propositions about human
nature, or about the nature of good and evil, or about 'the function of a human being', nor are
they inferred from a teleological conception of nature or any other conception of nature. They are
not inferred or derived from anything. they are underived (though not innate). Principles of right
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the widest possible range of traditions and practical considerations into a perfect system of
knowledge’ unified by reference to scripturally mediated revelation.” 118 Thus the project of
natural law in the scholastic framework is not to establish an autonomous conception of morality,
but to bring into conversation natural law moralities as it relates to a wide range of traditions.
Not only is a scholastic conception of natural law rooted in context, but it views such a
context as a resource for moral traditions. For Porter, in order to derive a moral action exegeting
one’s context is necessary. For Porter, human nature as reason, exists within particular contexts.
Nature cannot be described primarily as autonomous or individualized or based on sheer
“facticity”, Porter states, “Nature in the sense of sheer facticity is not incorporated into the
scholastic concept of the natural law, because nature taken in this sense cannot offer a basis for
understanding the regularities of the non-human or social world.” 119 Humanity must exegete and
understand their place in the world and understand natural law in relation to social customs and
their own characteristics. Thus, nature can be seen “as the ordered totality of all creatures” or
“seen as the intrinsic characteristic of a given kind of creature.” 120 Human nature can be
discussed in two ways, their nature in relation to the natural world and their relation to
themselves as a reasoning creature. Thus, scholastics would go on to describe the specific aspect

and wrong, too, are derived from these first, pre-moral principles of practical reasonableness, and
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of human nature within the totality of the natural world as a creature whose primary function is
that of reason. This contradicts the traditions of Grotius, Locke, and Kant who posit human
nature and its faculty of reason in contradistinction to the natural world. Aquinas posits the
natural world as integral to providing humanity the context in which reason is possible. Human
reason functions within the natural world and thus must take seriously its relationship as part of
the natural world and the contexts which are given. Thus, Porter’s understanding of natural law
morality transitions to a spectrum of natural law moralities that use the virtue of prudence to
discern which moral action can take place within a given context.
Critiquing new natural law’s understanding of autonomous practical reason as the
immediate apprehension of specific moral precepts, Porter argues that practical reason is rooted
in the will and desires of the person and these desires can be the result of cultural values given by
society. Porter states,
If practical reason does not generate its own aims (or functions without
reference to any aims at all), the obvious alternative would be to say that it
takes its starting points from somewhere else- from the agent’s own
desires, or from the commitments and values shared by a given society. In
other words, if practical reason is not autonomous, then it would appear to
be instrumental to aims generated outside of it. 121
Porter’s understanding of Aquinas’ use of practical reason is that while the first principle of
practical reason, to do good and avoid evil, is the starting point of moral reflection, such a
reflection is not specific enough to guide moral action. For Porter, “these principles by
themselves do not lead to action, much less generate norms for action until they are engaged by
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desires prompting a practical reflection and action.” 122 Thus, contrary to the new natural
lawyer’s understanding of autonomous practical reason, practical reflection is required to guide
moral action and this practical reflection requires the use of prudence. Prudence functions as a
discernment process that directs moral actions towards particular ends that are provided through
the person's desires as they are formed and shaped by societal contexts. Thus, “particular acts are
chosen with reference to some further end that the agent has in view - whether as means to an
end, or as one component of a more complex good, or as a way of expressing or enjoying one's
end in a particular act (47.1 ad 2).” 123 By assessing the ends of a particular act, Porter takes
seriously the need to assess the value of an act within the context of a particular end. By
assessing a moral act in reference to its ends, what is presumed is the context that gives saliency
to each moral act.
First principles of practical reason are not ignored by either Porter or Aquinas.
Rather,
first principles, in turn, can only function practically insofar as they are
informed by the natural inclinations of the human creature and given
concrete meaning through the agent's speculative beliefs about and overall
orientation toward, whatever he regards as his final good. Practical reason
is dependent for its functioning on speculative judgements, and by the
same token the virtue of prudence presupposes--it does not directly
generate--right judgements about the agent's appropriate aims. 124

122

Porter, Nature as Reason, 249.

123

Porter, Nature as Reason, 250.

124

Porter, Nature as Reason, 309-310.

67

The speculative and metaphysical judgements that are provided through the process of the virtue
of prudence function within the speculative frameworks of a given cultural narratives. Moral
rules derived from first principles cannot provide guidance for moral action unless they are
rooted in concrete narratives. 125 Cultures may have varying narratives, cosmologies, and
understandings of virtues and thus right actions must always dialogue between one’s culture, the
person’s desires or inclinations, and the general principle of choosing things that are perceived as
goods.
Because moral actions must be assessed and understood within their instantiated concrete
contexts, narratives, and the textured understandings of moral goods, communal reflection is
necessary. This communal reflection is where Porter’s natural law is clearly defined in
opposition to the autonomous reason of new natural law and the individualized frameworks of
enlightenment thought. Porter states,
The community cannot arrive at an adequate grasp of basic moral
precepts except through the collective process of experience, debate, and
reflection-- all of which must be informed by the prudential discernment
of individuals if they are to go well. This is the level at which the creative
scope of prudence will be most apparent, as each community develops its
own specification of the natural law within the context of its own
circumstances and history. 126

“We cannot understand moral rules, or (what comes to the same thing) general
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Crucial to developing a natural law morality is to place it within the context of one’s own
community circumstances and history. Natural law as a type of moral reasoning rather than the
prescription of universally valid moral precepts requires the taking seriously of the context in
which such reasoning is taking place. By attuning to a community’s values, desires, and goals,
the speculative positing of goods provides the ends towards which moral action is oriented and
provides a textured scene in which moral actions are tangibly assessed.
Porter’s attention to the role of context in her argument for natural law as a type of moral
reasoning provides a space in which one can engage the natural law tradition within the context
of one’s social location and narratives. By placing natural law, in its scholastic iterations, as
context dependent, she contests the enlightenment and new natural law frameworks that frame
natural law’s moral precepts as autonomous and universalized. By placing natural law within its
larger theological contexts, she illustrates that concepts of nature are always context dependent.
Not only does she illustrate that natural law is context dependent but also that when engaging in
natural law reasoning, one must engage cultural narratives in order to interpret the first principle
of practical reason. How is one to know what goods are to be pursued and what evils are to be
avoided unless one’s cultural narrative enters into dialogue with what are considered goods
worthy of pursuit and evils worth avoiding? Communal reflection does not just occur
horizontally but also in dialogue with a community's history providing a multifaceted approach
from where one is able to engage in natural law reasoning. As we begin to discuss what a Latinx
form of natural law reasoning may look like in later chapters, it is important to take Porter's work
as an avenue that opens up space to engage a context dependent starting point in which to begin
natural law reflection.
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Linda Hogan
Similar to Jean Porter’s attempt to retrieve a natural law position that contests the frameworks of
autonomous reason and abstract constructions of the individual, Linda Hogan seeks to formulate
human rights language that is attentive to pluricentric and relationally situated knowledge. Her
work seeks to, “challenge the assumption that the viability of human rights discourse depends on
the articulation of a single, universally persuasive account of its foundations…” 127 When
understood in this way, human rights, for Hogan, has become a form of “subjugated knowledge
and dominatory discourse.” 128 Rather than seeing human rights as a monolithic construction of
human nature that is autonomous, individualized, and free, Hogan seeks to establish a human
rights language that is attentive to culture and is instantiated in culture. Rather than constructing
a human rights language that has been traditionally acontextual, acultural, and negates the
contributions of particular cultures, Hogan discusses a type of human rights discourse
recognizes, “comprehensive doctrines” and that accepts that, “the articulation of each
community’s distinctive worldview and ethic is embedded in political processes.” 129
Hogan begins her discussion on human rights by providing historical nuance to the claim
that human rights language, especially the language on the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), was an effort in Western cultural imperialism. Hogan shows that the history of
UDHR’s ratification and promulgation was the result of non-Western countries holding fast to
the claims of Human Rights. Hogan states,
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thus, although human rights discourse of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries was essentially Western, liberal, and primarily (although not
exclusively) individualistic, and was focused on civil and political rights,
by the beginning of the twentieth century the influence of non-Western
political aspirations had begun to transform the discourse. 130
This was primarily seen when Western countries tried adopting a colonial clause that would,
“exclude their colonies from claiming the rights that were in the covenant and was motivated
primarily by their need to resist the claim to the right to self-determination on the part of the
peoples of the colonies.” 131 Contradicting the popular narrative that the West superimposed
rights language on non-Western countries, it was non-Western countries that contested the
West's hesitancy to adopt the universality of rights language to their former colonies. Hogan
illustrates that it was representatives from Indonesia, Lebanon, Cuba, the Philippines, and Chile
who argued for the universality of human rights against the Western detractors. Hogan provides
this example not to argue that the Western conceptions of human rights were not imperial,
because implementation of a High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Asian Values debate
of the 1990’s proved otherwise, but to show that human rights language is already and always
rooted in political and historical discourse about whose rights matter and who tries to circumvent
those rights. Thus, discussions of human rights that emphasize their inalienability often forget
that those unalienable rights were always historically contingent on those who have power. 132
Human rights discourse, for Hogan, is always rooted in historical and political contexts.
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Because human rights discourse is always rooted in historical and political contexts,
Hogan wishes to bring to attention which of these contexts have taken precedent and how the
over emphasis on this context has brought about what she considers a “crisis of legitimacy.”
Namely, Hogan discusses how the human rights language has been rooted in “liberalism’s
normative conception of the person as an individual, whose attachments are supplementary to her
essential nature and whose identity can be articulated apart from her relationships, loyalties, and
encumbrances.” 133 This construction of the person rooted in liberalism, for Hogan, is itself a
product of “historical and political practices.” 134 By positioning the unencumbered self as that
which is essentially human, what is really being posited is a particular version of human nature
that emphasizes certain frameworks over others.
Drawing on feminist critiques of the western subject, Hogan illustrates that the
essentialized understanding of a static individualized human nature was used to posit a claim of
ontological sameness that marginalized those that did not fit the essentialized mold of the human.
This mold often essentialized sexual difference, constructed gendered norms for discrimination,
ignored the way the body was “enmeshed in culture” and carries a history. Most importantly, the
essential construction of the human subject in the form of Western liberalized rendered various
racial, ethnic, and sexual groups invisible. For Hogan, to rearticulate a pluricentric human right’s
discourse one must engage in a framework that views the human as “first and foremost a being-
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in-relation” that recognizes the role of difference. 135 Thus, “human rights discourse can no
longer ignore the ethical responsibilities associated with rendering visible the experiences of
those who are both unseen and excluded.” 136 Thus, in establishing a human rights language it is
necessary to interrogate, “the nature of the discourse through which, the human is represented,
noting the silences and absences and making space for the emergence of new voices.” 137 In
interrogating the voices in that are privileged in discussing human rights language, it is important
to consider the way that these privileged voices often universalize their particular vantage point
to the subjugation of marginalized groups.
In order to contrast this hegemonic discourse that universalizes single viewpoints that are
rooted in Western individualism, Hogan argues that “it is the situated rather than the abstract
individual who ought to form the centerpiece of human rights discourse.” 138 As such, Hogan
argues for what she considers to be a moral epistemology that is rooted in an embedded
universalism. Hogan argues that human rights is undermined when, “we fail to acknowledge that
human rights discourse began as a particular historical and cultural expression of value that, over
time and through its persuasive appeal, acquired and continues to acquire a global influence and
attraction.” 139 As a result, the idea that truth is that which corresponds to reality as an
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epistemological framework presumes a guise of objective neutrality that proposes that moral
realism must be rooted in an acontextualism. A true realism, for Hogan, is one that acknowledges
that it is context dependent. Hogan states,
“The moral realism on which finite human beings can depend is not such
that it corresponds to some abstract and universalist set of norms or
principles. Rather, this moral realism is a fractured realism. It is a realism
that is based on an acknowledgement that, while our identities are shaped
by the material and discursive conditions of our lives, and while the
ethical judgments we make are inevitably shaped by the historical and
religious context of our moral formation, we can nonetheless strive to
embody the virtues and excellences that have come to believe reflect the
best that human beings can be.” 140
Some will suggest that because moral realism is a fractured realism based on material and
discursive conditions that an attempt to ground human rights theories on metaphysical
foundations should be abandoned. 141 However, Hogan argues that there are many different ways
of justifying human rights from a variety of different sources without necessitating a coherence
of ontology, epistemology or metaphysics 142 For Hogan, the error of finding a foundation for
human rights discourse is that the search is often for a single monolithic foundation rather than
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taking a pluralist approach in which, “several foundations...taken together are likely to be
agreeable to more people than any single foundation and no single foundation has a monopoly on
reasonable claims to be made in its favor.” 143 By having multiple foundations for human rights
language, no one cultural or religious understanding, is given hegemonic control.
While this idea of multiple foundations for discussing human rights might sound similar
to the political liberalism of John Rawls in which “comprehensive doctrines relegated to the
background culture” Hogan’s understanding of human rights is, “grounded in an appreciation of
the integrity of distinct moral and religious traditions. 144 She argues that what is needed are
discursive bridges across traditions that result in concrete legal protections. She argues that the
reason why human rights language has been able to withstand its abuses by Western imperialism
and it’s decolonial critique is because it can and does accommodate a thick pluralism across
traditions. Essential to Hogan’s idealism concerning a pluralist framework of rights language is
her concept of porous communities.
While some could view Hogan’s optimistic outlook for multiple foundations for rights
language as naive because it does not necessarily deal directly with incommensurability between
cultural frameworks, her construction of porous communities helps frame her confidence in cross
cultural dialogue. Hogan has argued that the incommensurability between cultures and
community is the result of the way multiculturalism enforced a static understanding of culture
and that communitarians overemphasized separatists' idea of community. Yet rather than
143
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viewing cultures as monolithic, static, and bounded, culture is always in the process of
negotiation and renegotiation. Community and belonging is also a site of negotiation because
individual identities place values in multiple centers of belonging. Because culture, community,
and tradition are dynamic, Hogan believes they can be sites of emancipatory politics. Drawing
from Madhavi Sunder, Hogan states, “more and more people are claiming the right to remain as
members of a group but define what that cultural membership means to them in their own
terms.” 145 Rather than culture, community, and identity being essentialized, forcing people into
particular roles and social spaces, recognizing that all these forms of relationships are open to
negotiation and provides a space for someone to engage in multicultural and pluriform dialogue
that can function as sites for human rights language.
Like Porter’s renegotiating of natural law as both existing within a tradition and needing
context in order to function properly, Hogan’s discussion on human rights provides a framework
from where Latinx communities can discuss human rights within their particular histories,
languages, and communities. Most importantly, as we will discuss in chapter 3, Hogan's
understanding of porous communities and cultural frameworks is already a prevalent concept
within Latinx traditions. While Hogan calls the spaces and identities one occupies as porous,
Latinx theologians have been using the Spanish concept of mestizaje to discuss the multiple
cultural, ethnic, and political identities people in the Latinx community have existed in for
centuries. For Latinx communities, mestizaje is an epistemic stance in which to engage a
particular type of moral realism that stems from a multifaceted and multicultural ethnic heritage.
Thus, people of Latinx heritage already have an epistemological privilege in discussing human
rights from Hogan’s perspective because they have the lived experience of situated knowledge
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that is rooted in multiple spaces and multiple comprehensive doctrines. While Hogan views
discursive bridges to exist between communities, within Latinx philosophy these bridges exist on
our backs and are often the sites of epistemic violence. 146 However, because Hogan invites
human rights discourse to constantly interrogate who is the one who is dominating the discourse,
the space in which epistemic violence has occurred against the Latinx community in discussions
of human rights can be made visible and become a site in which human rights can flourish not
just for the Latinx community but for all.

Contextual Natural Law
So, what might a theology that engages natural law from within one’s own particular tradition
look like? There are three major contexts from which natural law has been approached from
within one’s own tradition, feminist natural law, black natural law, and recently queer natural
law. When it comes to feminist natural law the works of Lisa Cahill and Cristina Traina are
exemplary. They both engage the Catholic natural law tradition and critique the tradition for its
emphasis on static conceptions of human nature that often marginalize the perspectives of
women. Vincent Lloyd’s recent work Black Natural Law provides a natural law framework that
is derived directly from the perspective of Black leaders in the United States. In particular, Lloyd
draws on the work of Frederick Douglas, Anna Julia Cooper, W.E.B. Dubois, and Martin Luther
King Jr to establish a natural law tradition that he believes, “offers the best way to approach

In particular I’m discussing Gloria Anzaldua’s which emphasize the space of Latinx
women occupying multiple identities and the failure by dominant cultures to recognize these
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politics, not just for blacks but for everyone.” 147 Craig Ford, in discussing a foundation for a
Queer natural law, provides a framework in which categories of human nature must constantly
be revised and renegotiated. By engaging in feminist, black, and queer natural law traditions, one
can find inspiration for a further engagement for a Latinx construction of natural law. A Latinx
natural law framework would add to the milieu of frameworks that contest claims about natural
law that are rooted in Eurocentric autonomous constructions of human nature.

Feminist Natural Law Traditions
For a feminist engagement in the natural law tradition, there are hardly works that are
more influential than Lisa Cahill and Christina Traina. Both Cahill and Traina believe that there
is an enduring value that natural law approaches to ethics have for feminist ethics. Cahill
believes that a revised natural law is important to the feminist moral claim that women are owed
certain substantive material goods and protection of wellbeing. She acknowledges that there are a
variety and multiplicity of human goods and that a natural law theory that is attentive to the
needs of women must root itself in an ongoing process of action and reflection. 148 As such,
Cahill critiques understandings of natural law that posit a human nature that impose universal
self-evident, essential, necessary, and mandatory features of human beings. Such static
constructions of human nature, she argues, must give feminists pause. Yet, given the atrocities
committed in the twentieth century in the wake of the holocaust, Cahill argues that human rights
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make it possible for people to know that there are some practices and deeds that are crimes
against humanity. Looking at Susan Thistlethwaite's claim against violence against women, there
needs to be substantive categories that claim violence against women is always and everywhere
wrong and that it must be stopped. Cahill discusses that first and foremost a feminist
understanding of natural law must be attentive to differences in understanding practical reason.
Reason as a static category cannot be applied to everyone everywhere. 149 Reason must first and
foremost be rooted in experience.
The relationship between reason and experience is where Cahill finds common ground
with Aquinas’ construction of natural law. Cahill discusses the three central inclinations of
Aquinas found in his Summa I-II 94.2. Cahill appreciates how Aquinas’ thought is social,
emphasizes the value of creation, and relies on scripture. Mainly, Cahill thinks that natural law
and feminist theory can understand one another in the process of discerning from experience,
beginning from the ground up. For both feminists and Aquinas, coming to know the good is an
experiential process. Beginning from different experiences, feminists believe one can get to
know the good. Deciding which bodily capacities, which human desires, and which social
relationships constitute authentic goods are the central questions for feminist’s moral
discernment. For feminists, it is important to not only take the experiences of women as a
starting point but to put priority on the experiences of women for discerning moral goods. 150
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Natural law’s claim to universality is strengthened by prioritizing what constitutes the human
good from the perspective of women.
Experience is also central for Christina Traina’s feminist ethics and natural law. She
discusses the dangers of essentializing women’s experiences which can lead to the negation of
some women’s experience over others. Traina believes that discussing experiences of women
must always be attentive to nuance and difference. For example, Traina suggests that it would be
appropriative for a white woman to use an African American spiritual to frame her own
oppression. 151 Thus Traina suggests, “experience can divide and oppress rather than unite.” 152
For Traina, “Instead, feminists must limit themselves to examining particular emancipatory
practices in their concrete social and religious contexts.” 153As such, Traina dives into the
differences between several types of feminisms.
Traina critiques feminism’s liberal, naturalist, and deconstructivist iterations. For
Traina, liberalism focuses on an uncritical view of the autonomous subject, a too thin notion of
the good, ignores embodiment, and ignores the fact that, “the female body in particular might
bring anything uniquely valuable to the human project of living well.” 154 For Traina, feminism
must include strong, thick definitions of the good for human flourishing. On the other hand,
naturalist iterations of feminism may be too quick to codify social norms of oppression through
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focusing on is-ought similarities. Traina states that in contradiction to naturalist tendencies,
“human fixities do not point clearly and inexorably toward a single, richly described end.” 155
Traina argues that Deconstructionist feminism is not able to provide an ethic because it
deconstructs any possibility to make normative claims of justice. For example, Traina argues that
Judith Butler's move to disassociate sex and gender from the body becomes problematic because
to move away from normative categories of identity is itself a move away from any normative
claim of justice that one makes based on the exclusion of some bodies over others, “in short,
although social constructionism grounds a healthy much needed ethical critique, it cannot by
itself produce an ethic.” 156 Thus, Traina suggests feminists need natural law in order to make
normative claims against injustice.
For Traina, natural law, starting with Aquinas, provides rich discussion in which feminist
ethics can dialogue in order to make normative claims of justice. The value of Aquinas for
Traina is that Aquinas emphasizes the idea that nature is open potentiality toward its supernatural
ends. Thus, human goods participate in the eternal good. For Traina, Aquinas roots natural law in
telic and dynamic anthropology. Since human good must be discerned, natural law makes use of
practical reason over speculative reason because human contexts change. As such, Traina claims
that reason must work through what thoughts and actions are best suited to reach natural ends
and to what degree. 157 Categories such as the common good are crucial because human beings
are social and must work through practical reason in the context of human communities. Thus,
for Traina, Individual flourishing requires social institutions and social institutions require
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individual flourishing for legitimation. 158 Traina sees critical principals in feminist ethics that
can be read as parallel to Aquinas’ natural law including legitimate self-interest, embodiment,
and the common good. Although there are substantial changes in anthropology the principals are
similar. 159 Critical for Traina’s appreciation of Aquinas from a feminist perspective is that
Aquinas’ anthropology is dynamic, his reason for natural law is practical and embodied, and that
community and individual flourishing are interdependent.
Discussing modern proportionalist natural law theories, Traina writes favorably on
casuistry because it requires drawing principles from specific situations. This requires practical
reason akin to feminist embodied knowledge. Traina frames her discussion on proportionalism
by discussing the thought of Joseph Fuch and Richard McCormick. Fuch’s theory of natural law
is rooted in transcendental Thomism. He argues that a person is not judged by individual acts but
whether one is fundamentally open to the absolute. Moral wisdom exists within concrete acts as
an individual strives to the absolute. Thus, the role of the Catholic magisterium should not
prescribe specific acts but provide principles in which one can orient their actions in given
situations. 160 Fuchs proportionalism is valuable for Traina because it is essentially oriented
toward general ends while maintaining space for a variety of concrete actions. Traina states
Fuch’s thought is valuable for feminist’s ethics because it provides, “for a meaningful return of
power for moral reasoning to the individual conscience: the objectivity of the alert person in the
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concrete situation.” 161 By placing the capacity to moral reason in concrete situations, feminist
can adopt such constructions of natural law because it provides a framework to address concrete
forms of oppression.
The dynamic construction of natural law that provides for a variety of options for
concrete acts is also found in McCormick’s thought. McCormick suggests that rather than natural
law primarily assessing acts in their ability to prevent evil, one should look at it as the pursuit of
the good. One should seek that which provides the most good in individual contexts. Moral
norms are ideals in which to strive but falling short of these ideals does not lead to ontic evils.
Thus, people can make decisions that are not always the ideal so that they can pursue
proportionate moral value. Traina appreciates such a framework because, “the ‘proportionate, but
not ideal’ label that results has the practical effect of approving the action without altering the
content of the troublesome norm.”

162

McCormick’s proportionalism, like Fuch’s transcendental

Thomism, provides a space for multiple concrete actions to be assessed from within the contexts
of particular situations with the realization that not all situations provide the contours for ideal
ethical norms.
In moving from feminist critique to constructing a feminist ethic, Traina lists the
importance of the natural law for a feminist ethics. The first contribution of natural law is the
importance of a comprehensive ethic that demands an encompassing telos. For Traina, a feminist
ethic must have a telos that meaningfully connects the many dimensions of the good. A natural
law and feministic ethic first views persons as fundamentally good and whole. A telic
anthropology also justifies a person acting in their self-interest. Natural law enforced by virtue
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theory also shows that the moral life is not only about acting rightly but acting in relationship to
a variety of human goods. Especially important for feminist ethics, is the valuation of natural
law’s positive construction of the body as a condition of temporal human flourishing. For Traina,
telic natural law combined with feminist perspectives posits an ethic that is neither overly
determinative nor irrelevant. She claims that natural law and feminist ethics can work together to
redress moral injustices and posit a positive construction of human flourishing.

Black Natural Law
As far as black natural law is concerned, Vincent Lloyd constructs black natural law as
its own tradition in the United States. His claim is that black natural law, when engaged,
collectively catalyzes social movements and offers a critique of the wisdom of the world. In
establishing a black natural law tradition in its own terms, Lloyd pluralizes understandings of
nature. Black natural law offers a complex view of the human person that leads to the inclusion
of emotion, community, and provides a critique of the wisdom of the world.
Lloyd discusses Frederick Douglass as one of the first to espouse a black natural law
tradition. In particular, Douglass makes appeals to moral absolutes in his reaction to the Dred
Scott case. 163 He makes appeals to a higher court than the Supreme Court. 164 As a strong
rhetorician Frederick Douglass was one to understand natural law theory as rooted in both reason
and emotion. Natural law for Douglass was not just a proposition of moral principles but a
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movement of people to a more just world. Douglas had a strong interest in catalyzing social
movements which push for justice wherever it would be most effective. Within Douglass’ own
personal narrative of resistance, Douglass believed that his confrontation with the man who was
appointed to whip him allowed him to see his resistance was constitutive of his humanity. For
Douglas, it is human nature to resist unjust structures and slavery is a transgression of nature. 165
Douglass suggests that part of human nature is to resist being reduced to anything, especially
objects. For Douglass, irreducibility is the main element of human nature. While acknowledging
that the higher law is self-evident, one can still have a distorted view of human nature because of
learned prejudice, custom, and superstition. By learning to perceive our nature rightly as one
that transcends any description through using reason and emotion, one can see that black natural
law demands freedom, equality, and the inherent value of human life.
Next, Lloyd discusses Anna Julia Cooper who believes that women have a privileged
position to discern natural law. Black women, in particular, have an important position in respect
to natural law. Cooper thinks that our emotional lives are central to who we are. Alongside
emotion, the longing for future possibility shapes our nature and is constitutive of natural law.
Because of the centralized role of possibility, for Cooper, the best perspective in the world is that
of a child because a child rests in the future and possibility. As we grow the dynamism of a child
is weighed down by learned cultural prejudices and inhibitors. In other words, human nature is
oriented toward future possibility, but humans forget that nature. Cooper’s analysis of oppression
illustrates how political norms can be deeply rooted in normalized violence and can be
overlooked when business interests dictate the terms of the conversation. Coopers’ natural law
emphasizes the role of women’s voices as being unique with respect to understanding natural
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law. Lloyd states, “Cooper privileges all women in her account of natural law, but she thinks
black women have a doubly important role. Given the oppression faced by blacks, the need to
combat unjust laws is all the stronger--so the need for black children to be raised well is all the
greater.” 166 She sees women as the primary teachers and formers of sentiment and therefore have
a responsibility for forming the world into a better place through the raising of children, teaching
of others, and forming critical policies. Any laws that take away a person's voice is wrong.
When discussing Du Bois, Lloyd frames him as a nonreligious writer who uses religious
rhetoric. Lloyd suggests that Du Bois be understood as a natural law theorist because he makes
normative judgments. Du Bois charges blacks with using their insight to change the world and,
“implicitly argues that this can be done by attempting to implement natural law.” 167 Du Bois’s
use of natural law starts from a scientific framework. For Du Bois, empirical and historical
evidence provided groundwork to see how human actions can have an important effect on the
world. Du Bois’s description of human nature consists of all that is human and makes
approximations to human nature rather than static concepts. Du Bois’s work Souls of Black Folk
can be seen as offering insights into the human soul or human nature gleaned from the
experience of black life. 168 Part of this experience is Du Bois’s understanding of double
consciousness and suffering oppression. Suffering these conditions gave insight into what it
means to be human and into humanity's capability to resist oppression. For Du Bois, humanity
can be seen most clearly in blacks and natural law can be most clearly discerned. For Du Bois,
God is black. In Du Bois’s analysis of John Brown, he posits that John Brown was to advance
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natural law by putting himself on the line by sacrificing his privileges of whiteness and
sacrificing his life. Through organization, critique, and educating children, one can begin to
implement natural law.
Lloyd illustrates that Martin Luther King Jr leans heavily on a natural law tradition to
fight against racial injustice, segregation, and poverty. His most notable contribution to the black
natural law tradition is his letter from Birmingham jail. However, King used natural law
language from his earliest speeches and writings. Lloyd seeks to treat King’s work as
performative rather than referential and seeks to treat King’s oratory as “doing” natural law.
King uses oratory to evoke feelings and to break illusions and confusions about the human
person. For King, his protests and in particular his protests in Montgomery were opportunities
for ordinary people to reflect and work toward justice. For King, his sense of human unity was
not only political but also a religious principle. 169 King thought natural law was progressive and
that calculation was important to implement the demands of justice. For example, the
Montgomery bus boycott was not started to fight for integrated seating on busses but to hire
more black bus drivers. King framed his struggle for justice as calculation and disciplined action
and that these actions are directed by God in the framework of his love. King focused on the
movement itself rather than the consequences of what's been achieved. Rather, it is in the
movement towards justice that humans participate in the divine, “it is through social movement
that natural law manifests.” 170 King believed that natural law was respect for the dignity of the
human personality. He then switched to a more practical idiom; unjust laws were those where a
majority enforces a code on the minority which is not binding on itself. This type of unjust law
169
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was what King thought segregation enacted. In asking if segregationists could fight against
Brown v. Board, King suggested that it was not possible to practice civil disobedience because it
has to do with laws imposed by the majority on a minority without the consent of that minority.
Lloyd discusses the decline of the black natural law tradition and begins with discussing
how Martin Luther King’s bust contains the word “love” but does not contain the words “law” or
“black”. Lloyd laments that ideology critique which is central to the natural law tradition is often
no longer part of the conversation in natural law. This has been, in part, due to the rise of black
intellectual elites taught at white institutions. Lloyd argues that after the civil rights movement,
the rise of the black power movement made higher law rhetoric simply a means of political aims.
The use of natural law outside a comprehensive context led to bracketing moral questions and
using natural law for political gains. On the other end, some like Jesse Jackson, water down
King’s rhetoric for the sake of political gain. 171 Lloyd critiques James Baldwin, Audre Lorde,
and bell hooks for making use of emotion without the context of reason and voiding emotion of
all content and nuance. On the other end, Lloyd critiques Clarence Thomas, Alan Keyes, and
Ben Carson for reducing black natural law to individual reason without social critique. Natural
law for Thomas, Keyes, and Carson become an effort for Black self-improvement. Critiquing
Louis Farrakhan and Barack Obama’s pragmatism, Lloyd suggests they trade prophetic social
critique for political gain.
In his conclusion, Lloyd critiques Afro-pessimism, a movement that seeks to discredit the
claims of western metaphysics or theology because they are entrenched in the commitment to the
dehumanization of black bodies. But for Lloyd with no criteria by which to know justice all that
is left is to pray or retreat into memories or memoirs. Central to natural law is ideology critique
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and social movement organizing. The challenge of the racist legal system is an opportunity to
confirm and refine black natural law. Lloyd also claims black natural law is beyond secularism
and multiculturalism. Lloyd suggests that natural law has been obscured by secularism and
multiculturalism. He suggests multi-culturalism purports to embrace race but only if it can be
managed. 172 The problem with multiculturalism is that there is no way to adjudicate what counts
as a social problem or discern the relative urgency of social problems. Multiculturalism moves
away from normative claims and does damage to marginalized communities that seek normative
protections and rights against injustice. Lloyd suggests that black natural law should be viewed
as a tradition, and such a tradition is not to make any claims about the biology of race or the
significance of skin color. It is to pick out a set of practices and communities that set the
standards for rationality. Part of this tradition of black natural law is the essential ineffability of
every human. For Lloyd, “the process of discerning natural law is a process of working that
ineffable point indefinitely, always failing but trying to fail better.” 173 For Lloyd, there are
normative claims that can only be discerned through the epistemic privilege of the black
community. Because there are normative claims the black natural law tradition can engage in
ideology critique and social movement organizing.

“Multiculturalism purports to embrace race, but only if it can be managed, can take on
a comfortable, controllable form. Race is reduced to culture, frightening skin tones converted to
a festival of colors, ordered properly in a joyful rainbow. I contend that multiculturalism hampers
black politics just as secularism hampers higher law, limiting its role in politics.” Lloyd, Black
Natural Law, 152.
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Queer Natural Law
Recently Craig Ford has advocated for discussing natural law at the intersection of queer
theory and queer theology. Ford’s queer natural law adopts the “eudaemonistic , realist, and
teleological emphasis” of Aquinas’ natural law tradition while also advocating that the natural
law tradition, “stands in need of queer thought.” 174 Natural law can dialogue with queer theory in
order to counteract the tendency to view human nature through hegemonic heteronormativity.
Queer theory also provides natural law with a way to, “institutionalize a constant dissatisfaction
with its own set of ethical prescriptions rendered at any historical moment, through the
recognition of the need to revise those prescriptions as new movements of the Holy Spirit.” 175
Not only does Ford seek foundations for a queer natural law but also draws from feminist natural
law traditions and revisionist natural law traditions that emphasizes the moral tradition as a
capacity of human reason.
Central to Ford’s account of natural law and a queer natural law is a teleological account
of human flourishing. Ford argues that without a teleological account, “it is impossible to
determine what will allow a human being to thrive in a moral sense unless and until one also gets
an idea of what a human being is supposed to do and what a human being is supposed to be.” 176
Despite what Ford calls postmodern objections to a teleological account with a “queer
inflection”, Ford believes that it is possible to develop, “a normative account of human
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flourishing that is adequate to meet these objections.” 177 Ford believes these objections to
teleological accounts of human nature present more of an argument as to whether or not must
accept moral antirealism is true. What Ford suggests is that to have any moral belief at all is to
reject such an antirealism. A queer natural law takes the postmodern critiques about the
contingency of knowledge and metanarratives seriously and requires its natural law method to
always be susceptible to revision and that truth is rooted in its social and discursive context. 178
For Ford, one must first acknowledge that one’s knowledge is always limited by the context in
which it is produced, and thus normative accounts of human flourishing must always be open to
revision and must always posit itself in contingent terms.
As a result, the promise of queer natural law is that it provide possibilities for what it
might look like when heteronormativity’s hegemonic claim on universal knowledge is
decentered and what might it look like to “allow ourselves to think of a common life that draws
normative significance from the lives and loves that are marginalized within what Lauren Berlant
and Michael Warner call ‘heterosexual culture’.” 179 By reevaluating what constitutes the good
life within heteronormative hegemonic discourse, queer natural law forces discussions about the
good life to take into account what constitutes the virtue of justice as “a substantive notion of the
value of equality” and make critical evaluations of the world based on those whose way of life
are most marginalized within it, queer theory gives to the natural law tradition a more careful
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way to go about making comprehensive assessments of human nature.” 180 Through natural law’s
traditional understanding of human nature as one that excludes the LGBTQ community; queer
natural law creates the space to see that human flourishing can only be called flourishing when it
is available for all humanity.

Conclusion
We began this chapter by stating that all natural law constructions are rooted in a particular
context and tradition. Moreover, each natural law tradition in turn constructs its own notion of
the natural. While the United States natural law tradition has proclaimed itself to be autonomous
and universal, following its European progenitors, it was in fact rooted in a framework that
sought to privilege its imperialist and colonial policies through racist constructions of human
nature and constructions that emphasized property ownership. In so doing, the marginalization of
black, Latinx, and indigenous populations were justified by their own natural law constructions.
We also illustrated how these constructions continued through the adoption of New Natural Law
frameworks.
In order to find a framework within Western thought that was able to make space for
Latinx contributions we discussed the promising research found in revisionist discussions of
natural law and human rights. In particular, the revisionist thought of Jean Porter and Linda
Hogan was particularly helpful in establishing a discussion about natural law and human rights
that did not presume abstract, autonomous, and universalized reason but sought to place context
and situated knowledge as crucial to natural law thought. Through seeing that natural law and

180

Ford, “Foundations”, 287.

92

human rights is always and already contexted, the use of context to begin moral discernment
provides the space for Latinx communities to do natural law within their own contexts.
The examples of contextual natural law in feminist, black, and queer iterations provided a
framework in which one can draw examples on how to do natural law thinking within particular
contexts. Their effort to frame human nature as dynamic, open, attentive to emotions, and always
open to revision is useful for Latinx theology because of its refusal to be essentialized into static
cultural categories. Doing natural law from within a particular context contests the universalized
and dangerous presumptions of Eurocentric and U.S. natural law traditions by illustrating that
they themselves are context-dependent. Our next chapter is all about the Latinx context in which
a natural law discussion can be derived. We will discuss the fact that since the construction of
Latin America, as an epistemological category, natural law has played a part, either positively or
negatively. We will discuss the part natural law played in the Valladolid debates concerning the
Spanish exploitation and abuse of Amerindians. We will argue that within the Spanish tradition
of natural law discourse, there exists a subversive natural law that contests Spanish
colonialization. This natural law was rooted in community, the imago dei, and solidarity with
Indigenous communities. The revisionist and contextual natural law theologians have
emphasized the importance of context and the next chapter will seek to develop a Latinx natural
law reasoning by first providing the context in which it has and can continue to develop.
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Chapter 2: Natural Law in the Latin American Context
Introduction
Discussing the role of natural law in Latinx social ethics, we have illustrated how the American
natural law tradition, rather than rooted in natural law derived from Aquinas and older sources,
finds its sources primarily in the enlightenment-modern traditions of the 16th-18th centuries. The
American tradition of natural law has been used to justify various systematic forms of oppression
against communities of color, Indigenous communities, and the Latinx community. We also
stated that these constructions of natural law found in the American natural law tradition are
positioned as universal and as normative for all cultures. This positioning, in actuality, is simply
a Euroamerican provincial construction of both human nature and the natural world. In order to
construct a natural law that is helpful for the liberation of Latinx communities in the United
States, it is necessary to find resources in history that were used to help those communities under
oppression. In situating Latinx natural law within the historical narrative context of Spanish
natural law theories, we will see that it contrasts Euroamerican natural law theories in its
emphasis on natural law being rooted in community, the imago dei, and solidarity with
Indigenous communities.
This chapter primarily engages in a method of ressourcement. Ressourcement was a
movement of German and French theologians who sought to return the Catholic Church to its
sources. As Gemma Simmonds states, “The primary purpose of ressourcement movement of the
twentieth-century France was a theological and spiritual renewal based on a return to the original
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sources of Christian tradition, namely scripture, the Fathers, and liturgy.” 1 Ressourcement is
known by its proponents such as Henri de Lubac, Yves Congar, Jean Danielou, Hans Urs Von
Balthasar, and Joseph Ratzinger. While much work has been done to resource the writers of the
early Catholic Church, primarily in their Greek, Syriac, and Roman traditions, little has been
done to engage in the Iberian, Hispanic, and Latinx traditions of the early, Medieval, and
Renaissance periods. 2 Gary Macy has illustrated that the relative absence of the Iberian,
Hispanic, and Latinx traditions from “mainstream theology” is a result of historical bias that
emphasizes some cultures over others. In other words, “history is what historians decide it is”
and theology in the United States has emphasized theologies from France, Germany, and Italy
over Hispanic and Iberian theologies. 3 However, to suggest that Iberian, Hispanic, and Latinx
theology is out of the mainstream is to ignore history. Macy argues that “on the contrary, it is the
heir of an ancient tradition that was greatly responsible not only for the preservation of the
Western European tradition and learning, but also was one of the most influential creators of that
tradition and that learning.” 4 Thus for Macy, “mainstream theology is shorthand for hegemonic
theology” and the absence of Iberian, Hispanic, and Latinx theology is the result of choices not
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to include them. 5 The exclusion of these theologies has also resulted in a relative absence of the
Iberian, Hispanic, and Latinx contributions to contemporary natural law conversations.
One reason that Iberian, Hispanic, and Latinx contributions to theology and natural law
have been excluded is the prevalence of the black legend. The black legend is the understanding
of colonial history that portrayed Spain and its colonial practices as particularly evil. While
Spanish cruelty is an absolute fact and is attested to by its own historians and theologians, such
claims are often embedded in anti-Spanish and Iberian propaganda by Northern European and
English colonial competition. 6 While painting Spanish colonialism as particularly evil, English,
French, and German colonial practices are often portrayed as more gentle and paternalistic. As
Mignolo states,
The ‘Black Legend’ of Spanish corruption, which the British initiated to
demonize the Spanish Empire in a ploy to get a grip on the Atlantic
economy during the seventeenth century, was a part of a European family
feud over the economic, political, and intellectual (in the general sense of
accumulation and control of knowledge including science and technology,
of course) riches of the “New World. 7
The Spanish black legend also influenced how modern history viewed the colonial practices of
the Spanish in comparison to the English. While the Spanish are seen to be particularly cruel and
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“gold seekers,” the English are referred to as seekers of liberty. 8 Spanish conquest is seen to be
particularly cruel while English conquest is seen to be a necessity.
On the other hand, the emphasis on the bias created by the black legend can be used to
gloss over the cruelty of the Spanish against the Indigenous communities of Latin America. For
example, José Vasconcelos’ posits the origins of mestizaje as a result of Iberian “emphatic love”
for Indigenous women. Vasconcelos glosses over the violent raping and pillaging of Indigenous
people and culture and radically misrepresents Spanish conquest and colonization. 9 The
willingness of the Spanish to engage in sexual relations with Indigenous women has resulted in
the understanding that while the Spanish were, “just as racist and superior-minded as other
Europeans...they were not racial purists.” 10 Moreover, the resulting mestizaje is often portrayed
in early Latinx theology in a positive light without acknowledging it as a result of violence and
conquest. 11 The black legend either furthers anti-Iberian, Hispanic, and Latinx bias in order to
gloss over Northern European colonial violence or masks the violence done by the Spanish
conquest of South America. Acknowledging both positions is integral to getting a clear picture
on why there is a general absence of the Iberian, Hispanic and Latinx contributions to theology
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and natural law. Acknowledging both understandings of the black legend guards against the
trend in ressourcement theology of idealizing particular periods of the past while ignoring their
faults.
Regardless of the reasons for the exclusion of Iberian and Hispanic Catholicism from the
method of ressourcement, resourcing these traditions are necessary if one is to engage in a Latinx
ethic for several reasons. First, resourcing an Iberian or Hispanic theology and natural law
provides a framework in which the ethical is embedded in the religious practices of the Latinx
community. The integration between the religious and ethical is integral to Latinx ethical
frameworks and natural law traditions. Roberto Goizueta has illustrated that, “Catholic
ressourcement thus demands a retrieval of those popular religious traditions that, while perhaps
not always recognized in the official theological and liturgical texts of teachings of the Church
are nevertheless an integral part of the sensus fidei…” 12 This integration between religious
practice and natural law frameworks helps situate the fact that Bartolomé de Las Casas’ religious
conversion to solidarity with the marginalized Indigenous community was rooted in both a
devotional and liturgical reading of scripture and an appreciation of legal reasoning. Rather than
seeing ethics and theology as separate and disparate categories, engaging with Iberian and
Hispanic Catholicism provides a framework in which religious systems ground ethical paradigms
and the ethical gives real world saliency to the religious.
A second reason why a ressourcement of Iberian and Hispanic Catholicism is necessary
in our discussions about Latinx natural law is that Iberian and Hispanic culture is integral for
Latinx identity. For the Latinx community, “The Spanish-American Roman Catholic Church is
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part of the common background of all Hispanics--if not personally, then at least in our
ancestry.” 13 The history of the Latinx community is rooted in the Spanish and Portuguese
conquests of the Americas. The mixture of identity and the occupation of multiple social spaces
forms Latinidad. Latinx identity is a mixture of Spanish, Portuguese, Indigenous, and African
cultural realities. The social location of Latinx identity is rooted in the concept of mestizaje, inbetweenness, and borderland epistemologies. 14 There is no monolithic construction of Latinidad,
and oftentimes, we occupy the space of both the oppressor and the oppressed, the colonizer and
the colonized. So, to ignore both the positive and negative aspects of the natural law discussions
of Iberian and Hispanic Catholicism is to ignore a part of our multilayered and pluralistic
ancestral history that takes seriously both the role of conquest and colonization and the varying
tools used in the quest for liberation from oppression.
Finally, one of the major reasons to engage in a ressourcement of Iberian and Hispanic
Catholicism and natural law discourse is that while the 15th-19th centuries are marked by
conquest and violence, the Iberian and Hispanic Catholic traditions were the only traditions that
questioned the ethics of colonization of North and South America. As Gustavo Gutiérrez states
in his study on Las Casas, “It is important, however, to remember that Spain alone had the
courage to hold a comprehensive debate on the ethics and morality of the European presence in
the Indies. In the other countries of the old world, the right to occupy these lands was regarded as
too obvious to be questioned.” 15 Many of the dissenting voices in the debates about conquest
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used natural law as a resource for resisting the violence against the Indigenous communities of
the Americas. Theologians under the Salamanca school advocated for the Indigenous rights of
freedom and property. Theologians such as Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, and
Bartolomé de Las Casas advocated for Indigenous rights using the canonical and juridical
traditions of Aquinas and scholastic natural law reasoning. This is not to say that discussions of
natural law did not have negative effects, one only needs to look at the arguments of Juan Ginés
de Supélveda to see negative contributions of natural law. 16 Yet, engaging the Hispanic and
Iberian Catholic traditions forces one to engage in the messy work of ressourcement that forces
us to not idealize the past but come to terms with violent histories.
We will begin our work of ressourcement with the encounter between Spain and the
Indigenous communities of South America. In particular, we will engage the natural law
discussions surrounding the colonization, violence, and the rights of the Amerindians by the
Salamanca school and the Valladolid debate. The discussion of natural law within the Salamanca
school and the Valladolid debate on behalf of the Indigenous communities of Latin America
provide a structure of resistance using the scholastic understanding of natural law in which they
were embedded.
We start with the encounter between the Indigenous communities and the Spanish
because to focus primarily on an Indigenous epistemology while not actually occupying such a
space would be appropriative in this dissertation. To assume that there is a type of natural law
that is rooted purely in Indigenous epistemologies would be to colonize such epistemologies. We
begin with this point of contact because the clash of these cultures provides a matrix in which
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truth can be discerned from an already given situation. In other words, the reality of colonization
and mixture of cultures has already occurred and thus it is important to work within these
relationships to form liberative structures that acknowledge a disparate relational power. From a
Latinx perspective where mestizaje is not only a cultural reality but an ancestral reality, the
ability to speak from a position of pure indigeneity is not possible. For many in the Latinx
community, as stated earlier, we occupy a space that is simultaneously colonizer and colonized.
Thus, a framework that does not acknowledge its own complicity in colonization and its own
pain from being colonized does not speak to the multifaceted reality that Latinx communities
face. As a result, it is important that the place of ressourcement begins in the place where this
multifaceted and pluriform reality begins, in the mixture of these cultures.

The Salamanca School and Colonial Conquest
The children’s song “1492” about Columbus’ “discovery” of America has a series of
couplets that begins, “In 1492/Columbus sailed the Ocean Blue” and continues to sing about the
bravery of Columbus sailing “day and night”. It teaches that, “The Arakawa natives were very
nice/and gave the sailors food and spice” and that “Columbus sailed on to find some gold/To
bring back home, as he'd been told” ending with “He made the trip again and again/Trading gold
to bring to Spain.” The violence enacted by Columbus and his men against the native population
is curiously absent from this rhyme. Yet it is commonly known that “nearly everything the
Spaniards did created havoc on the Indigenous population.” 17 The establishment of
repartiemento and the encomienda system alongside the introduction of new diseases by the
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Spanish, wreaked havoc on the native population. By the 1600s, the Indigenous population
declined by 56 million. 18 The encounters between the Spanish and the Indigenous communities
of the Americas marks one of the greatest tragedies and the greatest loss of life in history.
Bartolomé de Las Casas, a Dominican priest, who knew Columbus, wrote about the
cruelty of the Spanish. The encounter between the Spanish and the Indigenous communities
were, “followed by acts of extreme violence, cruelty, and exploitation, with the Amerindians
suffering at the hands of the Spanish conquistadors.” 19 The treatment of the natives by the
Spanish was so cruel that Las Casas doubted the humanity of the Spanish stating, “that not a few
of the people involved in this story had become so anaesthetized to human suffering by their own
greed and ambition that they had ceased to be men in any meaningful sense of the term and had
become, by dint of their own wicked deeds, so totally degenerate and given over to a reprobate
mind…” 20 According to Las Casas the Spanish,
Forced their way into native settlements, slaughtering everyone they found
there, including small children, old men, pregnant women, and even
women who had just given birth. They hacked them to pieces, slicing open
their bellies with their swords as though they were so many sheep herded
into a pen. They even laid wagers on whether they could manage to slice a
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man in two at a stroke, or cut an individual’s head from his body, or
disembowel him with a single blow from their actions. 21
When asked how the Spanish could be so cruel to these Indigenous communities, Las Casas
replied, “the reason the Christians have murdered on such a vast scale and killed anyone and
everyone in their way is purely and simply greed.” 22 Las Casas recounts a story about a local
ruler named Hatüey fleeing from Haiti to Cuba to warn other Indigenous tribes of the coming of
the Spanish. Having heard of the cruelty of the Spanish, these communities asked whether or not
the Spanish were simply cruel and evil. According to Las Casas, Hatüey responded, “They [the
Spanish] have a God whom they worship and adore, and it is in order to get that God from us so
that they can worship him that they conquer us and kill us” and pointing to a basket of gold
jewelry, Hatüey finished “Here is the God of the Christians.” 23 According to Las Casas, the
greed and cruelty was so great that even if the Spanish were to preach the Gospel of Christ, their
actions so muddied their preaching that the natives thought the Spanish worshipped gold.
Despite the fact that most of the Spanish conquistadors and encomenderos committed
heinous crimes against the Indigenous population, there were some Spanish priests and former
encomenderos who stood in solidarity with the Indigenous populations and were voices of
dissent within the Spanish Empire. Las Casas, as we will discuss below, was a former
encomendero who became a priest and worked in solidarity with the Indigenous community. He
would later be called, “protector of the Indians”. Las Casas, himself, owed his own conversion to
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solidarity with the Amerindians to a sermon preached by a Dominican priest named Antonio de
Montesinos in 1511.
On the fourth Sunday of Advent, Montesino preached a sermon that condemned the
unjust treatment of the Indigenous communities. Montesino preached with passion proclaiming
to the Spanish, “You are all in mortal sin! You live in it and you die in it! Why? Because of the
cruelty and tyranny you use with these innocent people. Know for certainty that in the state in
which you are you can no more be saved than Moors or Turks who have not, nor wish to have,
the faith of Jesus Christ.” 24 After that sermon, colonists went to the religious superior, Pedro de
Córdoba, threatening to do violence to Montesinos unless he recanted his teachings. The
following Sunday, Montesino reaffirmed his teaching to the chagrin of the encomenderos and
conquistadors. Gustavo Gutiérrez correctly states that, “after Montesinos sermon, there was no
possibility of invincible ignorance as to the injustice with which the Spaniards had proceeded.” 25
Among Montesino were other preachers such as Luis Beltrán, Gil González de San Nicolás, and
Pedro Clever who worked in solidarity with the Amerindians. 26 It is quite clear that there were
two Christianities at work in the encounter between the Indigenous communities and the Spanish
conquistadores. A Christianity that was numb to the violence enacted against the natives and a
Christianity that stood with a voice of dissent with those who were crucified by the Spanish
empire.
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Not only were preachers and former encomenderos ones to voice dissent against the cruel
treatment of the Amerindians, but also theologians and jurists in Spain itself understood the
treatment of the Indigenous communities to be incompatible with Christianity. These jurists and
theologians, who would form what is commonly called the Salamanca school, would use the
Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law tradition they received to offer voices of dissent from within
the Spanish Empire. 27 These theologians and jurists, “defended against the grain that: men were
created free and equal; considering the substantial unity of the human species, there was no such
thing as natural slavery for them in a strict sense but only a legal one; [and that] power was
constitutive of all human communities..” 28 Their thought undergirded much of the theoretical
defense against injustice of the Amerindians where their thought, “laid the groundwork for the
concept of offense against the human species – which we call today crimes against humanity.” 29
Through providing theoretical frameworks from within the received Thomistic tradition, these
theologians and jurists were able to establish voices of dissent from within the Spanish Empire
and among those that held political power. It is this proximity to power and the shrewd use of the
empire’s own theology against itself that allowed there to be tangible, although temporary,
change to the conditions of the Amerindians. The thought of the Salamanca school would not
only form the basis for limited change among the conditions of the native populations but would

The Salamanca School as a group of theologians and jurists gets its name from the fact
that many of these theologians and jurists came from the University of Salamanca. To include
theologians from other universities some have called this group the school of peace (paz). We
will use the terminology of the school of Salamanca for the sake of maintaining a single
conceptual framework with other research.
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also be a theoretical groundwork for Latin American independence movements and later
liberation theology.
Francisco de Vitoria
One of the first defenders of the Amerindians from within the Spanish empire was
Francisco de Vitoria who was considered to be one of the founders of the Salamanca school’s
theories of natural law. Born in 1483, Vitoria was educated in Paris and taught at the University
of Valladolid. He came to theological prominence when he was elected to be the chair of
theology at the University of Salamanca where he influenced many natural lawyers, canonists,
and theologians including Domingo de Soto, Melchor Cano, Francisco Suárez and Juan Luis
Molina. He also had a decisive influence on the Dominican theologian and Bishop of Chiapas,
Bartolomé de Las Casas. Most importantly, for our discussions about Latinx natural law, Vitoria
was one of the first theologians to provide a theoretical defense of the American Indigenous
communities using natural law and Roman Catholic theology. Because of Vitoria’s discussions
about the role of the Spanish and the rights of the Amerindians, Vitoria became known as one of
the founders of international law. 30 While his thought may not have always worked toward the
favor of Indigenous rights, for example, he believed that there were some conditions in which
Spanish colonialism could be justified, he ultimately left the Spanish, “only a slender claim to
jurisdiction (dominium iurisdictionis) in America, but no property rights whatsoever.” 31 Vitoria’s

While Hugo Grotius is also considered a founder in international law, the two could not
be more different. While Grotius founded his international law on the acquisition of colonial
property, Vitoria focused on what constituted a commonwealth and questioned whether Spanish
rule in the Americas was valid. While Grotius’ theories undergirded colonization, Vitoria’s
questioned its validity.
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use of natural law and theology provides a theoretical framework in which those who are both
committed to a Roman Catholic natural law framework and the preservation of Indigenous rights
can work in solidarity with the voices of Indigenous communities. Thus, one can argue that there
are counterhegemonic lines of thinking that occur within the epistemology of Spanish
colonization and that these voices of dissent can be used when discussing contemporary systems
of oppression.
Vitoria roots his defense of the Amerindians in his understanding of civil power. For
Vitoria, civil power’s final cause, in a Thomistic sense, is out of natural necessity. Using
primitive biological observation, Vitoria posits that human nature is naturally sociable and that
this sociality was established in order to defend itself against predators. Humanity is sociable
because nature gave humanity reason and virtue. The emphasis on reason left humanity
defenseless when juxtaposed against brute strength and thus reason necessitated human
community. 32 The natural necessity of human community is thus considered for Vitoria a natural
law. Vitoria states, “that the primitive origin of human cities and commonwealths was not a
human invention or contrivance to be numbered among the artefacts of craft, but a device
implanted by Nature in man for his own safety and survival. 33 For Vitoria, since the final cause
of civil power is natural necessity, the efficient cause of civil power is God. Because natural law
participates in the eternal law, or that patterned framework in which God sets all existence, that

“So it was that, in order to make up for these natural deficiencies, mankind was obliged
to give up the solitary nomadic life of animals, and to live life in partnerships (Societatas), each
supporting the other” Francisco de Vitoria, “On Civil Power” 4.1 in Vitoria: Political Writings.
eds Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 7.
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which becomes a natural necessity is indirectly caused by the creator of the natural. 34 Yet, the
most important Thomistic cause of natural law being an avenue for defense of the Indigenous
rights is the material cause of civil power. For Vitoria, the material cause of civil power is the
commonwealth itself.
Vitoria understood civil government as directly emanating from the people. For Vitoria,
“Divine and natural law require there to be some power to govern the commonwealth, and since
in the absence of any divine law or human elective franchise (Suffragium) there is no convincing
reason why one man should have power more than another, it is necessary that this power be
vested in the community which must be able to provide for itself.” 35 As Pagden and Lawrence
aptly explain, “But if men possess a natural urge to live in society, the types of political societies
in which they live would seem to be their own devising. All civil power, for Vitoria, is vested in
the commonwealth (res publica), since, if all societies are natural organisms, it follows that no
individual could have held power prior to their formation (On Civil Power 1. 4, p. 11).” 36
Contrasting the conception of natural law of Locke and Grotius, who argue civil society is
necessary in order to protect each individual’s property, Vitoria proposes an alternative view in
which civil society is not simply protection of an individual’s nature. Rather, Vitoria sees
humanity’s natural capacity for community as a positive inclination of natural law. 37 For Vitoria,

34“If,

as we have shown, public power is founded upon natural law, and if natural law
acknowledges God as its only author, then it is evident that public power is from God…” Vitoria,
On Civil Power, Section 6.1, 10.
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Here Vitoria follows Aquinas’ third inclination of natural law that, “there is in man an
inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus,
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the most apt form of government is monarchy because it presents a unity of government as
opposed to the push and pull of timocracy and the multiple masters of aristocracy.
Although Vitoria supports monarchy as an ideal form of government, this does not mean
that the authority of the monarch is absolute. While Vitoria does believe that, “royal power is not
from the commonwealth, but from God himself…” that does mean that the monarch’s power is
absolute. Vitoria understands power (potestas) in two ways. The first is the understanding of
power as a capability; this is the power given by God to monarchs. The second understanding of
power as authority is given by the commonwealth to put monarchs in charge of civil government.
In other words, “Royal power, then, is a ‘capability’ and comes from God; but since such power
clearly cannot be exercised in a void, kings must receive their authority or executive power from
the community.” 38 This means that, “there is no question of two separate powers, one belonging
to the sovereign and the others to the community.” 39 So that while a King or Queen is given both
capability from God and authority from the people, this does not mean a King or Queen can do
as they wish. Regal power functions as, “the executor of positive law” while, “legislative power
itself resides with the commonwealth.” 40 The laws that a Queen or King promulgates must, “be
in accordance with the customs of the commonwealth for which they are intended.” 41 The power

man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society….” Aquinas,
Summa Theologica, II-II q 94.2
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of the monarch is then restricted to the authority of the commonwealth and to seek the common
good of the community.
Because a monarch’s authority is not a direct infusion of grace over a particular
community but derives from the transfer of authority to the monarch by the commonwealth,
Vitoria believes that it is impossible for non-Christians to lose the authority over their lands
because of a nonbelief. Vitoria states, “there can be no doubt at all the heathen have legitimate
rulers and masters” and “neither Christian sovereigns nor the church may deprive non-Christians
of their kingship or power on the grounds of their unbelief, unless they have committed some
other injustice.” 42 Because the non-Christian’s sovereign is rooted in the natural capacity for
humanity to organize itself in civil society and whose authority is derived from a commonwealth,
to replace or abrogate such sovereignty without the consent of the commonwealth would be
against natural law. It is important to note that at this time, Vitoria is discussing non-Christian
kingdoms in the middleeast during the crusades and not the Indigenous communities in America.
However, Victoria's same line of thought will later be applied to the Amerindians.
Not only is monarchy restricted, but Vitoria’s understanding of positive and natural law is
rooted in the authority of the commonwealth as well. For Vitoria, a law is only a law insofar as it
is oriented toward the common good. Further limiting the power of the monarch, a monarch
cannot institute a law that is oriented to procuring private goods but must always be oriented
toward the common good. 43 It is the role of the prince to be a servant of the commonwealth and
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“A prince may not invent a law which has no regard for the common good, since
otherwise the law will be tyrannical” Vitoria “On Law” in Vitoria: Political Writings. eds.
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such services include promulgating laws for its good. A law that either is not useful or does not
serve the good is not considered by Vitoria to be a true law. Vitoria states, “I assert that a law
cannot be against the common good, not only de iure but also de facto, because in that case the
law would be no law. If it were established that a law in no way concerned the common good,
that law should not be obeyed.” 44 Rather, “the law must take as its chief concern the common
good which is happiness (Beatitudeo).” 45 Because the commonwealth is considered a natural
good according to Aquinas’ third inclination of natural law, natural law itself cannot go against
the good of the commonwealth since it is natural law that brought it into existence. Positive law
participates in the natural law in that it is the commonwealth and its representatives that
promulgate positive laws. Thus, a neither a positive law nor a natural law can go against the
good of the commonwealth.
The restrictions on the role of law in its orientation toward the good of the
commonwealth becomes an important discussion when we discuss the encounter of two societies
and whose law takes precedent. In the encounter between the Spanish and the Indigenous
communities of the Americas, one must ask do the laws that take away the rights of the natives’
function as a true law since it is neither derived from nor looking out for the good of the natives?
The restricted power of monarchy and law in Vitoria’s thought is important because the authority
of the commonwealth transferred to the monarch becomes an important framework when Vitoria
discusses whether or not the Spanish monarchy can claim authority of the Indigenous
communities in the Americas and whether these laws are considered laws at all.

Vitoria, “On Law”, 157. Martin Luther King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail uses
Vitoria’s line of reasoning to suggest that an unjust law is no law at all.
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Vitoria’s interest in the situation in the Americas is first indicated in a letter to his
religious superior, Miguel de Arcos, OP dated to 1534. In this letter Vitoria advises his superior
to have nothing to do with the growing violence in Peru. Reacting to the Cajamarca massacre led
by Francisco Pizarro on the Incas in November 1532 and the subsequent capture and death of the
last Incan emperor Atahualpa in 1533, Vitoria stated, “that no business shocks me or embarrasses
me more than the corrupt profits and affairs of the Indies. Their very mention freezes the blood
in my veins.” 46 Furthermore, Vitoria comments, “I do not understand the justice of the war….as
far as I understand from eyewitnesses who were personally present during the recent battle with
Atahualpa, neither he nor any of his people had ever done the slightest injury to the Christians,
nor given them the least grounds for making war upon them.” 47 Vitoria not only could not see
justification of the war against the Incas but he could also not fathom their treatment after the
war stating, “I know of no justification for robbing and plundering the unfortunate victims of
defeat of all they possess and even what they do not possess...I cannot see how to excuse these
conquistadors from utter impiety and tyranny.” 48 The utter inhumanity in which the natives were
treated by the Spanish led Vitoria to think of ways to discuss the injustice done to the natives
from within the logic of Spanish neo-scholastic Catholicism. Vitoria’s primary tool to undermine
Spanish colonization was the natural law discussions leading to the understanding of civil power
and civil resistance.

Vitoria, “Letter 1: Letter to Miguel de Arcos, OP Salamanca, 8 November 1534”, in
Vitoria: Political Writings. eds Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), 331.
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Rooted in his understanding of civil authority being transferred from the commonwealth
to a monarchy or other type of government, Vitoria contests several claims that the Spanish made
to justify the transfer of the sovereignty of the Indigenous community to the Spanish crown. The
first claim of the Spanish colonial framework was that the Holy Roman Emperor is master of the
whole world. Vitoria contests this by using natural law stating since all are free, “therefore no
one can be emperor of the world by natural law” and that, “dominion and supremacy were
introduced by human law and not natural law.” 49 According to Calafate neither could Divine
Law be invoked. He states,
“According to Francisco de Vitoria’s lecture in Salamanca, divine
law could not be invoked because in nowhere could be found that
God had given to someone such universal power; the same applies
to natural law since civil power emanated from the nature of the
various communities constituted on earth. And as far as human law
is concerned, universal authority could not be recalled since no one
has ever conquered the world through just war or has been
democratically elected by the peoples on earth.” 50
Since there are no claims either by natural or divine law that provide a justification for the Holy
Roman Emperor to be the emperor of the world, an argument that transfers the dominion of the
Indigenous communities to the Spanish crown based solely on authority is not possible. Even if,
according to Vitoria, the Emperor could make a claim to the government of the whole world, it
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would not apply to property but only to jurisdiction. Vitoria does not grant this jurisdiction but
claims that the government and dominion of the Indigenous communities are true dominions.
In the same way that the Holy Roman Emperor could not make a claim of properties that
do not properly belong to him, neither can the Pope grant properties to Christians that belong to
non-Christians. The Pope could not grant these lands because the temporal or civil is not within
the realm of his jurisdiction. Rather, the Pope enacts spiritual jurisdiction. Thus, for Vitoria, “the
pope has temporal power only insofar as it concerns spiritual matters” and as such, “that even if
the Indians refuse to recognize any dominion (dominium) of the pope’s, war cannot on that
account be declared on them, nor their goods seized. This is obvious, because the pope has no
such dominion.” 51 The sovereignty of the Amerindians could not be transferred to the Spanish
crown by the bulls of donation of Alexander VI.
In the same way that the dominion of the Indigenous communities cannot be taken away
by authority of the Pope or the Emperor, for Vitoria, they also cannot be taken away from the
Indigenous communities simply by unbelief. First, for Vitoria, there is significant doubt as to
whether the Indigenous communities in fact can be considered sinful in their unbelief. The
unbelief of the Indigenous communities for Vitoria qualifies as invincible ignorance. Yet, even
when the Spanish preached the gospel to the Indigenous communities and they rejected Christ,
“the Spanish cannot use it as a pretext to attack or conduct just war against them.” 52
Furthermore, Vitoria believes that if the Indigenous communities rejected Christ, who could
blame them? Vitoria states,
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It is not sufficiently clear to me that the Christian faith has up to now been
announced and set before the barbarians in such a way as to oblige them to
believe it under pain of fresh sin. By this I mean that, as explained in my
second proposition, they are not bound to believe unless the faith has been
set before them with persuasive probability...On the contrary, I hear only
of provocations, savage crimes, and multitudes of unholy acts. From this,
it does not appear that the Christian religion has been preached to them in
a sufficiently pious way to oblige their acquiescence: even though it is
clear that a number of friars and other churchmen have striven
industriously in this cause, by the example of their lives and the diligence
of their preaching, and this would have been enough, had they not been
thwarted by others with different aims. 53
The dominion of the Amerindians cannot be transferred over to the Spanish based on any notion
of unbelief in Christ. Unbelief for Vitoria is not a result of the culpability of the Indigenous
communities, rather it is the result of the cruelty of the Spanish. The only way that the
Indigenous sovereignty could be transferred over to a Christian prince as a result of conversion is
if the Indigenous communities authentically, without force, convert to Christianity and elect a
prince among them. 54 Yet, the ability to tell authentic conversion, by the time that Vitoria is
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“It follows that if there was a Christian majority in any community or country, and they
wished to have a Christian prince for the sake of the faith and for the common good, I believe
they could elect such a prince and abandon their allegiance to their infidel masters, even against
the opposition of the remainder of the population. By this I mean that they could elect a prince
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making these theoretical arguments, seem to be an impossibility because of the atrocious actions
of the Spanish, often leading to forced conversion.
Vitoria severely limited the possibility for the Spanish conquistadors to make claims on
the dominion of communities. Even when Vitoria does discuss the possibility for Spain to take
control of Indigenous lands, he often limits the extent to which the Spanish can take the property
of the Indigenous communities. For Vitoria, some of the possibilities that would allow for
Spanish control would be if the Indigenous communities limited travel and trade of the Spanish,
if they prohibited the preaching of the gospel, protection of converts, free and voluntary election,
and the protection of allies. The most important claim in which the Spanish could justify their
control was the defense of innocents against Indigenous human sacrifice. 55 For Vitoria, human
sacrifice broke the second inclination of natural law which is to preserve the human species.
Thus, for Vitoria, “Spaniards could intervene to save innocent people from cannibalism or other
“unjust death” or to aid native friends and allies.” 56 While Vitoria severely limits the claims of
the Spanish to have legitimate title to the lands of the Americas, these conditions do leave the
possibility for a “just” war in which the transfer of dominion from the Indigenous communities
to the Spanish could occur.
While Vitoria’s attempts to limit the claims to a just title to Amerindian lands, he leaves
open the possibility for theoretical argument that could provide justification for Spanish
colonization. Despite Vitoria’s ambiguous theoretical work which can limit or justify claims of

We will discuss later on that the claims of Indigenous sacrifice were vastly overstated
and actually quite rare. Even if it were the case that the Indigenous communities made human
sacrifice, Bartolomé de Las Casas would make an argument that this did not necessarily break
natural law directly.
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the Spanish, one of the most important contributions of Vitoria’s work is that he believes in the
fundamental freedom of the natives. Vitoria leaves no room for the claim of the Spanish that the
Indigenous communities were natural slaves and did not have true dominion. For Vitoria,
Indigenous communities have always had true dominion because of their human dignity. He
states,
The proof of this is that they are not in point of fact madmen but have
judgement like other men. This is self-evident, because they have some
order in their affairs: they have properly organized cities, proper
marriages, magistrates and overlords, laws, industries, and commerce, all
of which require the use of reason. They likewise have a form of religion
and they correctly apprehend things which are evident to other men, which
indicates the use of reason. 57
Because the Indigenous communities follow all of the criteria of Aquinas’ third inclination of
natural law, those things which are proper to humanity by their use of reason, natural law and all
of its implications are applicable to the Indigenous communities and therefore provide a
framework to establish their rights (ius). Thus, Indigenous society, which is a natural good
according to Aquinas and Vitoria, is the framework where one begins engaging in natural law
reasoning.
While some such as Walter Mignolo would like to position Vitoria in the realm of
primarily viewing natural law as a way to protect private property in the company of Grotius and
Locke and thus perpetuating a colonial matrix of power, others view the work of Vitoria and the
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School of Salamanca as offering a subversive natural law framework to colonial power. 58 David
Lantigua argues that Mignolo and others fail to account for the theological pluralism of the
Iberian peninsula and that the Spanish colonial debates contested the ideas of religious coercion
and violence as well as, “developed an unprecedented scholastic theological reflection on the
Gospel’s promotion of human freedom.” 59 I argue that contrary to the frameworks of Grotius and
Locke, Spanish natural law does not start from the individual, but is rooted in the natural good of
human community. Society isn’t gathered in order to protect individuals but is rather a natural
good of humanity. Discussions of Vitoria about property do not follow the same pattern of
Grotius and Locke in that Vitoria primarily discusses dominion and sovereignty for the
Indigenous people as a whole. Thus, for Vitoria, power emanates from the community
(commonwealth) rather than the individual. Because the Indigenous people live and work in a
community, natural law ethics for the Hispanic community is primarily rooted in relationships
within a society and between societies. Vitoria’s framework, then, is not simply a work to justify
Spanish colonial interests but to limit the ability to enact colonial policy using an epistemological
framework they would find hard to argue against. Not only does Vitoria limit Spanish interests
from within the framework of Spanish scholasticism, but he also provides a theoretical
framework from which the work jurists such as Domingo de Soto and activists such as

To see Mignolo’s, in our opinion, unfair comparison of Vitoria to Locke and Grotius
see, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options. (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press), 86-89. Mignolo accuses Vitoria of suggesting the Indigenous
communities are unable to think. This is a misrepresentation of Vitoria’s argument. As we have
clearly illustrated above, Vitoria, while still being influenced by the notions of Spanish
supremacy argues that the Indigenous communities have full capacity of reason and are able to
use logic like every other person.
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Bartolomé de Las Casas are able to work for substantial political change in regard to Spanish
colonialism, especially seen in the Valladolid debates of 1550 and 1551.

Domingo De Soto
Following Vitoria as the chair of theology at the University of Salamanca was Domingo de
Soto. De Soto not only became the chair of theology at Salamanca but was also an official
imperial theologian and representative at the Council of Trent. De Soto not only followed Vitoria
in his faculty position but also expanded and clarified much of Vitoria’s thought. In particular,
following Vitoria, de Soto also thought the Spanish engagement with the Indigenous
communities of the Americas was unjust. Using similar methods of natural law moral reasoning
as Vitoria, de Soto condemned the violence of the Spanish conquistadors. De Soto followed
Vitoria’s fundamental thoughts on natural rights and political authority. Like Vitoria, de Soto,
“precludes the possibility of a single person ruling the world, be it emperor or pope, since ‘every
commonwealth has power over itself according to natural right’.” 60 While Vitoria focused
primarily on civil power rooted in the commonwealth, De Soto put more emphasis on the
commonwealth being made of individual members who each hold within themselves the Imago
Dei. De Soto further expanded the notion of natural right not only for the commonwealth but for
those who lived individually within it.
Unlike Vitoria, de Soto’s relectio de domino, his lectures on the affair in the indies, never
presented hypothetical justifications for war. The only rights that de Soto emphasized that
belonged to the Spanish were the right to preach and right to defend themselves. 61 Yet, even
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within these rights of the Spanish, de Soto, placed stronger conditions in which people could
defend themselves. Most importantly, de Soto emphasized that freedom is a prerequisite for
someone to receive the gospel. Therefore, the right to preach must always be conditioned by the
obligation to preserve the freedom of those who would receive such preaching. 62 With the
stronger restrictions on how one is to preach the gospel and with de Soto’s greater emphasis on
the Imago Dei, de Soto was able to understand his natural law theory and its relationship to
Spanish colonialism within the framework of the virtues of freedom and justice.
For de Soto’s the virtues of freedom and justice are primarily rooted in the individual as
an image of God. De Soto primarily saw the image of God expressed through “self-movement,”
which “provides the touchstone of rights and this is what secures the autonomy of the political
community.” 63 The freedom to choose and make decisions is a key indicator that not only is one
an imago dei, but also that one possesses subjective rights and natural dominium. Yet, for de
Soto and the rest of the Spanish scholastics, right (ius) and dominion (dominium) were not
coterminous. While dominion was considered the ability to possess property, right (ius) is related
to conditions provided through relationship. While subjective rights according to French,
German, and Dutch humanists conflated rights with dominion, (i.e., that rights were
possessions), the Spanish scholastics, drawing on Aquinas saw dominium primarily in
relationship to Aquinas’ dominium utile. 64 One’s dominium was at some level analogous to
usufruct. That is, while one may not be sovereign one could derive profit from property and is
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entitled to the rights (ius) of the profits. Contrary to the protestant liberal tradition that viewed
property and the imago dei as rooted in grace that gave humanity the same sovereignty over
property as God, the Spanish scholastics viewed property (dominium) as primarily on loan
(usufruct) from God to be stewarded. Thus, dominion was not a result of grace that made it a
right in itself, rather dominion was “subordinated to the laws of nature and God.” 65 Subjective
rights were not considered simply dominion, but rather were related to the relationship in which
God has endowed humanity with rights based on a framework of stewardship of creation based
on relationship as opposed to subjective rights of property ownership. Human rights are based on
relationship rather than the ability to do what one wants when they want. This is important
because if a person’s freedom belongs to oneself, they could under a just war sell their freedom.
But if a person’s freedom is subordinated to the the fact that it is rooted in the imago dei, there
can be no justification for slavery because one’s freedom does not properly belong to oneself. As
such, “Any theory which radically limited the circumstances under which men could rightfully
become slaves, as the Dominicans did, could therefore help to undermine the trade.” 66 The
resulting emphasis of freedom and rights as rooted in the welfare of men lead to the Dominican
school, and de Soto, to “concentrate far more on questions of distributive justice.” 67 Thus, for de
Soto, freedom was not considered simply as a property in which one can use as one wishes,
rather freedom was a virtue or right that was enacted in relationships and obligations of
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protecting others freedom. To look after another’s freedom was to focus on justice as an integral
aspect of natural law.
De Soto, once again following Vitoria, rooted his understanding of justice explicitly in
the Thomistic tradition. Therefore, de Soto understood ethics, “in terms of virtues, both natural
and infused, which taken together shape the Christian into an agent who acts both selfconsciously and in good conscience on behalf of the common good.” 68 Following the argument
of Aquinas in both the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae, where both law and right are
discussed, De Soto places justice as the mediating point that connects rights and law. For de
Soto, justice cannot be simply explained under the categories of jurisprudence or legal
philosophy but requires the use of practical philosophy because it presents the telos of humanity.
As Merio Scattola states, “Mientras la jurisprudencia se concentra exclusivamente en el objeto
de la justicia y en su realización a través de la relaciones jurídicas, la filosofía pueda explicar
las materias del derecho en su verdadero significado y en todas sus implicaciones, porque lo
concibe como parte de actuar ético.” 69 Once de Soto establishes his discussion of justice in
relation to practical philosophy as opposed to jurisprudence, he illustrates that by treating justice
as a virtue in continuity with Aristotle and Aquinas, justice becomes the “the principle that
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orders everything.” 70 For de Soto, justice is the object of law and its purpose. The virtue of
justice, according to Aquinas, ‘is a habit in accordance with which someone, through a constant
and perpetual will, renders his right to each one.” 71 In order to give someone their right then one
must set up laws that provide for the expedient protection and distribution of what they are owed
or due. How does de Soto determine what one is due? This question goes back to his emphasis
on humanity as the Imago Dei. If each person is in the imago dei and God has pure dominium
and freedom, then each person also has dominium and freedom that must be respected. Thus, for
de Soto, since the native peoples of the Americas share in the imago dei, justice would require
that their dominium and their rights must in turn be protected. If justice requires giving each their
due then the Indigenous communities were entitled not only to be free of colonial rule, but also
given restitution for the cruelty of the Spanish.
De Soto’s emphasis on the imago dei as both a condition of freedom and the condition of
justice resulted in a serious reappraisal of the actions of the Spanish against the Indigenous
communities of the Americas. Because these peoples shared in the imago dei, they were free and
had rights claims towards justice. Bartolomé de Las Casas would take the rights claims to change
and affect foreign policy in regard to the Spanish colonization. Both de Soto and Las Casas
would be present at the Valladolid debates in 1550 and 1551. It would be at these debates that
one of the largest colonial powers would be the only colonial power to reflect on the ethics of
their colonial actions. This reflection is largely due to the theological reflections of Vitoria and
de Soto and the actions of Las Casas.
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Bartolomé de Las Casas and The Valladolid Debate
While the work of the early Dominicans to stand in solidarity with the Indigenous
communities exemplified by Antonio de Montesinos and the theoretical, juridical work by
Vitoria and de Soto were helpful in establishing arguments for the autonomy and sovereignty of
the Indigenous communities of the Americas against the cruelty of the Spanish, no one’s work
has been as influential to Indigenous freedom as Bartolomé de Las Casas and his work leading
up to the Valladolid debate against Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda.
Las Casas was born in 1484 and in 1502 and joined Nicholas de Ovando’s expedition to
the Americas. Las Casas was originally an encomendero who had a group of Indigenous slaves
working for him and, “over the next ten years, Las Casas was both actor and witness in the
destruction of the native Tainos of the Island and elsewhere.” 72 In 1510, Las Casas was ordained
a priest and the following year either heard or heard about the sermon of Antonio de Montesinos
demanding repentance of the encomenderos for their treatment of the natives. Soon after, the
Dominicans began denying confession to encomenderos, Las Casas included. Las Casas joined
Diego Velasquez in his conquest of Cuba and Las Casas was awarded a larger encomienda. Yet,
it wasn’t until Las Casas witnessed the slaughter of the Taino and Arawak peoples on the Caonao
river that, “His outrage as a human being and his Christian conscience were both seared by the
slaughter of hundreds of innocents by Spanish soldiers and the cavalry.” 73 The final push to
solidarity with the Indigenous communities for Las Casas was his encounter with Ecclesiasticus
34:21-22. This passage states, “tainted his gifts who offers in sacrifice ill-gotten goods. Mock
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presents from the lawless win not God’s favor. Like the man who slays a son in his father’s
presence is he who offers sacrifice from the possessions of the poor.” 74 This passage vivified Las
Casas’ conscience to the point where he could not offer the sacrifice of the mass at the same time
he persecuted the natives. As Roberto Goizueta states regarding the import of Las Casas’
conversion, “If the Spanish conquistadors and missionaries condemned the Indians for their
practice of human sacrifice, he argued the Spanish Christians themselves were guilty of human
sacrifice when, in the Mass, they presented their offerings of bread and wine, products of the
blood sweat, and tears extracted from the Indigenous peoples of the Americas.” 75 The conversion
of Las Casas led him to a life of study and action on behalf of the Indigenous communities of the
Americas. Through his efforts on behalf of the natives, Las Casas was able to effect political
change and became the Bishop of Chiapas in Mexico where he enacted a political and
ecclesiastical practice that would force the encomenderos to acknowledge and repent of the way
they exploited the native communities. Las Casas was not simply an activist but employed an
erudite understanding of theology and both civil and ecclesiastical law on behalf of the natives.
David Orique compares Las Casas to other notable figures in colonial Latin America:
Toribio de Benavente Motolinia and Juan Vasco de Quiroga. Orique illustrates that while
Motolinia and Quiroga were primarily influenced respectively by the millenarianism of the
Franciscan order and Thomas Moore’s humanism, Las Casas was steeped in the Thomistic
tradition as it was taught in the Salamanca school under Vitoria and De Soto. 76 Las Casas’
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Thomistic thought brought about an emphasis on a universalism that contrasted the millenarian
and utopian approaches of Motolinia and Quiroga. According to Orique, the millenarianism of
Motolinia invoked a sense of viewing the encounter with the Indigenous communities of
America as an opportunity to bring about a “New Jerusalem” leading to, “the future creation of
this millennial Kingdom as an Indigenous church with the paternal Franciscans as temporal and
spiritual leaders of the chosen Indigenous people.” 77 Similarly, Quiroga’s emphasis on the
humanism of Thomas Moore led his interpretation of the encounter with Indigenous
communities as an opportunity that, “these new people in this New World would renew the aging
Church.” 78 The problem with both of these approaches is that both look toward Indigenous
communities paternalistically. As Orique states both Motolinia and Quiroga, “related
paternalistically toward the Indigenous, not ‘looking up’ to them or ‘face-to-face’, but rather
gazing down on them as a loving parent looks at a needy child. Both saw the Indigenous as
malleable candidates on which to build the New Church--the future millennial Kingdom for
Motolinia, the reborn early apostolic community for Quiroga.” 79 Las Casas experience with the
Indigenous community contrasts with both Motolinia and Quiroga in that Las Casas encountered
persons from the Taino community when he was eight in Seville and as a teenager with a man
named Juanico, where he “looked up to such different people.” 80 Las Casas was a first-hand
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witness to the destruction of Indigenous communities of Hispaniola. Las Casas’s Eurocentric
epistemology was challenged by all of these events which ultimately led to his quest for biblical
justice for the Indigenous community.
Las Casas’ quest for biblical justice, according to Orique, was rooted in the concept of
Kairos and Rights language for the Indigenous community. Because Kairos is an understanding
of time in which the eternal is made manifest and the present is imbued with the sacred, how one
treats the Indigenous community has eternal and temporal consequence. Justice cannot wait until
some future utopia or later millennia. For Las Casas, “this prophetic panorama demanded that he
live in the middle, torn between Kairos time and chronos time-eternal time and temporal time in
the pursuit of justice.” 81 Thus, the encounter with the Indigenous community had a sacramental
effect in which the Indigenous community were not malleable instruments for future goals, but
their agency in the here and now, must be respected. After experiencing the Caonao massacre
and while meditating on Ecclesiasticus 34:18’s statement, “unclean is the offering sacrificed by
an oppressor,” Las Casas realized that the treatment of the Indigenous community in the here and
now has sacramental saliency. 82 Las Casas experienced the encounter with the Indigenous
community at the point of his conversion in the frame of Thomistic sacramental realism. In this
particular experience, in these particular people, at this particular time, how one treats these
people is indicative of one’s relationship with God. Each person in all of their concrete
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relationships, expressions, and cultural backgrounds are made in the image of God and are
afforded dignity. Each person, for Las Casas, has a sacramental character.
This human dignity led Las Casas to labor for the universal rights for the Indigenous
community. These rights not only included the right to life and right to freedom, but also
included religious freedom which Motolinia and Quiroga were hesitant to adopt. 83 For Las
Casas, the universal rights that were afforded to European communities could not be truly
universal unless they were made manifest in the treatment of Indigenous communities. In the
effort to establish a language of universal rights, “Las Casas coupled the new sixteenth-century
Thomistic understandings with canonistic precedents to argue for Indigenous rights…” 84
Kenneth Pennington contrasts the two theories that Las Casas was primarily a Thomist or
that Las Casas was primarily an activist that did not have, “any underlying coherence to his
thought.” 85 Rather, Pennington suggests that Las Casas drew primarily on medieval juridical
theory and canon law. The primary question in the medieval legal tradition was whether or not
infidel’s dominium was legitimate. Pennington illustrates that there were two schools of thought
articulated by medieval canonists. The first view by Pope Innocent IV, Oldradus de Ponte,
Johannes Andreae, Panormitanus, Francesco Zabarella, and Dominicus de Sancto Geminiano
believed that infidels maintained dominium and that their dominium could not be taken away
from them unless they threatened the lives of Christians. 86 The second view followed by Alanus
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Anglicus, Hostiensis, and later by Matias de Paz and Juan Lopez de Palacios Rubios, believed
that, “there was not any legitimate secular power outside of the Church.” 87 Canonists by the time
of the late 14th and early 15th century agreed with the thought of Innocent IV, Oldradus, et. al.
that infidels had dominium. Drawing from these canonists Las Casas argued, “that the Indians
dominium was legitimate and just, and that the Spaniards did not have the right to usurp the
Indians' just title.” 88
Las Casas argued for the freedom of the Indigenous communities of South America in his
De Thesaurus by applying a legal maxim popular with canonists at the time, “Quod omnes tangit
debet ab omnibus approbari; what touches all must be approved by all.” 89 This maxim was used
to argue the right of consent of the ruled by both ecclesiastical offices and secular authorities. By
adopting this legal maxim, Las Casas argued that the Indigenous communities could not be ruled
by Spanish authorities without their consent and therefore, “that the pope cannot grant the
Spanish king dominium in the New World without the consent of the Indians.” 90 The question
remained, what did Alexander VI’s “bulls of donation give to the Spanish and Portuguese
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crowns? 91 Las Casas, by maintaining the legal theory of Quod omnes tangit, argued that all
Alexander VI could award to Spain and Portugal was the right to preach the gospel. Pennington
states, “it was imperative, of course, that Alexander’s donation not be construed as giving what
its words indicated literally cum omnibus illarum dominiis et jurisdictionibus; with all their
dominions and jurisdictions...He [Las Casas] observed that it would be absurd if the pope had
actually taken the Indians’ dominum away; all he gave to the Spanish was the right to preach the
faith.” 92 Through the adoption of medieval canon law over speculative theological opinions, Las
Casas arguments were given the force of law and Las Casas was, “able to bring enormous
pressure to bear on the Spanish government” and its claims to dominion over Latin America. By
viewing Las Casas as a prolific legal scholar, his thought was able to force Spanish colonizers to
reflect on their actions towards Indigenous communities. Because of Las Casas’ legal and
theological works, the Spanish would reflect on their actions at a debate in Valladolid in the
years of 1550 and 1551, which would be the first time that a colonial power would reflect on the
ethics of its actions.

The Valladolid Debates
The chief question of the Valladolid debates were the questions of how the Spanish were to treat
the Indigenous communities of the Americas. To answer the question of how the Indigenous
communities were to be treated, the Valladolid debates centered its arguments on the religious
and intellectual capacity of the Amerindians. The common understanding of the Spanish
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conquest of the Americas centers on the belief that the Spanish considered the Indigenous
communities to not have the capacity to maintain their sovereignty and did not have the capacity
to receive the faith of the Catholic Church. Yet, a more nuanced approach is needed. While the
majority of the conquistadores believed that the native peoples did not have either capacity, early
Bishops believed that the natives were able to receive the faith and had great intellectual capacity
surpassing that of the Spanish. For example, in the first junta of the Council of the Indies in
1532, the presiding Bishops, Sebastian Ramirez de Fuenleal and Juan de Zumarraga declared,
“no doubt that natives have sufficient capacity to receive the faith.” 93 When encomendero
retractors wrote a negative response to Zumarraga’s declaration, Zumarraga responded in return,
“You are the ones who are repulsive and disgusting to me, because you seek only vain frivolities
and because you lead soft lives just as though you were not Christians. These poor Indians have
a heavenly smell to me; they comfort me and give me health, for they exemplify for me that
harshness of life and penitence which I must espouse if I am to be saved.” 94 Jacob de Testera, a
companion to Zumarraga similarly attests, “How can anyone say that these people are incapable,
when they constructed such impressive buildings, made such subtle creations, were silversmiths,
painters, merchants, and able in presiding, in speaking, in the exercise of courtesy, in fiestas,
marriages, solemn occasions, receptions of distinguished personages, able to express sorrow, and
appreciation, when the occasion requires it and, finally very ready to be educated in the the
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ethical, political, and economic aspects of life?” 95 The early work of Las Casas, Bishop
Zumarraga, Jacob de Testera influenced the promulgation of the New Laws in 1542 that severely
limited the claims of the encomenderos.
At the other end of the debate were the thoughts of Domingo de Betanzos and the
historiographer Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdes. Betanzos discussed the capacity of the
Indigenous communities to the council of the Indies in 1532. Betanzos declared, “I have spoken
somewhat on Indian capacity in general, not saying that they were wholly incapable, because I
have never said that, but rather that they have very little capacity.” 96 Despite the fact that
Betanzos did not deny the capacity of the native peoples, it was taken by those in Mexico that the
Amerindians did not have the capacity to even be baptized. 97 Betanzos opinions drew the ire of
Dominicans Bernardino de Minaya and Julián Garcés who both made an appeal to the pope.
Garcés told the Pope, “that if some ecclesiastics make such allegations it is because they have
‘sweated little or not at all in the conversion of the Indians and who little zeal in learning their
language and capabilities.” 98 The pope responded to these discussions by promulgating the bull
Sublimis Deus, which stated
“We define and declare by these our letters, or by any translation thereof
signed by any notary public and sealed with the seal of any ecclesiastical
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dignitary, to which the same credit shall be given as to the originals, that,
notwithstanding whatever may have been or may be said to the contrary,
the said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by
Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the
possession of their property, even though they may be outside the faith of
Jesus Christ; and that they may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy
their liberty and the possession of their property; nor should they be in any
way enslaved; should the contrary happen it shall be null and of no
effect.” 99
Although this was an important bull and was used by Las Casas and others in their defense on
behalf of the natives, the new laws that passed in 1542 that limited the encomienda system
brought about more debates because it jeopardized the income of the encomenderos who used
the natives as slave labor.
The primary tool used in these continued debates about the treatment of Indigenous
communities in the Americas was Oviedo’s work published in 1535, Historia general de las
Indias. In this work, Oviedo presented several theories that threatened the safety and sovereignty
of the natives. First, Oviedo believed that the Americas were once under a Visigoth monarchy in
Spain and that Castilian monarchs were merely recovering their lands. Second, that Christianity
had been preached to the Indians before Columbus and that the natives forgot the faith and
refused the faith. Finally, Oviedo thought the Indigenous people were incapable of becoming
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Christians. 100 The history and the theories of Oviedo became a central resource for Sepúlveda in
his preparation for the debates at Valladolid and was a prime enemy of Las Casas. As Victor
Manuel Patiño suggested, “Las Casas fought many opponents during his long life...but none of
them so absorbed his time and thought as Oviedo.” 101 Las Casas thought Oviedo’s thoughts
about the Indigenous communities were so dangerous that Las Casas referred to him as the
“deadly enemy of the Indians.” 102 Thus, while the Valladolid debates were primarily between
Las Casas and Sepúlveda, Las Casas also had Oviedo well within his sights.
The continued debate about the New Laws and the rights of the Amerindians often
resulted in resistance by the encomenderos. Las Casas enforced the New Laws to the ire of the
Spanish encomenderos and made it a condition of confession that encomenderos provide
restitution of the Indigenous communities’ wealth. 103 This brought on anger against the priests in
Mexico, “threatening the Dominicans with physical violence.” 104 The ire against the New Laws
occurred elsewhere. As Hanke describes. “The spirit of the times was such that the unfortunate
first viceroy in Peru, Blaco Nunez Vela, who had tried to enforce the New Laws in that violent
land, had been captured by angry and independent conquistadores, who killed the viceroy in
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1546.”105 Because of the constant violence and the quest of encomenderos to ensure perpetuity
of their claims, in the last year of Las Casas Bishopric, the New Laws were revoked in 1547.
The revocation of the new law’s gave Sepúlveda the confidence to compose a treatise
against Las Casas and those who worked for the rights of the Indigenous community. Sepúlveda
had previously written a treaty against students in Bologna who argued that it was impossible for
a Christian to also work as a soldier. These students viewed the actions of a soldier as
incompatible with Christian virtue. His second treatise in response to Las Casas was called
Democrates Secundus and “sought to prove that wars against the Indians were just and even
constituted a necessary preliminary to their Christianization.” 106 Despite Sepúlveda’s efforts to
have this treatise published, it was not well received. In university circles, Diego Covarrubias
lectured against Sepúlveda’s ideas that an Empire’s greatness should be spread by force. Rather,
Cavurrabias argued that an Empire’s strength rests in its culture. The Indigenous cultures of
America furthered the argument that they should have their own autonomy. Yet, despite
Sepúlveda’s lack of publication, he received popular support from encomenderos.
Despite the growing support for Sepúlveda’s position and the revocation of the New
Laws, Las Casas continued to politically maneuver a delay of the Council of the Indies’
forthcoming decision to validate Sepúlveda or Oviedo’s position. Hanke states, “Maneuvers such
as these have led historians to emphasize Las Casas qualities as a politician.” 107 Yet, Las Casas
knew that he must accompany his passionate positions with legal reforms. Las Casas,

105

Hanke 65.

106

Hanke 62.

107

Hanke, 59-60.

135

“energetically affirmed that the necessary reforms could be achieved if only the necessary laws
were made by the Council of the Indies and upright men appointed to execute them in
America.” 108 With continual letters emphasizing his position, Las Casas was able to convince
some members of the Council that an official debate should take place.
With the emphasis on establishing further laws that would restrain the conquests of the
Americas and the lack of accountability for the Conquistadores, the Council of the Indies
requested a meeting of theologians and jurists to debate the rescinding of the New Laws and how
the Amerindian population should be treated. The Council of the Indies wrote to Charles V, “We
feel certain that these laws have not been obeyed, because those who conduct these conquests are
not accompanied by persons who will restrain them and accuse them when they do evil...It would
be fitting for your majesty to order a meeting of learned men, theologians, and jurists, with
others according to your pleasure, to discuss and consider concerning the manner in which these
conquests should be carried on in order that they may be made justly and with security of
conscience.” 109 Charles V heard the request and ordered all conquests to stop on 1550 until the
debate could decide on how the Spanish should proceed to engage the Americas.
The council at Valladolid began in August of 1550 and a council of fourteen judges heard
debates between Las Casas and Sepúlveda. Among the Council were theologians from the
University of Salamanca such as Domingo de Soto, Melchor Cano, and Bernardino de Arevalo.
On the first day, Sepúlveda presented his resume and spoke for three hours. Las Casas, fully
opposing the conquests, responded with a “numbing five-day reading of his 500-page-give or
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take a few pages- track entitled ‘the Defense...Against the persecutors and Slanderers of the
Peoples of the New World Discovered Across the Seas’.” 110 Las Casas and Sepúlveda were
never in the same room when delivering their arguments. Because Las Casas’ argument was so
exhaustive the Council asked Domingo de Soto to condense his arguments.
Las Casas’ primary opponent in the Valladolid debates was Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda
who argued in his Democrates Secundus that war and conquest against the Indigenous
communities in Latin America was just. While some such as J. Mihane have argued that Las
Casas won the debate because Las Casas’ thought has prevailed through history, others such as
Mary Speer have suggested that within the immediate context of the debate that Sepúlveda won
because of his proximity and influence to Philip II after the abdication of Charles V. 111 Speer
makes her claim based on the fact that Sepúlveda taught Philip Latin, dedicated his translation of
Aristotle's Politics to Philip, and Philip instituted policies that banned and restricted the spread of
Las Casas works. 112 Most importantly, Philip’s policies echoed thoughts that Sepúlveda
promulgated in personal correspondence with Philip that were similar to the thought Sepúlveda
published in his Democrates Secundus. Regardless of who won the debate and by what criteria,
one is able to make the judgement that natural law reasoning played a huge role in both
Sepúlveda’s and Las Casas’ arguments. As Santana states, “At the Valladolid debate, natural law
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provided one of the main bases (along with scripture and the writing of church authorities) that
both Sepúlveda and Las Casas used to evaluate the justice and legality of the Spanish treatment
of the Amerindians, including making war on them.” 113 Sepúlveda used natural law primarily to
reinforce notions of Spanish supremacy and racial hierarchies by making appeals to Aristotle
while Las Casas used natural law to stand in solidarity with the native Indigenous peoples of the
Americas.
Sepúlveda’s arguments that were summarized at Valladolid came from his work
Democrates Secundus. Democrates Secundus was a dialogue between Democrates and a straw
man, Leopold, who was to represent Las Casas position. In this Dialogue Sepúlveda argues that
war against Indigenous Latin American communities was justified. Traditionally there were three
reasons for just war. These were responding to an attack, recovering stolen possessions, and
imposing punishment. 114 However, in justifying war against the Indigenous communities,
Sepúlveda disregards these reasons and presents four reasons for what he considered just war
against the Indigenous communities of the Americas: the natural inferiority of the Indians, sins
against natural law, obligations to release those who were oppressed in their own societies, and
the evangelical precept of spreading the truth, using force if necessary. 115 All of these arguments
are based on the parallel notions of Spanish supremacy and false caricatures of Indigenous
peoples.
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Sepúlveda’s Arguments
Sepúlveda argues that the virtue of prudence or wisdom, which is given by God, is what
determines those who should govern and those who should be governed. For Sepúlveda, those
who have the higher capacity to reason should rule over the rest. Drawing from Aristotle,
Sepúlveda argued that, “a natural slave is capable only of apprehending, not of having rational
principle. Not only is it necessary to rule over them but also it is in their best interests to be
enslaved by a ruler.” 116 Aristotle believed that within a Greek household there was the master
and an assistant. The assistant was considered a tool and a piece of property to be used by a
master. Aristotle considered this person to be a natural slave. For Aristotle, “For anyone who
despite being human is by nature not his own but someone else’s is a natural slave. And he is
someone else’s when, despite being human, he is a piece of property; and a piece of property is a
tool for action that is separate from its owner (154a12-17)” 117 A natural slave for Aristotle,
“completely lacked the capacity for rational deliberation and thereby were incapable of full
rationality.” 118 For Sepúlveda, the Indigenous communities of the America’s fit the description
of a natural slave by asserting Spanish superiority.
Some, such as Robert Quirk argue that the term “natura servus”, being translated as
natural slave, is a mistranslation that serves to disadvantage Sepúlveda’s modern reception.
Quirk argues that “natura servus” is better understood within the context of medieval serfdom
and should reflect that cultural background. Quirk states that because, “Sepúlveda was not a
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historian in the modern sense and could have had no intimate knowledge of Greek slavery” the
“key to understanding of that phase of the debate which concerned natural servitude lies,
accordingly not in an exegesis of Aristotle, but in a study of the sixteenth-century concepts of
serfdom and slavery; the two possible contemporary equivalents for Aristotle’s slavery by
nature.” 119 Las Casas seemed to have taken Sepúlveda's use “natura servus”, as “principally of
serfdom' when the latter described the ideal relationship between the more advanced, cultured
Spaniards and the primitive inhabitants of the new world.” 120 When Las Casas refers to the
Amerindians as being treated as slaves, he always uses the term hecho, to be made a slave. 121 So,
regardless as to whether or not they were slaves according to the Greek tradition, Las Casas’
first-hand experience illustrates that they were treated in such a way where there would be little
difference between serf and slave. Not only does Las Casas testimony show the arbitrariness of
Quirk’s point, but also one may find it hard to believe that Sepúlveda, who was a translator and
scholar of Aristotle, would have not intimately known the context of Greek slavery when he was
espousing that the Indigenous communities of the Americas fit such an Aristotelian category.
Regardless of the context in which natura servus was employed, Sepúlveda’s argument
for justified war was built primarily on an understanding of Spanish superiority. Sepúlveda
explicitly calls for the domination of the Indigenous community by saying that their, “condición
natural es tal que deban obedecer a otros” and “si rehúsan su gobierno y no queda otro recurso,
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sean dominados por las armas”122 Spain, according to Sepúlveda, should govern and subjugate
the Indigenous community not only because Spain exists at the height of reason, but because it is
under natural law that more cultured communities subjugate less cultured communities.
Sepúlveda states, “y será siempre justo y conforme al derecho natural que tales gentes se
sometan al imperio de príncipes y naciones más cultura y humanas, para que merced á sus
virtudes y á la prudencia de sus leyes, depongan la barbarie y se reuzcan á vida más humana y
al culto de virtud.” 123 According to Sepúlveda, natural law allows for some, “more cultured”
communities to subjugate other, “less cultured” communities.
The second and third reasons that Sepúlveda believes that the conquest of the Indies is
just are similar to one another. The second reason is that because some Indigenous communities
practice human sacrifice, they are breaking natural law and must be deposed. The third reason is
that it is the Christian’s duty to protect innocent life and therefore must intervene in Indigenous
practice of human sacrifice and depose their leadership for the sake of love of neighbor. Love of
neighbor and protecting the innocent is one of the few arguments that Vitoria says allows for
justifying war. Sepúlveda takes Vitoria’s argument to the next level and condemns Indians for
both idolatry and human sacrifice. According to Sepúlveda, because the gods of the natives are
so different, they constitute an offense against God and not simply a mistake on the nature of

It is their “natural condition who ought to obey others” and “if they refuse to be
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God. This is different from the noble Greeks or those nations surrounding Israel who were
simply infidels. Because of the “primitive nature” of the Indigenous communities they were not
simply just infidels but also idolaters. In regards to the argument that unbelief is not a cause for
war, Sepúlveda responds “if there were to be discovered in the New World some cultivated,
civilized, humane people to whom idolatry would be foreign and whom nature would have
impelled to worship the one true God” such an argument would hold. 124 But Sepúlveda believes
that because of the combination of idolatry and immolation of human flesh, the natives constitute
an offense against God. For Sepúlveda, human sacrifice was not only an offense against God but
was an offense against humanity. Summarizing Sepúlveda’s argument Gutiérrez states, “Human
solidarity ought to entail the defense of innocent victims.... To offense of God is now added that
of neighbor: now human solidarity is involved.” 125 Such a connection between offense of God
and neighbor would seem to seal the deal for Sepúlveda. But Las Casas’ counter argument, as we
will see below, will prevail.
The fourth and final argument Sepúlveda makes for the justification of war against the
natives of the Americas is to evangelize and propagate the faith. For Sepúlveda, “Christians have
a duty to spread the faith, and this cannot be done without first subjugating those who
resist.” 126While it is impossible to force someone to believe anything against their will, through
subjugation they could be forced to listen to the presentation of the Gospel. Sepúlveda uses the
parable of the “Great Feast” to illustrate his point. In this parable, a rich man hosts a banquet and
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his invited guests cancel at the last minute. The host asks his servants to compel people off the
streets to come to his banquet. While this parable probably speaks more to the fact that the
invited guests were the ones to reject Jesus and those off of the streets are the ones who actually
understand and perceive how great it is to be invited to such a host’s banquet, Sepúlveda focuses
on the language of compelling the people on streets to come to the banquet. Rather, “For
Sepúlveda, this parable is evidence for the permissibility of compelling unbelievers to the faith,
by force if necessary.” 127 Thus, for Sepúlveda, it is possible to evangelize with the gun and the
sword.

Las Casas Defense
Las Casas’ defense is a point-by-point refutation of Sepúlveda’s fourfold argument. Las
Casas not only attacks Sepúlveda’s arguments directly but also attacks the way that Sepúlveda
uses different biblical passages, early and medieval writers, and attacks the integrity of some of
his sources like Oviedo’s History and the thought of John Major. 128 Most importantly for our
purposes, Las Casas employs a type of natural law reasoning that contests the natural law
reasoning of Sepúlveda. As Clayton and Lantigua have pointed out
Las Casas, Similar to Dominican theologians from the University of
Salamanca such as Soto and Francisco de Vitoria, applied the view of
natural law inspired by St. Thomas Aquinas to support the legitimacy and
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rights of Indian polities. The Dominicans advocated that no civilization
such as the Amerindian ones--lacked natural reason in their political
affairs. 129
In the Valladolid debates, Las Casas not only presents his arguments as an exchange of rhetoric,
but also presents a contrasting view of natural law that stands in contradistinction to the natural
law reasoning that supports empire. As Lantigua and Clayton suggest, contrary to the
understanding that natural law was only a tool of empire, “Under Las Casas’s erudition and
advocacy, natural law was not a tool of imperial conquest, but an ethic of resistance to colonial
power.” 130 While it is tempting to portray Las Casas as a hero of modern liberal culture, to do so
would damage to, “him, history, the truth, the imagination, and his Indians.” 131 Las Casas was a
man of his time and his language is often crude and his rhetoric sharp. His references to the
Indigenous people are not without fault and are often paternalistic. Yet, Las Casas’ Defense
provides a framework of natural law moral reasoning that stands in solidarity with the
Indigenous communities of the Americas and takes the natural law reasoning of Sepúlveda and
others like him to task. 132 Las Casas uses his privilege as a Spaniard to work toward, “shaping in
his lifetime the improvement of imperial policy regarding the treatment of Amerindians. He also
helped lay the theoretical and legal groundwork for the development of international law and
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human rights.” 133 Las Casas’ Defense is a prime example of how one who, within their own
cultural framework, can speak from within their position of power to the powers of imperialism.
The first point of Sepúlveda’s argument that Las Casas refutes is the argument that the
Indigenous communities are placed under the Aristotelian category of natural slaves. In refuting
Sepúlveda’s first point, Las Casas accuses Sepúlveda of oversimplifying and wrongly
categorizing Aristotle’s position on natural slaves in books 1 and 3 of his Politics and book 7 of
his Ethics. Rather than there simply being one category of “natural slave”, Las Casas suggests
that there are four types of ‘barbarians’ that only one could be vaguely considered a natural
slave. 134
According to Las Casas, the first type of barbarian is one who is “cruel, inhuman, wild,
and merciless, acting against human reason out of anger or native disposition.” 135 Las Casas did
not believe the Indigenous communities of America fit this category. First of all, even if these
communities were to commit inhuman and merciless acts, they would not be unique in history.
Las Casas speaks of “both Greeks and the Latins, and any others who live even in the most
highly developed states, can be called barbarians, if by the savagery of their behavior, they are
anything like the Scythians, whose country was regarded as singularly barbaric.” 136 Most
damningly Las Casas suggests that by Aristotle’s definition it is the Spanish rather than the
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Indigenous communities of the Americas that behaves barbarically. Las Casas states, “Indeed,
our Spaniards are not unacquainted with a number of these practices. On the contrary, in the
absolutely inhuman things they have done to those nations they have surpassed all other
barbarians.” 137 So even if the Indigenous people fit the category of this first type, which Las
Casas clearly believes they do not, the Latins, the Greek, and the Spanish also fit with these
categories. Thus, if Aristotle was speaking about the first category of barbarians when he refers
to “natura servus” then, historically, people of every nation fit the category, least of all the
Indigenous communities of the Americas. Las Casas concludes that not only do the Amerindians
do not fit the first category of barbarians and that the Spaniards better fit the description, but also
that the first category of barbarian is not what Aristotle was referring to in discussing “natura
servus”.
The second type of barbarian that Las Casas delineates are those who do not have a
written language that corresponds to the spoken one. Las Casas considers such persons, “are not
called barbarians in the absolute but in a restricted sense; that is, they are not barbarians literally
but by circumstance….” 138 The circumstances that Las Casas speaks about are circumstances
where there is misunderstanding between cultures where, “because of the difference of his
language, does not understand another speaking to him.” 139 Las Casas recalls that in 1
Corinthians 14:11, the Apostle Paul himself, called himself a barbarian. Paraphrasing Homilia 7
in Matteaum, Las Casas argues that Chrysostom himself, states, “it is obvious that a people can
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be called barbarians and still be wise, courageous, prudent, and lead a settled life.” 140 Las Casas
also points out that according to this second usage that the Greeks called the Romans barbarous
and that the Romans called the Greeks barbarous. This understanding of barbarism, according to
Las Casas, is entirely circumstantial and thus cannot be used as a justification to make war on
anyone, let alone make the claim that because there is a miscommunication of language that
anyone should be considered a “natura servus.” 141 It is clear that if Las Casas considered the
Indigenous people to fit into this second category, it was definitely in a restricted sense that other
nations found themselves in as well. To make a claim toward justified war on the grounds of Las
Casas’ second type of barbarism would be absurd and is clearly not the type of barbarism that
Aristotle is referencing.
The third type of barbarism that Las Casas discusses is most likely the type that Aristotle
is referencing when he discusses natural servitude and for Las Casas this is an extremely rare or
even nonexistent occasion. This type of barbarism is reserved for those that, “of their evil and
wicked character or the barrenness of the region in which they live, are cruel, savage, sottish,
stupid, and strangers to reason.” 142 Las Casas believes that it is very rare for any person to fit this
description and this situation is not a situation that occurs in any kind of natural evolutionary
trajectory nor through the intention of God. Because this type of barbarism is so rare, Las Casas
condemns Sepúlveda vehemently for suggesting that such a type of barbarism could be attributed
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to an entire nation. Las Casas writes passionately, ‘Who, therefore, except one who is irreverent
toward God and contemptuous of nature, has dared to write that countless numbers of natives
across the ocean are barbarous, savage, uncivilized, and slow witted when, if they are evaluated
by an accurate judgment, they completely outnumber all other men?” 143 In other words,
Sepúlveda’s insistence that the entire number of Indigenous peoples in the Americas fit this third
category of barbarism is so contrary to the will of God, the traditions that say God wills all to be
saved would be made to be incoherent. Las Casas states, “Again, if we believe that such a huge
part of mankind is barbaric, it would follow that God’s design has for the most part been
ineffective, with so many thousands of men deprived of the natural light that is common to all
peoples.” 144 For Las Casas, Sepúlveda’s claim that the Indigenous communities of the Americas
are barbaric and natural slaves is not only offensive to the intelligence and culture of those
communities but is offensive to God. To say that God created entire communities as barbaric is
an insult to God. Not only is it offensive to God to say that entire communities could be
considered barbaric, but it is also offensive to God to make war against these communities. As
Las Casas states, “Again, if we want to be sons of Christ and followers of the truth of the gospel,
we should consider that, even though these peoples may be completely barbaric, they are
nevertheless created in God’s image. They are not so forsaken by divine providence that they are
incapable of attaining Christ’s kingdom” 145 For Las Casas, even if there is the possibility of this
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third type of barbarism, they should be treated with the dignity afforded to them as image bearers
of God.
Not only does Sepúlveda present a claim that would be offensive to God, but Sepúlveda
also depends on inaccurate sources about the native populations. Since Sepúlveda, himself, had
never travelled to the Americas he depended on Oviedo’s biased history to make his claims
about the Amerindian communities. Las Casas states, “The testimony of such a person of myself,
who has spent so many years in America, on the character of the Indians nullifies any allegation
founded solely on the testimony of Fernandez de Oviedo who had a preconceived attitude against
the Indians because he held Indians as slaves.” 146 It is clear for Las Casas, that even if Aristotle
is referring to this third category as natural servants, the Indigenous communities and no other
entire community could ever fit this category and that any testimony that would say these
communities fit the description of the third type of barbarism come either from an uninformed or
biased source.
The fourth and final type of barbarians that Las Casas defines are simply non-Christians.
For Las Casas, “The Amerindians, however, are barbarians of the fourth type, but so are all other
non-Christians, and this doesn’t justify making war on them.” 147 Las Casas, being a Dominican
priest of the 16th century, enacts a Christo-supremacy that is common to his context stating, “For
no matter how well governed a people may be or how philosophical a man, they are subject to
complete barbarism, specifically, the barbarism of vice, if they are not imbued with the mysteries
of Christian philosophy.” 148 This type of barbarism is not one that is inherent to any group but a
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matter of a Christocentric perspective making value statements on others. Drawing from
Augustine’s conversation with Lactantius, Las Casas understands the religions of the ancient
Greeks and Romans to be barbarous and often of the worst kind. If Aristotle was talking about
this type of barbarism as the precondition for natural servitude, then Aristotle himself must fit the
category since Aristotle did not participate in Christian philosophy.
Las Casas’ categories of barbarism illustrate how often this framework is based on
conditional and restricted meanings. Of the first type, a poignant observation of Las Casas is that
Christians, especially the Spanish colonists, often fit this category. The Indigenous people are not
barbarous in the second sense by nature but once again, Christians can occupy the second type of
barbarism. The third type of barbarism that Aristotle is probably referencing when referring to
natural servitude is so rare and that to call an entire nation this third type of barbarism would be
offensive to the plans of God. The final type of barbarism is a result of a Christo-supremacy of
the time and does not qualify for making just war.
The second and third arguments of Sepúlveda’s that qualify a just war based on the
Indigenous people breaking natural law by practicing “idolatry and human sacrifice” and the
need for Christians to rescue the innocent are countered by Las Casas by meticulous
interpretations of civic, ecclesiastical and natural law. As stated by Gutiérrez, “Human sacrifice
and cannibalism were the gravest of the accusations lodged against the Indians by those who
sought to legitimize the wars of conquest.” 149 Even theologians sympathetic to Amerindian
sovereignty such as Francisco de Vitoria, as we have illustrated, were concerned about the
allegations of human sacrifice and believed that saving the innocent from human sacrifice was
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one of the few claims the Spanish could make to justify war. Las Casas rejects arguments that
human sacrifice justifies Spanish conquest.
For Las Casas, the Spanish did not have actual jurisdiction over the Indigenous
communities to punish transgressions of natural law. For Las Casas jurisdiction could only
happen through habitation among Christians, a case under litigation within the land of a
sovereign, if they are a vassal, or a crime committed within the jurisdiction of Christians. 150
Crimes that were committed by unbelievers who live in jurisdictions not controlled by Christians
are unable to be prosecuted. “Surely”, Las Casas states, “no matter how despicable the crimes
they may commit against God, or even against religion among themselves or within their
territories, neither the Church nor Christian rulers can take cognizance of them or punish them
for these.” 151 People who have not converted to Christianity cannot be punished by Christians
and are not subject to Christ. While the Catholic Church during Las Casas’ time believed that
Christ had power over all nations, Las Casas argues that this is potential or habitual power rather
than actual power. Las Casas argues
Unbelievers are subject to Christ only potentially, not actually, and do not
belong to his authority or jurisdiction, insofar as it is potential until they be
converted or die or until the end of the world, when Christ will exercise
his full power over all persons by condemning the evil and rewarding the
good. And then all things will be actually subject to him.
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Drawing from Christian writers such as Augustine, Chrysostom, and Aquinas, Las Casas argues
that the Church is, “not in the business to punish the paganism of those who have never been
cleansed by Christian baptism.” 152 Not only does the Church not have jurisdiction over nonChristians, but the charge of idolatry cannot be punished because according to Las Casas, “the
worship of idols presupposes paganism or unbelief and is a superstitious protestation of unbelief”
and as stated earlier it is not possible to wage a just war on the basis of simple unbelief. Even if
the Indigenous community were under the jurisdiction of the Church and the Church could
punish unbelief, Las Casas’ final argument on why the Church should not even engage in such
jurisdiction is that preaching Christ to unbelievers should never start with punishment.
Las Casas argues that if the Church had jurisdiction to save the innocent, that, “(a) this
option should not always be exercised and (b) is no reason to make war, especially where there
are viable and peaceful alternatives.” 153 For Las Casas, there are six reasons that the Church
could make just war for the actions of non-Christians. The first is if unbelievers unjustly possess
Christian lands. The second is if they practice idolatry in lands under former Christian
jurisdiction. 154 Third is when unbelievers are blasphemous toward Christianity. The fourth is
when they hinder the spread of Christianity. The fifth is if they attack Christian territories and the
sixth is when they practice cannibalism and human sacrifice. It is clear to Las Casas that the first
condition does not apply to the Amerindians because they do not possess Christian lands. The
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second condition does not apply because their lands were never under Christian jurisdiction. 155
The third and fourth conditions of blaspheming Christianity and hindering the spread of
Christianity, for Las Casas, are nullified by the atrocious actions of the Spanish against the
Indigenous populations. For Las Casas, if the Amerindian communities blaspheme Christianity,
it is because, “they are not referring to the Christian religion but to Christians who have
mistreated them.” 156 If they hinder the spread of Christianity it is because they are acting in selfdefense, “they have killed preachers not because the preachers are Christian; they have killed the
preachers because they are Spanish.” 157 The fifth condition of just war does not apply to the
Amerindian communities because they are not attacking Christian lands. The only possible cause
of just war would be to protect the innocent from cannibalism and human sacrifice.
For Sepúlveda, if the Church was not able to punish the Indigenous communities for
“idolatry and human” sacrifice, surely the Church and Spain could intervene and make a just war
against the Indigenous communities of the Americas for the sake of protecting innocent lives lost
in the acts of human sacrifice? Las Casas contests this claim as well. First of all, Las Casas
argues that when there are two evils that one must face, it is necessary to choose the lesser evil.
In the case of loss of innocent life in the case of human sacrifice against the case for making just
war where there can be a loss of innocent life in the “fog of war”, Las Casas believes there would
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be more loss of innocent life in Spanish conquest. 158 Las Casas believes in the course of war it is
hard to distinguish the innocent from the oppressors because the large number involved, the
turbulent fury of battle, and the confusion and fear of invaders. 159 The Spanish conquest would
be an act that would involve far more loss of life than human sacrifice. Las Casas argument is
contingent on, “if one accepts his account of the American reality, that is, the facts of the case
regarding the ‘crimes’ of the American Indians on the one hand and the conduct of the Spanish
on the other.” 160 In the case of Las Casas understanding of the Spanish conquest, far more
innocent lives will be killed by the Spanish than by the sacrifices by the few Indigenous
communities that actually practice these sacrifices.
Not only would a just conquest against the Indigenous communities of America lead to
more loss of innocent life, but for Las Casas, the most powerful weapon against human sacrifice
are not guns or swords but rather the word of God. For Las Casas, “God’s word is more effective
than war, and experience has shown that Christianity is best spread only through preaching the
gospel.” 161 For Las Casas, “the real obstacle to the evangelization of the natives of the Indies is
the counter testimonial of Christians themselves.” 162 If God wants all people to be saved, then
the atrocities committed by the Spanish against the natives would not be the best way to bring

“Christ, then, does not seek but forbids that the guilty be judged or punished, or
uprooted by men as long as they cannot be distinguished from the innocent without endangering
them.” Las Casas, Defense, 209.
158

159

Las Casas, Defense, 213.

Glen Carman, “Human Sacrifice and Natural Law in Las Casas’s Apologia”, in
Colonial Latin American Review Vol 25 No 3. (2016), 283.
160

161

Santana, 49.

162

Gutiérrez, Las Casas, 155.

154

the news of salvation. The violence conducted by the Spanish would serve as an impediment to
the gospel. Las Casas believed this is what has happened in the past, “there is no other reason
why Saracens, Turks, and other unbelievers refuse to embrace our faith than the fact that we
deny them with our conduct what we offer them with our words.” 163 To make a just war would
do more harm to Christian testimony than it would do good.
Finally, one of Las Casas most interesting arguments against making just war against the
natives on the account of human sacrifice is that, according to Las Casas, human sacrifice is not
necessarily a direct breaking of natural law. Drawing on the understanding of whether or not
natural law is the same for everyone and natural law’s increasing variability in regard to specific
conclusions in Aquinas Summa I-II 94.4 and Soto’s understanding that distorted customs can
cloud or blind people from practical reason, Las Casas argued that human sacrifice can be an
excusable error of the Indigenous population’s effort to follow natural law. While making this
claim, Las Casas is quick to remind his readers that, “the ancient history of pagans and Catholics
alike testifies that almost all peoples used to do the same thing.” 164 If at some point human
sacrifice was common to all, how is it that it can be a result of natural law reasoning when the
first inclination of natural law is to preserve human life? Las Casas reasoning is as follows:
(1) All nations have a knowledge of God, even if this knowledge is
confused; (2) “natural instinct” leads all to worship God and honor him in
the best way they can; (3) there is no better way to worship God than
through sacrifice, and, in fact, ‘natural law’ obliges men to honor God in
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the best way they can and offer him the best things in sacrifice; and (4)
although the principle of sacrifice comes from natural law, the manner of
sacrifice and the things to be sacrificed do not; these come rather from
human law. 165
Las Casas goes on to argue that the value of human life is paramount and that without the
guidance of divine revelation, “nature obligates us to offer to God what seems to us the most
important and precious good, that is, human life.” 166 While such an argument seems to be quite
extraordinary, Las Casas frames this argument by calling attention to the fact that God asked
Abraham to sacrifice Isaac on Mt. Moriah. While God ultimately asks Abraham to stop, Las
Casas’ point is that there are narratives within the Christian and Hebrew scriptures that bring into
question the right to judge the Indigenous worldviews. As Gutiérrez states, “His effort to adopt
the viewpoint of the dwellers of the New World (“as if he was an Indian”) enables him to discern
the religious sense of actions such as the sacrifice to God of human beings’ lives--without
approving these actions ethically-- however much they might provoke revulsion in his
contemporaries.” 167 Adopting the viewpoint of the Indigenous communities not only provides
Las Casas the ability to discern their religious actions, but also provides a framework for natural
law reason acting in solidarity with Indigenous communities.
Las Casas illustrates that natural law reasoning, in order to be a law that is common to
all, must come from within particular cultural contexts rather than above cultural contexts. In so
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doing, Las Casas provides a framework of natural law reasoning that acknowledges the social
location of the reasoning subject. As such, while human sacrifice might be unheard of by the
theologians of Salamanca, through natural law reasoning engaging both the imperial perspective
and the Indigenous perspective Las Casas is able to dialogue between the two in order to speak
to imperial power in solidarity with the marginalized.
The last argument of Sepúlveda’s that Las Casas engages is primarily that Indigenous
communities cannot be evangelized by force. Ultimately, Las Casas believes that Sepúlveda
misunderstands the parable of the great feast in Sepúlveda’s emphasis on compulsory attendance.
When the host of the feast asks his servants to compel the outsiders to come to the feast, Las
Casas conveniently notices the general lack of guns but rather how compelling the outsiders
involves persuasion. Sepúlveda argues that Amerindians should not be forced to be baptized to
which Las Casas responds, “Sepúlveda says that he does not want Indians to be baptized
unwillingly or to be forced to the faith. But what greater compulsion can there be than that which
is carried out by an armed phalanx, shooting rifles and cannon…?” 168 For Las Casas, the proper
way to influence or preach to the native communities is through peaceful persuasion. Through
good deed and rather than through violence.
Las Casas’ work in the Valladolid debates were the culmination of years of his work on
behalf of the Indigenous communities. He was able to contest the understanding of natural law
that sought to establish Spanish supremacy over the Indigenous communities of the Americas by
offering a natural law reasoning that was rooted in solidarity on behalf of Indigenous
communities. Sepúlveda’s work on the debate was not published during Sepúlveda’s lifetime and
his thought was generally suppressed. After Las Casas’ death his thought was not well received
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and was seen as radical by the Spanish authorities who sought to continue the exploitation of the
Indigenous people and their lands. Las Casas legacy and his defense of the Amerindians has
more recently been recognized as one of the first attempts to establish international human rights
and Indigenous rights. Las Casas, because of his life's work in solidarity with the Amerindians, is
known as one of the greatest advocates for human rights in history.

Conclusion
The works of Vitoria and de Soto in the Salamanca school and the work of Las Casas as an
advocate for Indigenous rights has had a long-lasting impact on discussions about Indigenous
rights, human rights, natural law, and colonialism. While the study of Spanish and Iberian natural
law has been underdeveloped in the discussions about natural law in the United States, its
ressourcement for the study of Latinx social ethics is an important avenue of study. The Latinx
experience of imperialism is still an existential reality that Latinx communities face. Yet, for the
Latinx community, “The relevant imperial power in our time is not Spain; rather it is the United
States of America.” 169 Thus the ressourcement of the thought of Vitoria, de Soto, and Las Casas
and their natural law framework provides opportunities to translate their interaction with Spanish
imperialism with the Latinx experience being formed and shaped by policies that undergird U.S.
neocolonialism. The history and thought of these authors are important because, “This history is
also important in the philosophies of liberation, race, and identity. It is particularly crucial to
understanding immigration issues in the Americas, as the U.S. itself bears significant
responsibility for the brutal conditions that compel Latin American peoples, most notably those
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in Mexico and Central America, to leave their home countries.” 170 U.S. neo-colonial and
Imperial policies affect the everyday lives of Latinx communities whose identity is tied to U.S.
foreign policy. By adopting a framework similar to the natural law frameworks of the Spanish
scholastics, one is able to speak truth to the imperial power of the United States.
Not only is resourcing this Iberian natural law tradition important in discussing American
imperial power, it is also helpful in establishing the multi-faceted contexts that undergird much
of Latinx history and identity. Because many Latinx communities are of Latin American origin,
it is helpful to see the role that natural law has formed and shaped our communities of origin.
The thought of Las Casas and the Spanish scholastics formed much of theoretical underpinning
for Latin American independence movements. As Jose Carlos Chiarmonte illustrates, “The
laudatory stance arose from a belated recognition of natural law in the key arguments of
independentists agendas. This was the central argument in legitimizing the constitution of
governing bodies throughout Spanish America, namely, the doctrine of the pacto de sujeción
(pactum subjectionis) and the corollary of retroversion de las soberania al pueblo (retroversion
of sovereignty to the people).” 171 Not only was natural law an important aspect in Latin
American independence movements but it was in particular it’s Spanish iteration that proved
important. For example, “La Revolución que empezó en los años 1808-1810 tuvo poca influencia
de la filosfia política de Norteamérica o Europa (con excepción de España); estuvo basada
sobre la teoría politica de la Escolástica española (pactum translationis), que fue la palanca
para todo el movimiento que finalmente condujo a la independencia. La potestad de los reyes
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emanó originariamente del pueblo; revierte a él cuando el trono queda vacante.” 172 The
language of power being drawn from the people is a key theme in the theologies of Vitoria, de
Soto, and Las Casas.
Not only do Latin American independence movements derive their thought from the
natural law theories of Vitoria, de Soto, and Las Casas, but much of the continued fight for
liberation in the form of liberation theologies stem from their work. As Leonardo Boff, Clodovis
Boff, and Maria Clara Bingemer state, “
“The historical roots of liberation theology are to be found in the prophetic
tradition of evangelists and missionaries from the earliest colonial days in
Latin America--churchmen who questioned the type of presence adopted
by the church and the way Indigenous peoples, blacks mestizos, and the
poor rural and urban masses were treated. The names of Bartolomé de Las
Casas, Antonio de Montesinos, Antonio Vieira, Brother Caneca, and
others can stand for a whole host of religious personalities who have
graced every century of our short history.” 173
While there has been some hesitancy to adopt natural law frameworks from liberation
theologians, such as Gustavo Gutiérrez and Ignacio Ellacuría, their contention is against a natural
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law framework primarily originating in central Europe. This form of natural law is criticized as
ahistorical, uncritical, and dualistic, these theologians maintain that it has produced a
conservative church and a non-prophetic moral theology. They further criticize natural law's
concentration on philosophical reason to deduce moral prescriptions while ignoring both socialcultural locations and theological insights known through revelation and the practice of faith.” 174
Yet, this is quite obviously not describing the natural law discussions of Vitoria, de Soto, and
Las Casas, who focus their natural law arguments in history and multiple sources and pay
attention to social location. Gutiérrez and Ellacuría criticize a type of natural law that is rooted
primarily in modern magisterial teachings that are more akin to the John Finnis and Germaine
Grisez’s new natural law than it is to scholastic, revisionist, and contextual natural law. What
liberation theologians attack are the natural law opinions that emphasize, “fixed moral content
derived from natural inclinations that remains unaffected by new historical events and
discoveries; the virtual ignoring of Sacred Scripture as an entailing source for evaluating and
guiding human behavior; and the lack of a program of social reform.” 175 The type of natural law
that Traina suggests that Gutiérrez formulates is a type of natural law that is focused on the
human person over and against static moral principles, that is open and dynamic, and emphasizes
the liberation of every person. 176 Gutiérrez even focuses an entire study on Las Casas and his
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natural law method which focuses on standing in solidarity with the marginalized and exercising
natural law reasoning from within particular traditions.
Enrique Dussel argues that the thought of Las Casas and Vitoria constitute what he calls
counter-discourse. In contrasting Eurocentric discourse, Dussel argues that the most important
achievements in history are not explicitly European creations but are “instead the continued
dialectic of impacts, effects and responses between the center and its periphery.” 177 The dialectic
between center and periphery constitute counter-discourse as opposed to Habermas positioning
counter-discourse as beginning with Kant. Rather Dussel suggests that counter-discourse began
500 years before Kant. As Dussel states,
if we approach history from a global perspective, anchored in a nonEurocentrist vision of modernity, this counterdiscourse in fact is more
than five hundred years old: it was first heard on the island of Hispaniola
in the Caribbean in 1511, When Antonio de Montesinos assailed the
injustices being committed against the Indigenous peoples of this region
and echoed from there to the halls of the University of Salamanca,
deepening the theoretical and practical labor of the critique initiated by
Bartolomé de Las Casas in 1514, and thereafter, when this nascent
counterdiscourse was reflected in the lectures of Francisco de Vitoria
(compiled in his seminal work entitled De Indis). Once again, as is
typical among philosophers from Central Europe, the sixteenth century is
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irrelevant, and Latin America is simply absent from their mental
landscape. 178
What Habermas attributes to Kant has actually been a method of discussing ethics as counterdiscourse since the time of the encounter between the Spanish and the Indigenous communities
of the Americas. Not only does this encounter initiate the role of counter-discourse to empire, but
it’s because these discussions by Las Casas sought to do ethics from the position of the periphery
rather than the center.
Not only does the ressourcement of Iberian and Hispanic natural law found in Vitoria, de
Soto, and Las Casas provide a historical context for Latin American independence and liberation
theology but their thought also provides a couple of important themes that we can appropriate in
our effort to establish an explicitly Latinx natural law theory from within the Imperial constructs
of the United States.
First, these theologians and jurists provide a framework of natural law that is rooted in
the power of the community rather than simply the individual. Vitoria’s understanding of
authority deriving from the commonwealth illustrates that community is a natural good derived
from Aquinas’ third inclination of natural law. Contrasting Grotius’, Locke’s and Kant’s
understanding of social contract as primarily a movement to restrain the individual human’s
natural capacity to consume property and thus community is formed to protect an individual's
property, the Spanish conception of community is a natural good whose goal is to protect the
common good. This means that natural rights are not primarily rooted in an ontological
antagonism that positions one individual against another but are the place through which natural
moral reasoning can truly occur. Such a communal orientation gives validity to the emphasis of
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Latinx culture, narratives, and communal identity as a space from which moral reasoning about
the world can occur. Since the Scholastic’s view natural law as humanity’s participation in the
eternal law through the use of reason, communal reason that emphasizes the common good can
be a starting point for moral reasoning and synderesis.
Not only is community important for Vitoria, de Soto, and Las Casas, but the virtue of
justice is rooted in community and the common good as opposed to rectifying or creating
structures that simply preserve the individual from the other. Taking on the concept of justice as
giving each person their due, justice is essentially a virtue that orients one to another. This
understanding of justice requires rights language to negotiate the nuances of viewing rights
subjectively as property and viewing rights objectively as deriving from relationships. For justice
to be oriented towards giving each their due, justice is rooted in encounter and relationships as
opposed to faculties and liberties of individuals. De Soto’s thought, in particular, forces us to
ask, “what do we owe each other given these specific conditions of our relationship?” Knowing
the conditions of each relationship requires that we get involved in each other’s stories and to
acknowledge how our stories are often told at the expense of others. Justice begins by knowing
the conditions of our relationships and how our relationships form interrelated stories.
The emphasis on justice leads to appropriating Las Casas form of viewing natural law not
as abstract principles but as intercommunal dialogue rooted in real circumstances instead of
idealistic precepts. Natural law is done from the context of real communities with real problems.
While it would have been better for the Indigenous communities to have never had to deal with
Spanish conquest, the fact that the Spanish conquest brought about a set of circumstances that
must be addressed means that natural law reasoning cannot be done outside the recognition of
the real and intercommunal narratives of multiple communities. The encounter between the
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Spanish and Indigenous communities happened and often to disastrous effects. Las Casas’
natural law reasoning faces the realities of these effects and engages any resource available to
stop the reality of the destruction of the Indigenous communities. While it is best to highlight the
Indigenous voices in their indigeneity, when encountering the realities of an oppressive empire,
Las Casas illustrates that one must use any tool available in order to preserve lives.
For the Latinx community, community, justice, and a natural law reasoning that is rooted
in the realism of Latinx narratives is a framework of natural law reasoning that is worth
reclaiming in the face of the hegemony of American natural law. Now that we have discussed the
Latinx context from both the oppressive structures of the American natural law tradition and its
revisionist and contextual efforts of rehabilitation and the Iberian and Hispanic natural law
context, it will be necessary to construct a natural law tradition that takes seriously the specific
epistemological and narratival contexts of Latinx identity.
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Chapter 3: Mestizaje and Moral Realism: Towards a Latinx Synderesis
Introduction
In the first part of this dissertation, we focused on setting the historical context that
shapes discussions about the relationship between natural law and the Latinx communities of
origin. The American natural law and legal traditions functioned in ways that disenfranchise the
Latinx community from participation in the American legal and academic systems. We discussed
how the American natural law traditions were the inheritors of the traditions of Grotius, Locke,
and Kant, who sought to propagate natural law traditions that focused on the protection of the
individual and the protection of individual property. The discussions of individual property
presented an ontological antagonism that was rooted in racist constructions of reason. For
Grotius, Locke, and Kant, reason and whiteness were coterminous. Not only did we discuss the
racist constructions of reason, but we also illustrated how these authors posited their provincial,
Northern European construction of reason as universal. They universalized their particular
understandings of human reason and the natural world as normative over all other
epistemologies. At the end of chapter one, we discussed how revisionist and contextual natural
lawyers sought to revitalize a type of reason that took seriously the multifaceted and pluralized
epistemological locations in which people exist. These revisionist and contextual natural law
theologians sought to place natural law within their theological, pluralistic, and multifaceted
communities. These communities were theological, feminist, black, and queer communities.
Rather than positing a universalized understanding of natural law that seeks to dominate all
communities, these revisionist and contextual natural lawyers sought to promulgate a natural law
that was discerned from within these multivalent human contexts.
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In chapter 2, we focused on reclaiming the Iberian natural law traditions that functioned
as a counter-discourse to Empire and worked for the liberation of the indigenous communities of
the Americas. By resourcing an Iberian and Hispanic natural law, we worked to include a crucial
aspect of Latinx heritage into modern conversations of natural law. From the works of Francisco
de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, and Bartolomé de Las Casas, we resourced a natural law that
functioned as a voice of dissent from the type of natural law that justified Empire. In so doing,
we drew from these natural lawyers a type of natural law that understood authority as deriving
from the community, a type of law that posited justice as a central tenet of intercommunal
dialogue, and a type of natural law that took emphasized a moral realism that took seriously the
physical suffering of indigenous communities.
What the American and Iberian iterations of natural law have in common is a particular
understanding of moral epistemology. Both understand natural law as a framework of
antagonistic binaries in which opposites are pitted against each other. In the American natural
law traditions, whiteness is pitted against people of color in order to form racialized hierarchical
structures of reason. Iberian and Hispanic natural law served to codify Spanish imperialism to
the detriment of Indigenous communities with the notable exceptions of the theologians we
discussed above. Even from within the pre-enlightenment and pre-Colonial world of medieval
theologians we see a type of moral reasoning that often created codified non-fluid binaries: good
versus evil, reason versus passion, conscience versus synderesis. The natural law tradition of
both the Euroamerican tradition and the purely Hispanic and Iberian traditions take for granted
that their moral epistemology or synderesis is rooted in the construction of binaries. What is
needed to contrast this moral epistemology is to adopt a new epistemology rooted in a Latinx
understanding of Mestizaje.
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Latinx mestizaje, or intermixture, is a type of epistemological framework that brings
about new constructions that combat the notion of stable, nontransitive binaries. While mestizaje
is rooted in the interrelation between Spanish colonizers and indigenous women resulting in
mixed children, Latinx theologians in the United States have taken mestizaje to be an
epistemological position of in-betweenness. This epistemological position or border thinking
makes possible a type of thinking that is not rooted in either/or but in neither/nor and the
both/and. By adopting such a position, the Latinx moral experience allows for more ambiguity
and discernment. Even within the category of mestizaje itself, there exists a spectrum of
culpability that illustrates that moral reasoning must always exist in a spectrum of complicity and
solidarity with the most marginalized in the Latinx community.
This chapter will first illustrate how natural law moral thinking has been traditionally
rooted in a nontransitive moral reasoning developed by a tradition of explicating and explaining
synderesis. We will then look at the contributions of Latinx theologians to the epistemological
concept of mestizaje in order to posit a type of synderesis that can transcend these antagonistic
and non-transitive moral truth categories. We will illustrate what such a moral epistemology
rooted in mestizaje might look like by looking at how it is embedded in the cultural production of
Latinx literature. Within Latinx literature one can see mestizaje through the incorporation of
magical realism. Magical Realism is a genre in which there exists an aggressive corporeality
imbued with magical elements to show that neither are mutually exclusive. The conflict within
such literature is often a type of impossible moral decision making that requires the type of
thinking that antagonistic binaries cannot work through. We will make the claim that this type of
literature, which often seems fantastic, posits a truer picture of the moral than a type of
synderesis that is rooted in antagonistic binaries. Thus, mestizaje and magical realism posit a
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type of moral realism that rings truer to the moral realities people face in their everyday life than
the antagonistic binaries typically seen within Euroamerican and Iberian natural law.

What is Synderesis?
The process in which one knows the good is called synderesis. Synderesis has been defined by
the Catholic magisterial hierarchy as the apprehension of the first principles of morality. 1
Synderesis, however, has never had a continually consistent definition but has been a matter of
debate for centuries. Typically, synderesis has been understood to be infallible and impeccable,
meaning that synderesis is a good in itself that does not change. 2 Theologians during the middle
ages fought over the definition of synderesis asking whether synderesis was a power, was part of
reason, or was a habit. Later moral theologians and ethicists took these arguments and developed
a moral epistemology called moral realism. In what follows, I will provide a brief discussion on
the development of synderesis that leads to modern conceptions of moral realism as a way of
positing the good as an intransitive truth value immediately accessible to Eurocentric
autonomous reason.
The term synderesis first comes into discussion through Jerome’s commentary on
Ezekiel. 3 In his commentary, Jerome discusses the theophanic vision in the first chapter of
Ezekiel. In particular, Jerome comments on the appearance of four heavenly creatures described
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in 1:10-14. The creatures, known as “tetramorphs” each have four faces. Each creature has a face
of a human, a lion, an ox, and an eagle. 4 Because of the general ambiguity of what Ezekiel
encounters and the allegorical and typological readings of scripture employed by early Christian
writers, the faces of the tetramorph were interpreted to symbolize a plethora of things including
the four virtues, four major prophets, and the four gospel writers. 5 Jerome interprets the
tetramorph Christocentrically. Acknowledging the creatures’ reappearance in Revelation 4:7,
Jerome speculates that the tetramorph symbolizes the four gospels. In the same way that the
creatures in Ezekiel 1:10-14 obscure the divine image, the gospels contain the image of God
within them, Jesus.
In his discussion about the symbolic meaning about the faces of the tetramorph, Jerome
engages the philosophical interpretations of the creatures. In particular, he engages in the
interpretations influenced by Plato’s tripartite distinctions of the soul. As Douglas Kries states,
“these interpreters who were following Plato must be applying to Ezekiel the famous tripartite
distinction between the ‘reasoning,’ the ‘spirited,’ and the ‘desiring’ parts of the soul discussed
by Socrates in book 4 of the Republic.” 6 Kries acknowledges that while there are four faces there
are only three parts of the soul. Jerome states,
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“And they place the fourth part, which the Greeks call syneidêsis,
above and beyond these three. This is the spark of conscience
(scintilla conscientiae), which, even in the breast of Cain after he
was ejected from paradise, is not extinguished, and by which, even
when conquered by pleasures or by rage, deceived by the very
similitude of reason, we realize that we sin. 7
According to Jerome’s understanding of the Platonist interpretations of the faces of the
tetramorph, the human face represents reason, the lion’s face represents passion, the ox
represents desire, and the eagle is above all and represents synderesis. 8 It is Jerome’s use of
synderesis that sparks discussions about the role synderesis plays in relation to conscience in the
middle ages.
However, a problem arises in the way medieval theologians approach Jerome’s
Commentary on Ezekiel. They presume that Jerome adopted the Platonist’s view of the
tetramorph. As Kries states,
In a blunder of remarkable proportions, the fact that in this
passage Jerome was reporting not his own view but that of those
who follow the "foolish wisdom of the philosophers" was
overlooked, presumably because the passage from Jerome had
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been incorporated into the glossae without the warning that
preceded it in the original Commentary 9
Nevertheless, the reception of the Platonist’s view in Jerome’s commentary allowed synderesis
to be interpreted as a higher power that exists above human reason, passions, and desires. This
understanding of synderesis became the normative ethical framework for the theologians of the
middle ages. Not only do medieval theologians adopt the Platonist framework that was rejected
by Jerome, but they also adopt Jerome’s use of synderesis as a term that was corrupted from
syneidesis. According to Kries, “most scholars acknowledge that the appearance of synderesis in
the medieval manuscripts of Jerome's commentary is in all likelihood a corruption of the Greek
word syneidesis, which is the standard correlate in Greek Patristic literature for the Latin
conscientia.” 10 It is the adoption of the Platonist interpretation of the tetramorph and the adoption
of the term synderesis that led to medieval debates about conscience and synderesis.
The debates about natural law in the middle ages were concerned with the difference
between synderesis and conscience. The primary question the theologians of the middle ages
sought to address was whether or not synderesis was innate to human reason as a power or if
synderesis was innate to nature as part of creation outside the human subject. The debates about
the nature of synderesis are also part of a wider debate in the work of the scholastics about
whether to locate natural law in pre-rational order of natural creation or in reason as a nature
unique to humanity. As Jean Porter suggests, “It is one of the legacies of modern romanticism
that we tend to think of nature and reason as contrasts” and “the scholastics were not unaware of
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such a contrast.” 11 Essentially, the scholastics delineate two types of nature. The first type of
nature they discuss is nature as the pre-rational order of creation established by God. The second
type of nature is a nature unique to the human person through reason. Despite these two contrasts
of pre-rational nature and rationality unique to human nature, the scholastics did not see them as
incommensurable. Rather they saw the dichotomy as working together. The discussions about
pre-rational nature and rational nature required further investigation about the core features of
natural law. Namely, does natural law exist in pre-rational nature or is it something unique to
humans, and moreover, does natural law, “prescribe different forms of behavior for human
beings and non-rational animals.” 12 Different scholastics often emphasized natural law existing
in pre-rational nature or nature as human reason.
According to Porter, Phillip the Chancellor emphasized natural law as primarily “reason
as nature”, in which, “the properly human expression of natural law involves acting in
accordance with reason, because the characteristic expression of human nature is to act in
accordance with reason.” 13 Yet, human nature as rational doesn’t preclude the pre-rational as not
participating in God’s reason. Albert the Great suggests, even though all creation works under
rational principles, only humans and angels are rational creatures and therefore are the only one’s
under moral obligation. 14 The separation between pre-rational nature and nature as reason unique
to humans provide the contextual framework in discussing where to locate natural law and its
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obligations. Is natural law primarily in the pre-rational order of creation or is natural law unique
to humans? Furthermore, where is synderesis located? Does synderesis as the ability to know the
good primarily exist in the pre-rational nature or is synderesis a type of power unique to human
reason? And finally, is synderesis natural law itself or a way to understand natural law?
In the same way that the medieval theologians and canonists had an abundance of views
regarding the role of natural law’s location in pre-rational nature or nature as reason unique to
humanity, the debates on synderesis follow the same pattern. Simon of Bisignano, a 12th century
canonist and Roland of Cremona, a 13th century scholastic philosopher, identify synderesis as
natural law itself. 15 Reading the story of Mary and Martha in John’s gospel where Mary sits and
contemplates at the feet of Jesus, Hugh of St. Cher equates Mary with contemplation and the
Stella Maris, the guiding light of the sea. 16 Mary’s guiding light symbolizes synderesis which
can be interpreted to be outside the volitional powers of the human subject. Rufinus, another
12th century canonist, contrasts the idea that synderesis exists outside the person by suggesting
that synderesis is a natural force deep within the human person and that not even Cain, who
killed his brother, has that force extinguished. William of Auxerre, Roland of Cremona, and John
of La Rochelle follow the same line of thought and say that it is a power within a human person
that is superior to reason. 17 Alexander of Hale equates synderesis with reason itself. 18 Phillip the

15

Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 89.

Robert A. Greene. “Synderesis, the Spark of Conscience, in the English Renaissance.”
Journal of the History of Ideas 52, no. 2 (April 1, 1991):201. 14 Hugh of St. Cher, Opera Omnia
(Venice, 1600), VI, 355: "Maria stella maris, & significat rationem sive synderesim
remurmurantem contra peccatum, ad quam recurrens Anima scit utrum erraverit, sicut naute per
stellum.”
16

17

Somme “The Infallibility of Synderesis”, 405.

18

Somme, “Infallibility of Synderesis”, 405.

174

Chancellor was the first to write a complete treatise on synderesis in his Summa de Bono. In this
treatise Phillip connects synderesis to conscience. Ultimately synderesis is related to conscience
as knowledge is related to action. 19 Conscience, for Phillip, acts upon the knowledge of the good
apprehended by synderesis. These medieval theologians that equate reason with synderesis
become the focal point of 13th century discussions between Aquinas and Bonaventure on
whether or not Synderesis is a power, a habit, or exists in conscience.
While many medieval canonists and theologians take synderesis as equivalent with
reason, St. Bonaventure joins synderesis to the affective parts of the human will. Bonaventure
places conscience in the realm of the will and by placing synderesis in the realm of the will it
becomes the “spark” (scintilla) that drives conscience toward the good. 20 Bonaventure calls
synderesis the spark because conscience cannot move without the, “mediation of synderesis.” 21
For Bonaventure, synderesis is placed in the affective part of the will because humanity has an
attraction to the good found in objects. Conscience, as part of the intellect, decides which objects
to pursue. Synderesis becomes the innate attraction to the good expressed in the will. Since
synderesis is placed in the affective parts of the human will, emotion usually associated with our
modern notion of conscience such as guilt, shame, and regret are a result of synderesis. For
Bonaventure, while synderesis never is implicated in sin or errs, it can be rendered ineffective by
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an erroneous conscience, by pursuit of unbridled pleasure, and obstinanancy. 22 By placing
synderesis in the affective part of the will, Bonaventure stands in contrast with the medieval
theologians that place synderesis as equivalent to reason.
In contrast to Bonaventure, Aquinas does not place synderesis in the affective powers of
the will. Rather, Aquinas describes synderesis as a habit (habitus) of the immediate apprehension
of the first principles of practical reason. Synderesis still drives conscience for both Bonaventure
and Aquinas. Yet, for Aquinas, synderesis drives conscience through the apprehension of
knowledge in which conscience acts. For Bonaventure, on the other hand, synderesis is the will
that drives conscience to act. For Aquinas, synderesis is not a movement while Bonaventure
synderesis is the first movement of action. Synderesis for Bonaventure is a power of movement
from the will.
Aquinas’ first work in which he discusses synderesis is his Commentary on the
Sentences. In this early work, one can see the influences of early commentators in Aquinas’
connecting synderesis to reason. In the Sentences, Aquinas places synderesis in the realm of
reason but not coterminous with reason itself insofar as synderesis is not a power like reason but
is a habit of apprehending the good. 23 Yet, ultimately, Aquinas suggests that synderesis is above
reason. His argument in the Commentary on the Sentences, is that if synderesis is part of reason
then it must attend to both good and evil as acting within the same genus. Synderesis, however,
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always attends to the good, and therefore must not be coterminous with reason but is a habit. 24
For Aquinas, synderesis is more like the immovable starting point from which action is derived.
As Crowe states, “everything that undergoes change must proceed from something that remains
one and the same” and requires “a stable and unchanging knowledge, not obtained by the normal
discursus but immediately given to the intellect.” 25 For Aquinas, in the same way that
speculative reason is founded on self-evident principles, practical reason begins in the
apprehension of indemonstrable first principles. The apprehension of first principles is itself
synderesis. As Crowe summarizes, “Synderesis is, therefore, the habitual knowledge of
immediately-known first principles in practical matters.” 26 Synderesis guides conscience in such
a way as it acts as an unmoving starting point.
Because synderesis is not a power or faculty within the subject of human reason but is
rather analogous to the first principles of speculative reason, this means that synderesis cannot
err. Synderesis is therefore, infallible, inerrant, impeccable, and Aquinas equates these qualities
with the universal. 27 Aquinas does this by discussing the differences between the nature of
angels and humans. Drawing from pseudo-Dionysius’ notion of hierarchy in the Divine Names,
Aquinas argues that “Divine wisdom ‘joins the ends of nobler things with the beginnings of
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lesser things’.” 28 When it comes to moral epistemology or the pursuit of truth, angels
immediately apprehend truth without “investigation or movement of reason,” while humans need
discursive powers to know truth. 29 Yet, when humans participate in their highest nature, they are
able to perceive truth immediately, although still lower than the angels. Once again, Aquinas
makes the analogous comparison between synderesis and the first principles of practical reason
and ultimately concludes that synderesis cannot be sublimated to the powers of human faculties
but rather exists above it and is unchangeable. This unchangeable habit that is immediately
accessible to the human mind, results in universalized principles. As Aquinas states:
For in the very habit of the universal principles of law there are
contained certain things which pertain to the eternal norms of
conduct, such as, that God must be obeyed; and there are some that
pertain to lower norms, such as, that we must live according to
reason. However, synderesis is said to refer to these unchangeable
things in one way, and higher reason in another. For something is
called unchangeable because of an immutability of its nature, and
it is thus that divine things are unchangeable. Higher reason is said
to deal with unchangeable things in this way. A thing is also said to
be unchangeable because of the necessity of a truth, although the
truth may concern things which according to their nature can
change. Thus the truth: every whole is greater than its part, is
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unchangeably true even in changeable things. Synderesis is said to
refer to unchangeable things in this way. 30
The unchangeability of synderesis and its immutability make moral good an objective reality. The
universalized objective goods that are immediately perceived by angel’s, when humanity is at its
highest nature, are immediately recognizable to humanity. Moral failure then does not occur in
synderesis itself or in its knowledge but rather is a failure of subsequent principles and
conscience.
Interpreters of Aquinas look at moral failure through the lens of syllogistic reason. As
Somme describes, making moral decisions requires the use of several premises and a conclusion.
The first premise is a first principle grasped by synderesis, such as “evil must be avoided.” 31 The
minor premise would consist of a lower principle such as, “adultery is evil.” 32 The conclusions
will be, “particular judgement concerning the course of action in a particular situation.” 33 The
judgement of the course of action in any given situation would be the result of conscience. Given
this syllogistic framework, synderesis as the first premise is indemonstrable and therefore must be
taken as something to believe through faith. The knowledge of the good based on first principles
cannot be wrong nor cannot it be rooted in sin. Moral error is typically found in the course of
action decided upon by conscience.
Aquinas’ understanding of synderesis as a habit that is able to immediately perceive
unmoved first principles of practical reason becomes the normative framework through which
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moral realism is developed in the new natural law theories we discussed in chapter one. The fact
that these first principles grasped by synderesis are immutable and unchangeable, and therefore
universalized, provides a pathway to moral realism that views the good as intransitive objective
goods that are universally recognizable regardless of cultural framework.
The problem with the understanding the role of synderesis as immutable and
unchangeable as a ground for moral realism is that it does not seem entirely realistic to suggest
that there is a type of morality that is always applicable within a variety of different situations and
that each situation will always yield the same moral conclusion. One can also question the
viability of syllogistic reasoning in the context of actual moral pursuits. While there are some
occasions where one can choose between an unambiguous good and unambiguous evil, most
situations are not black and white. Instead, moral choices often involve ambiguity wherein one
must discern which action would produce the most good or least amount of evil. A synderesis that
is rooted in the immediate apprehension of the good cannot effectively deal with the messiness of
everyday moral decisions. Not only does such a synderesis ignore the practical in everyday
decision making, it also ignores the fact that people’s moral agencies are also tied up in varying
degrees of oppressive structures. Moral decisions are conditioned by the systemic structures that
frame such decisions. Not only are there moral decisions that don’t have a stark dichotomy
between good and evil but are competing notions of the good, there are also decisions where one
has to decide which decision is the lesser evil. Rather than advocating for a type of synderesis that
cannot bear the weight of everyday decisions that are intricately tied to systematic oppression,
there needs to be a type of moral epistemology that takes into account the fact that most moral
decision making does not occur within a type of syllogistic reason, but rather requires careful
discernment between a variety of factors including cultural, historical, and narratival variables.
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There needs to be an epistemology that can account for ambiguity, paradox, and mixture. For
Latinx theologians, mestizaje, as an epistemological category, could provide a type of synderesis
that can account for the messiness of moral discernment.

What is Mestizaje?
Mestizaje is a Spanish term that simply means mixture or intermixture. However, it is the context
in which this term is employed that gives it epistemological and political saliency. Mestizaje was
first a concept rooted in colonialism and racism and was used as a racialized term to denote
mixture between Iberian conquistadores and exploited Indigenous communities in the Americas.
Ultimately, mestizaje was a result of European white supremacy. Mestizas/os were people placed
into a racialized hierarchy.
The birth of mestizaje as an ethic and racialized category came through the initial
violence of Spanish colonialism against Indigenous communities. Christopher Columbus’
encounters with the Taino of Hispaniola and Hernando Cortez’ encounter with the Mexica
people of Mexico resulted in genocidal violence against the native peoples. Part of this violence
was sexual violence against the native women culminating in children with indigenous and
Spanish ancestry. Facilitated by their victory over the Indigenous people and a sense of
Eurocentric superiority, “The Spanish accounts offer racialized depictions of the indigenous
peoples that downplayed the outstanding achievements expressed in their diverse
civilizations.” 34 Although the Spanish considered themselves to be biologically and culturally
superior, they still had children with Indigenous women. The resulting children were usually,
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“singled out, marginalized, and stripped of social and political privileges on the basis of their
mixed condition” and resulted in a “racialized social hierarchy.” 35 At the top of the racial
hierarchy were those colonists who were born in Spain and traveled to the Americas. Below
them were the criollos, those who were born to Spanish parents. Because of the Spanish
racialized hierarchy, Spanish colonizers sought to keep governance of Spanish colonies in the
hands of the Spanish born or criollx class. Mestizos were “prevented from occupying public
offices, enlisting in the army, being ordained as priests, and entering schools where only people
with “pure” blood were allowed (Rosenblat 1954; Ares Queija 1997). They were discriminated
against in many ways, and legislation was even passed by the consejo de las Indias, in which
they could not own property, have encomiendas, or have indigenous people as servants.” 36
Mestizaje became a constructed badge of discrimination. Any perception of intermixture
between Spanish and Indigenous ancestry lead to the deprivation of any political agency.
As a result of the lack of political agency through the systematic discrimination of the
mestizx community, mestizaje itself became a source of political identity. Garcilaso Inca de La
Vega, one of the earliest known mestizos, was one of the first persons to make his mestizaje
central to not only his ethnic identity but also his political identity. 37 Because of the growing
number of the Mestizx population in Latin America, Mestizaje became “the most powerful and
widespread conceptual device with which Latin America has interpreted itself.” 38 Latin
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American independence was centered around the concept that Mestizx community constituted a
new people that could govern themselves. As Latin America continued to identify itself within
the epistemological framework of mestizaje, it took on a salvation ideology that, “has prevailed
and still does prevail as a conciliating synthesis of the many mixtures that constitute the social
and cultural Latin American corpus.” 39 Mestizaje functioned as a major epistemological category
that permeates Latin American identity.
Similar to Latin American formation of identity, U.S. Hispanic theologians have
uncritically adopted mestizaje as a theo-political category in which they could identify
themselves. Mestizaje became a political and religious banner of unity for a variety of Latinx
populations from diverse backgrounds. 40 As Néstor Medina summarizes,
In the context of exclusion from the social imaginary of the United States,
and in the search for creative ways to name their reality, the category of
mestizaje provided these scholars with a way to name themselves as social
subjects in resistance to the assimilatory policies of the U.S. government.
As a collective of diverse ethnic and cultural groups, mestizaje served as
the symbolic term for cohering as a people and for engaging the struggle
for sociopolitical and economic justice. 41
Medina illustrates how these theologians, while working to provide an epistemological and
cultural framework that is more accepting of difference and the contingent nature of Latinx racial
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and ethnic identity, fail to address the anti-Indigenous and anti-Black frameworks rooted in the
historical use of mestizaje. For Medina, these theologians draw, “from idealized constructions
about mestizaje in Latin America, and without engaging the socio-political contexts of the
region.” 42 The appropriation of mestizaje by these theologians occurred in a particular context in
which the Latinx community encountered intense marginalization. Now that these contexts have
changed, toward an increasing acceptance of some in the Latinx community, one must take into
account the ways, “Indigenous, African and women’s voices are beginning to challenge the
dominant versions of mestizaje in the different countries of Latin America.” 43 These voice have
challenged the way that mestizaje has been understood in a context saturated by, “hegemony,
homogenization, racism and sexism to the way mestizaje has been conceived and articulated
differently by the Latin American elite.” 44As we continue to discuss mestizaje, we will see how
the trajectory of these theologians’ appropriation of mestizaje moves away from the biological
reality and racialized hierarchies to an epistemological location of embracing difference that
subverts the Latin American contexts that conceived mestizaje as a frame of exclusion. It is this
epistemological understanding of mestizaje, as will be articulated by Ada María Isasi-Díaz, that
forms the basis for a more open and dynamic understanding of synderesis. Following Díaz, we
will adopt mestizaje as a moral epistemology that seeks to open oneself up to difference rather
than homogenization. As such, describing mestizaje as a type of synderesis will allow us to view
mestizaje as heuristic, an approximation for establishing a strategy of cooperation among diverse
Latinx groups while also acknowledging both difference and mixture within these groups. Such a
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strategic use of mestizaje as a frame of synderesis will allow us to contextualize ahistorical and
acontextual forms of moral reasoning with a type of reasoning, whose frame itself, is rooted in
the messy and contradictory conditions of historical and contextual contingency.
Virgilio Elizondo, one of the first to adopt mestizaje as a theological category, writing
about the Mexican-American experience, suggested that mestizaje was the in-betweenness that
Mexican-Americans feel in regard to their nonacceptance by the dominant Anglo-community in
the United States and their Mexican brothers and sisters south of the border. Elizondo considers
this mestizaje to be a second mestizaje that speaks to the cultural rejection experienced by the
Latinx community in the United States. Elizondo transforms the biological condition of mestizaje
as originally understood in Latin America to a theological construction explaining the social
location of the Latinx community in the United States.
Drawing on Elizondo’s understanding of mestizaje as a theological category of inbetweenness, Roberto Goizueta applies the understanding of mestizaje to theological aesthetics.
Rather than seeing the good, beautiful, and the true as mutually exclusive categories of thought,
Goizueta argues that these ‘transcendentals’ are interdependent and their transcendence is mixed
with the everyday religious practices of the Latinx community. For Goizueta, a mestizx
theological aesthetic is most aptly seen in the popular Catholicism of the Latinx community in
which it is seen as, “aesthetic praxis in that it embodies the Latino mestizo heritage and
identity.” 45 Popular Catholicism according to Goizueta subverts the binaries and rejects the
dichotomies prevalent in Euroamerican epistemologies. Rather, U.S. Hispanics, “instinctively
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see the world as a fusion of “both/and” rather than as a separation of “either/or.”” 46 Popular
Catholicism views the universal in the particular and does not see one superimposing itself on
the other. For Goizueta, Latinx popular Catholicism primarily subverts the tendency in
Euroamerican epistemology to separate reality into abstract categories away from concrete
realities which, “distorts our understanding of the nature of reality and the character of human
action.” 47 Goizueta argues that the concrete is saturated with the real creating a real mixture. For
Goizueta, mestizaje takes on a sacramental quality, or what he defines, as sacramental realism in
which concrete religious symbols are not simply symbols but are imbued with universal import.
Goizueta argues for a worldview that is, “characterized by a critical realism that is not naive or
simplistic in its affirmation of religious truth, or in its understanding of reality” but is also is “not
reducible to a mere human construction that, while meaningful for Hispanics, cannot be said to
express a truth or reality that extends beyond the U.S. Hispanic community.” 48 For Goizueta, the
mixture of the concrete and the universal functions as an epistemological framework that gives
the U.S. Hispanic community universal value deriving from their particularity. Latinx popular
Catholicism, in other words, particularizes the universal rather than universalizes the particular.
To operate in worldview that does not particularize the universal but only exists in the abstract,
Goizueta argues is the greatest threat to faith because it is, “represented by a rationalist or
spiritualist Christianity that preaches God without a world; a Christ without a face, without a
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body, without wounds; a cross without a corpus.” 49 The wounds of Christ and the wounds
affecting the Latinx community are the same and must be accounted for if one is to call oneself a
moral realist.
The theologian whose appropriation of mestizaje that is most useful for our understanding
of mestizaje as a type of synderesis is Ada María Isasi-Díaz. For Díaz, Mestizaje is a symbol for
the moral truth-praxis that focuses on the everyday (lo cotidiano) lives and struggles (luchas) of
Hispanic women in the United States. For Isasi-Díaz, “mestizaje is, first of all, a call to recreate
moral standards according to our daily struggle for survival, and it is a call for social change so
we can embrace diversity and live according to our own moral norms.” 50 Mestizaje as a symbol
of moral truth-praxis is a movement of positionality that subverts the notion that truth, in order to
be universal, must be abstract. As Díaz states
“By using mestizaje, therefore, as a symbol of our moral truth-praxis, we
once again claim the experience of Hispanic Women as the source of our
theology. In claiming mestizaje as a symbol for our mortal truth-praxis we
are saying that we do not believe in abstract notions of truth. We are suing
the binomial truth-praxis to indicate that we deal with our own experience
in a critical way and look at it in light of the histories of our own
communities and of other communities of struggle, and in light of what
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has been passed down to us by our forebears, particularly our mothers, our
tías, and our abuelitas.” 51
Mestizaje is a category that mixes the universal with particular experiences of Hispanic women.
Truth is not a static category of immediate apprehension but is something that is lived through
praxis. Through rooting the universal in the lived experiences and struggles of Hispanic women,
truth becomes a matter in which one takes the epistemological position to struggle for justice,
reject hierarchical competition, and maintain responsibility for each other. Mestizaje is an
epistemological commitment to diversity and to struggle on behalf of the marginalized.
It is quite important that Isasi-Díaz uses the language of symbol to discuss mestizaje as a
symbol of moral-truth praxis. Within the realm of theology, a symbol does not simply point to an
exterior reality. A symbol makes such a reality present in its very process of representation. It
brings about the reality it represents. As such, making mestizaje a symbol of moral truth-praxis is
to say that mestizaje makes present openness to the other and unity in diversity. As Isasi-Díaz
states, “we judge our morality and our commitment to mestizaje by how effective we are in
welcoming diversity and engaging with each other.” 52 Mestizaje makes real diversity and
engagement. Because of this sacramental-symbolic function of mestizaje in relation to moral
truth praxis, it functions as a type of moral realism. Mestizaje speaks more to the reality of
multiculturalism and diversity than types of moral realism that present monolithic conceptions of
the good. Thus, mestizaje presents an alternative type of synderesis.
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Mestizaje as a symbol of moral truth-praxis positions synderesis as praxis. That is, in
order to know the good, one must do the good. To quote Richard Cohen who writes about the
ethical/philosophical project of Emmanuel Levinas, “to know the good is to already not to have
done it.” 53 By placing mestizaje as an epistemological commitment, it influences the way a
person knows, how they know, and what they know. This means that what is considered to be
good is passed down from the past and is both codified by its very process of being traditioned
and is itself subject to change through encounters with other traditions. One begins to know the
good through the very process of knowing and learning. Synderesis is therefore not the result of
passive consumption of information but is the result of the dynamic process of dialogue,
encounter, and discernment. The type of dynamic synderesis in which the good is pluriform
rather than univocal is made present in the reality of mestizaje.

Mestizaje as a Moral Epistemology
There are advantages to adopting mestizaje as a moral epistemology or a type of way of
engaging in a more global form of synderesis. Adopting mestizaje provides opportunities to
create a more holistic understanding of synderesis by including more voices in moral
conversations, recognizing that moral decision-making is a journey rather than the apprehension
of a static truth, and privileging voices that have traditionally been marginalized through
Eurocentric moral thinking. In adopting mestizaje, as a type of synderesis, natural law takes on
the form of a type of moral reasoning rather than the explication of specific moral precepts.
Adopting mestizaje as a type of moral reasoning allows for a type of realism that is invested in
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the everyday lives of the people who are doing the actual reasoning. Instead of viewing moral
decision making as derived from generalized principles and actions compared to those principles,
mestizaje, intermingles the universal and the particular to focus on the actual location of moral
decision making. Through adopting mestizaje as a type of synderesis, one can contest the ideas
that the universal must be univocal, that decision making is static apprehension of the good
rather than a journey, and that there are privileged perspectives that marginalize non-Eurocentric
moral reasoning.

Contesting the Universal as the Univocal
Adopting mestizaje as a type of synderesis subverts the idea that the universal is
coterminous with the univocal. That is, to know the good is not to simply adopt a single voice, a
single path, and a single pattern. To pay attention to the particularity of differing communities
and to bring them together in their particularity is to participate in the intermixture of mestizaje.
Mestizaje is not a catch-all term for Hispanic experience but rather is the relational coming
together of multiple experiences. Therefore, to adopt mestizaje as the coming-together of
interrelational interdependencies is to reject the universal as a monolithic voice.
Maria Pilar Aquino discusses prior conditions for doing theology from the perspective of
U.S. Latino/a Theology. One of these conditions is understanding the ‘whole’ as culturally plural
truths. Aquino argues, “we must move beyond the notion that the ‘whole’ implies ‘the truth’ or
that ‘the truth’ exists in an abstract ‘whole’” but rather, “we must understand truth not as a
condition or situation but as a process.” 54 The process of understanding truth involves

Maria Pilar Aquino, “Theological Method in U.S. Latino/a Theology: Toward an
Intercultural Theology for the Third Millennium”, in From the Heart of Our People. eds.
Orlando Espín and Miguel H. Díaz. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 1999), 21.
54

190

interdiscursive truth and we must choose to know, “not by imprisoning reality in a closed
conceptual system, but by affirming that reality as a foundational ‘opening’ that is ‘respective’ to
other modes of reality.” 55 This fundamental opening of reality involves, on the practical level,
broadening the sources that make up theology. Knowing truth has less to do with static
apprehension but more to do with attuning our understanding to multi-valent and culturally
interdependent practices of truth-making.
Orlando Espín offers similar thoughts on the method of theology by understanding the
quest for static truth as a univocal concept as a vain pursuit while at the same time critiquing the
Euroamerican iterations of postmodernity as, “an attempt at ethically justifying self-sufficiency
and the silencing of the voices of the non-dominant others.” 56 Rather, Espín argues that, there are
no multiple particularities and there is not one evident human universality”, rather, “there are
multiple historical, cultural, human universalities which can encounter one another, which can
challenge one another, and which through intercultural dialogue might engage in the process of
unveiling universally relevant truth.” 57 Essential for moving from a univocal reality toward
plural universalities is understanding that knowledge is contingent and thus making universality
itself contingent on interaction with others. Espín posits that, “by acknowledging the contingency
of our universality (and of its knowing, living, and saying) we open our universality to the
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possibility, indeed to the need, for dialogue for learning from other historical and cultural
universalities, and for allowing our universality to be called to solidarity with others.” 58 For
Espín, the understanding of universality must shift to understanding universalities as rooted in
interdependent particularities that lead not to universally valid truth but to universally relevant
truths engaging in intercultural dialogue.
The advocating for an understanding of plural construction of universalities stands in
direct contrast to a type of epistemology that constructs a monolithic and univocal construction
of universality. Espín argues this understanding of universality, “is the opposite of Eurocentric
dominant provincialism, whereby the dominant western cultures decree and define their own
universality as the only ‘universally valid’ universality.” 59 Rather, by engaging in intercultural
dialogue and understanding the pluralistic nature of particular universalities, “that only through
the contrasting and difficult process of unveiling universally relevant truth will universally
relevant truth be unveiled without imposition, without colonization, and with the utmost respect
for all those who engage in this search.” 60 Espín calls this practice verisimultud.61 Because truth
is rooted in the conditions in which we know it, through particular communities in dialogue,
knowing truth can never be a static apprehension of a concept but much like Aquino argues is a
process that can only be done by analogy.
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The universal as univocal takes on an ethical importance when it comes to the everyday
lives of the Latinx community in the United States. The monolithic and cultural domination
enacted by Anglo communities in the U.S. physical and epistemological borders of who is in,
who is out are a daily reality for the Latinx community. As Miguel de La Torre correctly points
out, “To be a Hispanic living anywhere in the U.S. is to live constantly on the border, that is, the
borders between power and disenfranchisement, between privileged and dispossession, between
whiteness and ‘color’.” 62 Daisy Machado discusses the borderlands stating, “The U.S.
borderlands are that place where Latinas and Latinos live, struggle, love, fight, and strive to
define who they are in the midst of a society that has for centuries kept them an invisible mass, a
footnote in the homogenizing historical process of an entire nation.” 63 The homogenizing
practices and the push towards Latinx assimilation to Euroamerican paradigms enacts an
epistemological colonization that needs to be contrasted with border thinking or a mestizaje
epistemology. For de La Torre, the in-betweenness that comes from living in the borderlands is
the place where Hispanic ethical frameworks must originate. 64 Eurocentric constructions of
moral thinking are based on universalizable and border-oriented epistemology excluding the
Latinx community who live on the borders, physically and epistemologically. As such, the
construction of Eurocentric moral thinking necessarily excludes those that live in the in-between.
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Thus, frameworks that we discussed in chapter one that are hierarchical and racialized, such as
Kant’s, do not have a place for those who are in the in-between.
Mestizaje and border thinking is not a framework that happens outside of the subject but
rather is embodied within the bodies of the Latinx community that makes their own subjectivity
pluriform and multi-spacial. One of the earliest persons to discuss the embodied mestizx reality
was Gloria Anzaldúa. Anzaldúa argued for a new Mestiza reality that embraced within her body
the negotiation of existing from within multiple spaces that blurs the lines of a single monolithic
subjectivity from which one is supposed to engage in moral reasoning. For Anzaldúa, her
mestizaje was deeply constitutive of her identity and was used as a source of resistance to what
can be considered, “plural sources of cultural prejudice.” 65 Not only did Anzaldúa find her social
location to be in-between several different cultures (U.S.., Mexican, and Indian), Anzaldúa’s
sexuality was a source of alienation from dominant U.S. and Mexican culture. Anzaldúa writes:
As a mestiza I have no country, my homeland cast me out; yet all
countries are mine because I am every woman’s sister or potential lover.
(As a Lesbian, I have no race, my own people disclaim me; but I am all
races because there is the queer of me in all races.) I am cultureless
because, as a feminist, I challenge the collective cultural/religious malederived beliefs of Indo-Hispanics and Anglos, yet I am cultured because I
am participating in the creation of yet another culture, a new story to
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explain the world and our participation in it, a new value system with
images and symbols that connect us to each other and to the planet. 66
For Anzaldúa, her mestiza identity is not only made up of old identities (i.e., U.S., Mexican,
Indian) but is rather used to construct a new world and new frame of knowing that transgresses
static constructions of both identity and values. For Anzaldúa’s understanding of Mestiza
consciousness, tolerance for ambiguity is essential. The mestiza according to Anzaldúa is one
who must move away from the static construction of values. Anzaldúa states, “La Mestiza
constantly has to shift out of habitual formations; from convergent thinking, analytical reasoning
that tends to use rationality to move toward a single goal (a Western mode), to divergent thinking
characterized away from set patterns and goals and toward a more whole perspective, one that
includes rather than excludes.” 67 The more inclusive, whole perspective Anzaldúa advocates is
the same perspective that must be advocated for when it comes to a realistic moral reasoning that
takes into account the real experiences of the Latinx community.
The binaries that exist through the univocal and monolithic Eurocentric moral reasoning
is transcended by Anzaldúa’s use of mestizaje. For Anzaldúa, “The work of mestiza
consciousness is to break down the subject-object duality that keeps her a prisoner and to show
the flesh and through images in her work how duality is transcended. The bordered and binaried
ways of thinking posited by a Eurocentric synderesis are transgressed and transcended by
mestiza consciousness. Anzaldúa’s work is transformative in that it takes the pluriform frames of
oppressions that is latent in Eurocentric values and forced assimilation on one hand and
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machismo and patriarchy on the other and becomes the very place where a new perspective is
born. This perspective is one that is done from being caught in-between multiple spaces
negotiated within a Latinx identity. The identity of in-betweenness, mestizaje, rather than being a
site of oppression is transformed into a sight of liberation.
For Walter Mignolo, the use and language of the new mestiza reality drawn from Gloria
Anzaldúa, places border thinking in the matrix of modernity/coloniality/decoloniality. The
monolithic and homogenized framework developed from Euroamerican epistemologies that in
their very construction exclude those on the periphery. Mignolo calls this framework the colonial
matrix of power resulting in colonial difference. Colonial difference is the space that borders or
is othered by the colonial matrix of power that undergirds modernity/coloniality. For Mignolo,
modernity and coloniality are not independent concepts but are rather interrelated. One cannot
have modernity without the construction of colonial power that brings about the modern world
system rooted in hegemonic capitalism. For Mignolo, the colonial matrix of power creates
borders and such borders create colonial difference. For Mignolo, “borders are everywhere and
they are not only geographic; they are racial and sexual, epistemic and ontological, religious and
aesthetic, linguistic and national. Borders are the interior routes of modernity/coloniality and the
consequences of international law and global linear thinking.” 68 Border-thinking is thus a type of
thought that tries to de-link itself from the hegemonic and monolithic constructions of
knowledge that are rooted in the coloniality of being. For Mignolo “the coloniality of being is
instituted by racism and sexism.” 69 The coloniality of being justifies itself through a
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representational ontology that argues that ontology is represented by epistemology. 70 The way
humanity sees the world is reflective of the way the world truly is. But, for Mignolo,
epistemology instead is the starting point to constructing an ontology. Mignolo argues that,
“ontologies are cosmologic/epistemic creations (storytelling about the creation of the world
(cosmologies) and principles of knowing within a given cosmology (epistemology): it is through
knowledge that entities and relations are conceived, perceived, sensed and described.” 71 Thus, to
delink from a coloniality of being, one must engage in a delinking from colonial epistemology,
what we have argued is the Eurocentric monolithic construction of non-transitive truth
properties.
When it comes to Eurocentric moral reasoning, Mignolo’s colonial matrix of power is
seen to be analogous to the type of moral reasoning and synderesis that posits a single univocal
and universal narrative. However, by adopting a framework in mestizaje and border-thinking, the
static non-transitive truth claims and syllogistic moral reasoning can be confronted with a type of
thinking that breaks away from the static bordered concepts and allows for a multivocal
construction of moral reasoning. The multivocal construction of moral reasoning done in the
context of mestizaje or hibridez contradicts the coloniality of thought that situates the subject
outside a field of study in a traditional Cartesian mind/body binary. 72 Rather than perpetuating
another border between the observer and the observed, mestizaje can take on a type of thinking
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that is involved in its subject and can take on an activist role in scholarship. Or rather, as
Mignolo discusses, drawing from Habermas,
knowledge without interests is an impossibility, and that the natural
sciences’ self-description as objective knowledge detached from human
interest was a positivist self-description that favored instrumental reason
and the use of knowledge for social management rather than for creativity,
intellectual pursuit, and human ‘emancipation’ (Habermas’s use of a post
enlightenment word), or for human ‘liberation’ as Enrique Dussel and
other Third World thinkers will prefer. 73
Knowledge of the world, through the eyes of mestizaje or border-thinking is not something that
is “out-there” but is deeply intertwined with the knower. Thus, a synderesis that exists “outthere”, much like the synderesis advocated by Aquinas, is one that takes for granted the subjectobject distinction within moral thought. Moral thought is seen to be something that can be
grasped as a reality that exists outside the knowing subject.
What border-thinking and mestizaje contests is that reality cannot exist in the abstract
without being deeply interrelated with the personal and real relationships from which moral
thought actually exists. For the Latinx community, a moral thought that is based in a single
universalizable construction only means more assimilation to dominant cultures and ways of
thinking and more exclusion from moral conversation. Yet, through the adoption of mestizaje
and understanding morality as pluriform and interconnected, moral decision making does not
come from a single universalizable perspective but is constituted by a plurality of universalities.
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A plurality of universalities is a place where multiple voices speak to interrelated existences.
Thus, synderesis done Latinamente, is as diverse as the multiple spaces and identities that
construct Latinidad in general. This leads to understanding of synderesis as not a grasping of
generalized concept coming from a homogenized monolithic construction of right and wrong,
but rather is understood as a process rooted in praxis. Or in the words of a popular Latinx saying,
“no hay camino, se hacemos camino al andar,” we make the road by walking.

A Path-Making Epistemology
Emphasizing the mixture that is inherent between the universal and the particular,
adopting mestizaje creates a synderesis rooted in dialogue, discernment, and path-making
epistemologies. Dialogue is an open and creative process with mutual respect and ability to
influence. Dialogue is not a road that is already paved in which speaking to one another simply
reinforces old habits and beliefs. True dialogue, rooted in mestizaje, is the very process of
making new roads together based on equal power relationships. Traditional truth-seeking
philosophies presuppose roads that are already made. Latinx synderesis suggests, as we stated
earlier “no hay camino, se hacemos camino al andar.” That is, while traditional Eurocentric
understanding of synderesis emphasizes the apprehension of static categories, the type of
synderesis that occurs by adopting a mestizaje based moral epistemology is more akin to
understanding the good as a process or a journey. Synderesis done Latinamente, is a process of
road-making.
The road making that occurs through a synderesis that is influenced by epistemological
mestizaje is one that transgresses and travels through pre-established borders. Through the
transgressing of borders through mestizaje itself, epistemological borders that are used for
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exclusion themselves are transformed into, “frontiers of new existence.” 74 This frontier of new
existence has the implication of travel and of border crossing and for Elizondo, “Every bordercrossing relativizes human absolutes and challenges previously unquestioned taboos for the sake
of the new family of unlimited love.” 75 Elizondo continues, “in this new humanity, no one
person, culture, religion or race will be accepted as universal, normative, and ideal for everyone
else.” 76 Through the permeability of boundaries, these borders that seek to exclude actually
become points of contact.
Similar to Elizondo’s thoughts about boundaries as ‘frontiers of new existence”, Michael
Nausner sees boundaries and borderlands as fields of negotiation. Drawing on Homi K. Bhabha,
Nausner believes that boundaries are hybrid spaces. For Bhabha, a boundary is a “margin of
hybridity, where cultural differences ‘contingently’ and conflictually touch.” 77 Thus for Nausner
a boundary's significance, “is not primarily to keep apart or to strictly divide cultures and
territories. In their constructedness they are not natural lines of separation, but rather highly
relevant places for the production of meaning. Boundaries emerge as privileged fields of
encounter, where differences and commonalities are continuously negotiated.” 78 While Nausner
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is primarily talking about the role boundaries play in Christian identity, his solutions can be
helpful in understanding how to negotiate boundaries through an epistemological lens that affects
how one views synderesis. While synderesis is seen to perpetuate static notions of truth, the
understanding that the boundaries between what is considered a static truth and fluid contingency
is precisely the place where truth is acted out rather than apprehended. Thus, understanding the
truth of a moral situation needs a solution of nomadology. Nausner draws on Deleuze and
Guattari’s understanding of nomadology to illustrate that nomads do not “parcel out closed
spaces to people” but rather “distributes people (or animals) in an open space.” 79 By not settling
or occupying a single space, rather tracking though land, boundaries become fluid and become
sites of new possibilities. This fluidity or mestizaje, as would be understood through a Latinx
lens, makes moral reasoning a process that is always on a continual journey navigating through
various territories and narratives in finding ways of truth rather than apprehending a static truth.
Yet one does not need to simply draw from modern or contemporary theologians to see
that from a Latinx perspective moral truth is not static but is dynamic and requires negotiation
and discernment. To draw from Latinx indigenous knowledge by Mexico’s native Mexica
peoples, the dialogue needed to pursue moral goodness comes from Mexica thinkers called
tlamatinimeh and what they developed is “what scholars call a ‘way-’ or ‘path-seeking’
philosophy” as opposed to, “a truth-seeking philosophy, the approach that has dominated the
western philosophical tradition since Plato.” 80 A truth seeking philosophy seeks to understand
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concepts through apprehending, representing, believing and grounding actions upon specific
norms. 81 In contrast, the philosophy advocated by the Mexica people, “understand these notions
in terms of finding, following and extending a path.” 82 In the encounter between the Mexica
people and the Spanish Franciscans, one can see these two paradigms collide. While the
Franciscan sought to establish their philosophy on a God that is coterminous with an immutable
reality, truth as a singularity and absoluteness, and doctrine derived from specific precepts, the
Mexica people sought a path (ohtli). According to Maffie, “What concerns Mexica philosophers
first and foremost is knowing how to act, i.e., the practical understanding involved in knowing
how to maintain one’s balance on the slippery earth.” 83 For the Mexica people and their
descendants in the Latinx community, moral reasoning is primarily found in the journey of life
rather than apprehending universalizable principles.
Mexica ethics is focused on harmonious living within the current age. For Mexica
peoples there have been four creations and four destructions. We are currently in the fifth age of
the Sun. 84 Because the Mexica people view the fifth age as potentially ending, to forestall this
ending humanity must journey to find a way to live in a balance with their environment. The
Mexica people believe that humanity must “co-participate in the ongoing reproduction and
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existence of the 5th age.” 85 The journey that promises the continuation of the fifth age is called
Macehua and is the activity of meriting, deserving, or being made worthy. Macehua is the root
of Mexica ethics and is about establishing balanced interpersonal relationships with all living
things. Macehua is about,
social know-how or knowing how to get along with other persons in a
social world--social because populated by a variety of different kinds of
persons (human and other-than human, visible and invisible, who are
characterized by different interrelationships and degrees of power) --in
order to both remain on good terms with them and to induce them into
cooperating by doing as one wishes.
Personhood, for the Mexica, is about action and participation in relationships rather than static
ontic categories. Thus, moral action is not about apprehending, but rather by becoming. Reality
is then, “fluid, dynamic, and defined by becoming and changing rather than stasis and
permanence.” 86 The movement of reality and the continual change in the world requires a
synderesis that is comfortable with ambiguity, movement, and the interchanging of relationships.
The fluidity of border thinking and reality from Latinx indigenous traditions means that
there is a pluralism in how the Latinx community engages ethics. As Ismael Garcia suggests,
“not all Latino/as engage the ethical task in the same way.” 87 The Latinx community must do
ethics while navigating several spheres of social and ethical analysis. Since the Latinx
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community faces oppression from cultural, political, and social spheres generalized precepts that
may engage only one of these spheres will not be helpful for Latinx moral reasoning. Because
each of these spheres of Latinx reality effects and interfaces with the other, moral reasoning done
Latinamente draws on the social “know-how” that is a constitutive element of Macehua. Thus,
moral reasoning is not a static apprehension of the good but the good is worked out through
praxis. The good is not discovered, rather, it is done through the everyday practices of the Latinx
community.
Mestizaje mixes the fluid and the static, the universal and the particular, in such a way
that moral decision making requires the continual involvement in the world and in each other’s
narratives. Mestizaje takes the encounter at the physical and epistemic borders of Eurocentric
moral thinking and creates a new, fluid, and dynamic reality that takes synderesis from a static
apprehension of the good to a journey or path-finding living out the good. As such, Mestizaje as
synderesis, allows for the diving deep of interpersonal stories of individuals and communities
that transgresses and transcends the efforts that delineate static categories of the good.

Privileging Marginalized Identities
A final reason to adopt mestizaje as a type of synderesis or moral epistemology is that it
places marginalized identities as a loci of power and moral knowledge. Virgilio Elizondo’s
Galilean Journey places Jesus’ identity as a Galilean in the context of Mestizaje. As a Galilean,
he was not accepted by the Jerusalem elite as their own. As a Jew in Galilee, Jesus was not
accepted by the Roman population. Jesus’ identity was one that was in-between. Yet, for
Elizondo, God’s identification with Jesus, through his life, death, and resurrection introduced
what Elizondo calls the Galilee principle. Elizondo states the Galilee principle as such, “what
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human beings reject, God chooses as his very own.” 88 The mestizaje of Jesus was the thing that
the Jerusalem elite and the Roman occupiers rejected, but this mestizaje was the very thing that
God chose as God’s own. God identified directly as mestizx. 89 To take the Galilee principle
epistemologically is to take the historically rejected idea of mestizaje, both as an ethnic and
epistemological identification, and privilege it in the place of knowing. To privilege mestizaje as
an epistemological synderesis is to privilege the perspective of those who have been
marginalized due to strict binaries of insider/outsider, individual/community, public/private, and
universal/particular. Mestizaje takes those identities which have been placed in precarious
situations because of constructed borders and places them in a place of power and critique
against arbitrary systems of domination. As Maria Pilar Aquino states, “precisely because
mestizaje has been portrayed by dominant cultures as carrying a social value only worthy of
exclusion, a mestizo/a theology will highlight the vital syntheses which ‘new peoples” have
interculturally created in order to explain their own vision and their own identities.” Adopting
mestizaje as a type of moral realism presents the possibility to imagine spaces of power in which
the marginalized occupy.
When considering decolonial thinking, Mignolo suggests that decolonial thinking and
border thinking means thinking from the periphery or what he calls exteriority. For Mignolo,
“Exteriority is not the outside, but the outside built from the inside in the process of building
itself as inside. Exteriority is the dwelling place of the world population who do not belong to the
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house of civilization and democracy. Thus, modernity is a discourse defining its interiority by
creating the difference to be marginalized and eliminated.” 90 By thinking through the place of
differentiation, or the place of exteriority, Mignolo believes one begins to think decolonially.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos frames exteriority in the concept of the Abyssal line, or the line in
which one judges who is outside or inside. To think across the abyssal line requires, “The
decisive community of belongingness or identity” that has more to do with “sharing the struggle
against domination.” 91 For Santos, it is important to recognize which side of the Abyssal line one
thinks from and that if one is to be a post abyssal researcher, one must be interested in,
“producing and valorizing knowledges capable of strengthening resistance against
domination.” 92 If knowledge that is done from the periphery is rooted in a resistance to
domination, then such a knowledge from the periphery is privileged against normative structures
of Eurocentric moral reasoning.
In adopting mestizaje as a moral epistemological category that emphasizes the
importance of the marginalized in moral decision making, it is also important to acknowledge the
troubled history of mestizaje. While theologians such as Elizondo and Goizueta readily use
mestizaje, oftentimes mestizaje is idealized to ignore its history in Latin America as a racialized
concept. Within the colonial period the exploitation of the Spanish created two social classes, the
marginalized Mestizx class and the more legitimate criollx class, born of European parents. Yet
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for Mestizx, “in order to secure their political power and racial privilege, often distanced
themselves from their mother’s indigenous blood and culture.” 93 Because of this grab for
political power, “Claiming a mestizo/a or mulato/a identity is a manner of ‘whitening’ one’s
racial identity, gaining privilege over black and indigenous peoples.” 94 Yet, because of the way
mestizaje is adopted by U.S. Hispanic Theologians, mestizaje is an important category to
problematize static identities placed on the U.S. Latinx community by dominant communities.
Being honest about the ambiguous history of mestizaje itself helps fight against the notion that
mestizaje is a nonviolent blending of cultures. Rather, mestizaje is a site of contradiction and
violence that forms identities shaped by ambiguous histories themselves. Adopting mestizaje is a
reality that the Latinx community must face as part of our violent and complicit histories. By
claiming mestizaje as our own, we must at the same time contest the ways it has been used to
“whiten” ourselves for the sake of upward mobility. Adopting mestizaje as a strategy of
cooperation requires owning the ambiguous and complicit history attached to the term. Through
mestizaje, one must understand themselves as both oppressor and oppressed, colonizer and
colonized. As such, mestizaje is a tool that forces the Latinx community to exist in a spectrum of
complicity or solidarity with the most marginalized within their own community. Mestizaje,
itself, cannot be just a static biological or cultural category of personal identity, rather it must be
dynamic. Because of the ambiguous and sometimes troublesome ways mestizaje is used to both
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elevate marginality and silence it, it is important to adopt mestizaje as an epistemological
position of standing in solidarity with the marginalized.
For Isasi-Díaz, adopting mestizaje, is less about one’s biological identity and proximity to
whiteness but is rather the symbolic-truth praxis that stands in solidarity with the marginalized.
For Díaz, “mestizaje is a present historical reality being elaborated in our very lives. This is why
it must be affirmed and chosen repeatedly in all aspects of our lives.” 95 The ambiguity and
hybridity that comes through mestizaje, for Díaz, is an epistemological choice in which one
accepts diversity through praxis. Díaz, “to choose mestizaje means that we reject hierarchical
understandings that set some over others. It also means that we reject a competitive
individualism that destroys our sense of community and makes us see life as a win-lose
situation.” 96 By adopting mestizaje as a refusal to categorize, hierarchicalize, or delineate
between those who are in or out, Díaz reconceptualized mestizaje to be a position in which one
chooses a way to look at life. Most importantly for Díaz, mestizaje, “is an expression of our
responsibility to each other.” 97 By adopting mestizaje as an epistemological choice, one can
engage in a type of ethic that negates and contests any type of ethic that tries to create lines of
thought that exclude persons for any reason, but rather adopt an ethic that includes all people and
especially those persons who have been excluded through Eurocentric normative ethics.
Adopting mestizaje as a type of synderesis allows one to engage ethics without
privileging a univocal universality but allows for a pluricentric construction of many
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universalities that blurs the abstract and the particular. Not only does adopting mestizaje create
the space for many particular voices to participate in moral reasoning, it also understands moral
reasoning to be a process of dialogue, discernment, and road making where moral truth is not
simply apprehended through static contemplation but is discovered in the very process of
walking through life. Synderesis done by the Latinx community is more like creating a path
rather than doing math. Thus, it involves intimate involvement with one’s immediate community
and environment of all living beings. In making this path, the privileged guides to moral decision
making are the marginalized who through mestizaje, transgress exclusionary boundaries and for
whom moral decision-making effects first. Yet, to discuss mestizaje, in the abstract and through
theory alone, would be to deny the efficacy of mestizaje as a synderesis that is intimately
involved in daily life and the cultural production of a people. Thus, we will close this chapter by
seeing how mestizaje is illustrated through the cultural production of Latin American and Latinx
literature.

Framing Mestizaje through Latinx Cultural Production
Mestizaje plays a prominent role in Latinx literature. Not only does mestizaje engage in the
intermixture of cultural and nation of origins within Latinx identity, but within Latinx literature,
“the colonial history implicit in the idea of mestizaje evokes the very real constraints imposed
upon mestizo bodies, not least of which are the racial hierarchies generated using colonialism
and passed down a legacy of discrimination and violence.” 98 Latinx literature often deals with
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the complex identity and history formed by colonization and the fact that the lines of oppressor
and oppressed are often acted out within the bodies of the mestizx community. Yet out of the
complex history and contradiction, Mestizaje as it is played out in Latinx literature, “allows for
an understanding of culture and identity that incorporates difference and paradox as component
characteristics of subjectivity and expression.” 99 The cultural production of Latinx literature does
not only see mestizaje as an opportunity for expression of individual identity but also sees it as a
mixture that provides the space to “balance a sense of boundless possibility with an awareness of
constraint in historical connection.” 100 Mestizaje in Latinx literature takes seriously the role of
colonial oppression that has marked mestizx identity and provides a way of navigating this
marked identity into a role of new possibility that, for the sake of moral epistemology, frames the
journey of discerning the good. In other words, how can one who has been marked by such
oppressions navigate a multivalent world in which there is simultaneously good and bad, often
mixed themselves, to find a moral agency that is simultaneously a good for the individual but
also a good that has been conditioned by a community marked by oppression? The journey of
moral agency is precisely what is at the heart of Latinx magical realist literature.
A great example to illustrate the journey of mestizaje when it comes to the discernment of
the good life is the work by Junot Díaz, The Brief and Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao. This 2007
novel by Díaz is the story about a heavy-set young man named Oscar de León (whose interest in
Oscar Wilde results in a misunderstanding that leads his friends to call him Oscar Wao). Oscar is
of Dominican descent and lives in Patterson, New Jersey. Oscar’s goal in life is to find love and
when he does not find it in college he fails at an attempt to commit suicide. On one of his visits
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to the Dominican Republic, Oscar falls in love with a sex worker, Ybon, and is subsequently
beaten up in a canefield by her boyfriend. After recovering from such violence in the U.S., Oscar
goes back to the Dominican Republic to continue to confess his love to Ybon and is eventually
killed by Ybon’s boyfriend.
Díaz does not tell the story of Oscar in a linear narrative but intertwines it with multigenerational stories that are deeply interconnected to colonial violence and the American backed
dictatorship of the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic. Díaz connects Oscar’s story
primarily to what is called the Fukú curse. The Fukú curse, in the narrative, is a curse of doom.
Díaz writes,
They say it came first from Africa, carried in the screams of the enslaved;
that it was the death bane of the Tainos, uttered just as one world perished
and another began; that it was a demon drawn into Creation through the
nightmare door that was cracked open in the Antilles...No matter what its
name or provenance, it is believed that the arrival of Europeans on
Hispaniola unleashed the Fukú on the world, and we’ve all been in the shit
ever since.” 101
The Fukú curse is connected to colonial violence and the dictatorship of the Trujillo regime in
the Dominican Republic. Anyone that seems to stand up against the colonial violence or violence
of Trujillo feels its spell. The Fukú curse (i.e., the colonial and neocolonial violence of Trujillo
regime) are what haunts Oscar throughout his life. In Oscar’s story, the story of his family and
the story of the Dominican Republic are weaved into one. Díaz employs a type of mestizaje to
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explain the contradiction of interpersonal tragedy and the tragedy of a nation. Because of
colonial legacy and the legacy of Trujillo is ever present for Oscar and the rest of the Dominican
diaspora, the only way to make sense of such violence is to mix the fantastic of the Fukú curse
with the reality of the violence experienced by Latinx communities. The Fukú curse was brought
about through European colonialism and although is a part of Díaz’ fictional world, feels real for
many of the Latinx community who face continual oppression in the dominant Anglo-American
landscape. Thus, like Oscar, searching for the good life requires navigating the specter of
colonial and neo-colonial violence that many in the Latinx community face on a daily basis.
Díaz’ mestizaje is not only between the magical and the real, but also functions at a
structural level of the novel. Díaz draws from American comic books and the Afro-Caribbean
literary tradition. 102 Díaz also mixes footnotes with narrative to intertwine the de Leon family
with Dominican history in general. This intertwining or mixture of familial narrative with
national narrative illustrates that for the Latinx community, their personal histories are
intertwined with the history of oppression tied to their country of origin and the cultural baggage
that comes with it. At least for the de León family, “the Fukú aint just ancient history, a ghost
story from the past, with no power to scare. In my parent’s day the Fukú was real as shit,
something your everyday person could believe in.” 103 The mixture of language between proper
English of high English fantasy, colonial Spanish, English slang, and Spanish slang illustrates the
result of living a reality of mixture through diaspora. Describing Díaz’s use of mixture and
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mestizaje, Pérez-Torrez states, “These linguistic and generic mixings on a formal level serve to
express and embody the effects of mixture on racial, cultural, and social levels. Mixture on a
formal level signals the contradictory forces that have one into the creation of a Latino/a
culture.” 104 For Díaz the structural mixture that he applies to his novel reflects the cultural and
social mixture that the Latinx community faces in their everyday lives living in either a physical,
cultural, or psychological exile from dominant Anglo-communities.
One can find theological analogues to the mixture and contradictory nature of diaspora
and mestizaje found in Díaz’ work. Fernando Segovia states, “as with exile itself, the result is a
theology that cannot help but look in various different and even conflicting directions at all
times, gathering together within itself the affirmations and contradictions, the joys and
frustrations, the challenges and obstacles of a life of ‘otherness’.” 105 By taking on Latinx
literature and the work of Díaz as an example of mestizaje, such an example provides us a way to
articulate,
a sense of mestizaje that is critical and that seeks to make present the
numerous struggles that remain a part of Latino/a societies along lines of
class, race, language, sexuality, gender, and nationality. In short, the terms
mestizo and mestiza do not attempt to name smoothly blended, easily
hybrid cultural or personal identities. Rather, they name identities sutured
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together out of a desire for coping, surviving, and (hopefully) triumphing
over the unequal colonial legacies embodied by the idea of mestizaje.” 106
By looking at Latinx literature, one is able to get a sense of how an individual’s moral agency is
tied up in and worked through a colonial legacy and a mixture of interacting parts. Through
reading the personal, familial, cultural, and literary stories by the Latinx community one can see
that moral decision making and the quest for the good life is not something that can be done
through immediate apprehension of the good nor can it be done without the struggling through
and path making synderesis provided by a mestizaje based moral epistemology. Rather,
understanding of the good requires acknowledging the mixture of colonial, cultural, and
interpersonal legacies; the mixture of multiple voices as opposed to the univocal; the
understanding that knowing the good requires praxis and path-making, and that mestizaje
privileges the marginalized voices that are incorporated into its very identity.

Conclusion
In this chapter we argued that both U.S. and Iberian natural law traditions worked from a moral
epistemology that framed synderesis as an immediate apprehension of the good through types of
reasoning that are rooted in a Eurocentric rationality. By giving the history of synderesis we were
able to suggest that a synderesis that is both infallible and immediately knowable does not
provide enough context for real life moral decision making and was not, in actuality, a type of
moral realism that can affect everyday decision making. We then argued that by adopting the
theological concept of mestizaje, could provide a solution that would allow moral knowledge to
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be practiced in the everyday. Namely, by arguing that mestizaje provides a framework that
allows for multiple voices and multiple universalities as opposed to the universal as the univocal,
one could understand moral decision making through multiple interacting cultural lenses. We
also argued that by allowing for a multi-vocal approach provided by mestizaje, we could
understand moral truth as a process and its acquisition as a path-making epistemology as
opposed to a type of knowing that seeks to statically apprehend the good through contemplation.
In other words, to know the good, one must do it. Finally, we argued that by placing mestizx
identity as a locus of moral knowledge, marginalized groups who exist in a cultural, linguistic,
and epistemological mestizaje would be able to lead in new ways of moral thinking. We
concluded with understanding mestizaje in the context of Junot Díaz’ The Brief and Wondrous
Life of Oscar Wao, which provided texture to the theoretical framing of mestizaje.
As we continue to chapter four, we will increasingly rely on narrative in order to discern
moral principles. Mestizaje formed the epistemological base for moral discernment. In chapter
four, we will discuss the role of cuentos (stories/witnesses/accounts) as a type of natural law
casuistry for Latinx social ethics. Much like using Díaz’s novel to extricate some general
principles about Latinx social ethics, the multivalent and multileveled stories found in Latinx
experience will help us as we seek to derive some principles that are applicable not only to the
Latinx community but the dominant Anglo-community as well. These cuentos will involve
interpersonal stories, historical and social narratives of particular communities, and more literary
stories that provide cultural themes for Latinx social ethics.
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Chapter 4: Cuentos as Casuistry
Introduction
In the last chapter we discussed how moral epistemology done Latinamente involves employing
mestizaje as an epistemological category. Through the employment of mestizaje, the universal is
particularized through specific cultural communities and the binary between the universal and
particular is obfuscated. Through employing mestizaje as a type of synderesis we discussed how
the universal is multi-vocal and establishes a plurality of universalities, that knowing the good
comes through engaging a path-making and road-making philosophy, and that the marginalized
are the privileged knowers of the good. We ended our last chapter by taking a look at Latinx
literature in Junot Díaz work, The Brief and Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao. In examining this
work, we illustrated that mestizaje, as a moral epistemology, cannot be relegated solely to the
abstract but takes root in the narratives of the Latinx community.
This chapter discusses the fact that Latinx theology is rooted in the stories and beliefs of
the Latinx community. Stories or cuentos form the moral background through which the Latinx
community continually reflects on ethical action. Essentially, the chapter argues that through
engaging the various types of Latinx cuentos, or narratives, that we are working through a
natural law casuistry. We will first define casuistry and discuss how it has been used to engage in
ethical reflection in drawing conclusions from a case-by-case basis. We will also understand
casuistry as primarily a reflection on narratives in which ethical action is manifested. As we will
discuss, because ethical action is always aimed at a specific end within concrete situations,
casuistry is the ethical methodology of choice for the Latinx community.
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Because the Latinx community roots their theology in the concrete, everyday (Lo
Cotidiano) narratives of their community we will then discuss the types of cuentos prevalent in
the Latinx community and how they shape ethical reflection. We will discuss the interpersonal
narratives often highlighting the voices of Hispanic women and see how their interrelational
stories, often bound by a double oppression, have ethical import. 1 As Isasi-Díaz writes
concerning Hispanic women, “it is often difficult to determine whether we are being oppressed
because of our gender, our ethnicity, or our economic status.” 2 As such, the narratives of
Hispanic and Latinx women are particularly important because they illustrate the multi-layered
web of oppression that women of color face and the historical projects needed, “to give meaning
and value to our daily struggle for survival.” 3 We will then discuss how these stories are related
to the grander, cultural, and communal stories that give shape to the smaller stories. These
communal and cultural stories form the social imaginaries that provide the contours of Latinx
experience in Anglo-dominant United States and how the Latinx community identifies itself
while navigating multifaceted moral landscapes and systems of oppression. Through drawing
from the everyday stories of the Latinx community one is able to engage in ethical reflection
about the social, cultural, and political conditions of the Latinx community and understand the
quest for the good life as a process of story-telling and path-making. As such, we will close our

I am writing about Hispanic women primarily to honor the Hispanic women in my life
who have had the greatest effect on me, my Abuela and my mother. Both of these women had to
face overwhelming struggles being Hispanic women in Anglo-dominated culture. Their
experiences were often overlooked and undervalued. In writing about them and their experiences
I hope to accomplish what Ada Maria Isasi-Díaz, hoped to accomplish in her groundbreaking
work, En La Lucha, that “to honor others honors one”. I hope to honor the experiences of my
mom and abuela.
1
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chapter on casuistry by looking at the Ana Castillo’s novel So Far from God as a story-telling
cultural casuistry that provide paradigmatic Latina saints, whose everyday reality shapes their
ethical reflection.

Casuistry and Narrative
Casuistry is a system of ethical reflection that is oriented by the study of cases. That is, ethical
reflection occurs on a case-by-case basis. The beginnings of casuistic reflection start with
Aristotle's differentiation between scientific or speculative reason (episteme) and practical reason
(phronesis). While scientific reason is supposedly based on universal principles, practical reason
takes seriously the particularity of each case. As Aristotle states,
In this respect phronesis and episteme are opposed. The intellect masters
the basic definition of a science, which are not further demonstrable [and
argues from these definitions]; but phronesis deals with the ‘ultimate
particular” (to eschaton), and this is an object of perception (aesthesis)
rather than episteme. 4
The main difference between speculative reason and practical reason is that the former is rooted
in theory and the latter in praxis. While theory seeks to provide deductive universalizable proofs,
practical reason often uses prudence and wisdom to orient oneself to practical goals, ends, and
outcomes. Practical reason provides the roadmap to particular destinations rather than provides
general proofs of universal applicability. Ethics is rooted in practical reason (phronesis) as
opposed to merely scientific reason. As Albert Jonsen states,
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“Since real moral agents decide and act in relation to specific, attainable
ends and in the context of concrete circumstances, practical reasoning can
be said to be about “cases,” that is, “instances” (in Latin, casus), in which
the particular agent’s specific purposes and motives, as well as the extant
circumstances of time, place, probability, and possibility, etc., can be
described.” 5
Ethics deals with concrete circumstances seeking attainable ends. Thus, since ethics is described
within the realm of practical reason, certain conditions apply to ethical reasoning that differ from
scientific reasoning.
While scientific reason seeks to develop arguments that are “idealized, atemporal, and
necessary,” practical wisdom seeks to establish arguments that are concrete, temporal, and
presumptive” 6 That is, while scientific reason seeks universally valid arguments, practical reason
(and ethics), must make room for a multiplicity of valid arguments based on presumptive and
concrete experience. Thus, when Aristotle talks about what is good or right he does not discuss
them, “in abstract and general terms” rather only what is good or right, “for an agent of a specific
kind, acting on an occasion of a particular sort, in a situation that involves other people of
equally specific kinds.”7 Thus, Aristotle is not primarily engaged in a moral taxonomy, “rather,
he is concerned to show how the moral deliberations of specific agents depend on their social,
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5

Albert R. Jonsen, and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral
Reasoning (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 26-27.
6

7

Jonsen and Toulmin, 69.

219

political, and personal status, and on the spirit in which they act.” 8 By understanding ethical and
moral knowledge within the context of practical as opposed to scientific reason, Aristotle
provides a type of ethical analysis that is open to the variety of particular situations.
Because Aristotle takes seriously the variety of ethical situations that occur during the
course of one’s life in relation to specific and concrete ends, the scientific methodology of
syllogistic and deductive reason cannot account for the plurality of ethical situations. Thus,
Aristotle teaches that the syllogistic reason that is prevalent in ethical analysis is “is taken over,
in ethics and rhetoric, by analogous arguments he calls ‘enthymemes.” 9 Jonsen and Toulmin
define enthymemes as having drawn
Their particular conclusions presumptively or probably (not ‘necessarily’):
they appeal, for example to matters of common knowledge, general
maxims, or ‘signs’--what a detective calls ‘clues’--or by referring to
historical events, fictional stories or other well-known ‘examples’
(paradeigmata).
Casuistry, as a result, does not make use of syllogistic arguments but makes use of enthymematic
arguments that draw on a plethora of sources including personal, cultural, and communal
narratives.
Despite the prevalence of Aristotelian thought in the early and medieval church, Christian
casuistic thinking does not begin with the adoption of Aristotle’s distinctions between scientific
and practical reason, but rather, with Jesus himself. Coming out of the Jewish tradition of
interpreting the Torah, Jesus often created situations in which traditional readings of Torah were
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challenged. Jesus’ teachings which consisted of “moral challenges, moral paradoxes, hard
saying, and abrupt revisions of familiar rules” created situations for early Christians that required
casuistic thinking based on a, “a conflict of basic obligations.” 10 With the increased transition
from Judaism to Hellenism in early Christian communities, legal obligations provided by the
Torah had to take on more nuanced meaning with the increasing inclusion of gentiles into the
early Christian community. At stake in these conflicting obligations is the ability to hold Jewish
tradition in one hand and the new gentile inclusion of the early Christian community in the other.
This conflict of obligation required a casuistic thinking that holds tradition, which we understand
as a community’s narratives of normative identity, and new situations in tension. Thus, religious
casuistry requires holding two, sometimes contradictory, commitments together. As Jonsen
states,
“Religious casuistry, then, is the practical reasoning of communities of
faith. In the background always stand the scripture and traditional beliefs
of the community. In the foreground stand the scholarly communities
who interpret that scriptural and traditional background and teach it to the
faithful…. They not only theorize but also respond to actual cases in
which the faithful may face perplexity in acting according to their faith in
current circumstances. They utilize to a high degree analogical reasoning,
working from case to case, in order to reach a resolution that is both
traditional and novel.” 11

10

Jonsen and Toulmin, 91-92.

11

Jonsen, “Practical Reason and Moral Casuistry”, 59-60.

221

Religious casuistry is a way of moral reasoning that takes seriously the multiple narrative
commitments of an individual and their community. While one may identify with a particular
religious tradition such as Christianity, different social, political, and historical circumstances
require navigating these commitments with new narratives, new stories, and new moral
dilemmas. Navigating new situations is precisely how the tradition of high casuistry developed in
the 13-16th centuries.
High casuistry developed in the 13th century with the confluence of treaties on natural
law, the development of canon law, and the development of private confession and penitential
books that give particular penances in relation to specific moral circumstances. To aid priests,
Summas collected the theologies of natural and canon law and related them to specific examples
to guide them in confessionals. Alongside the integration of natural and canon law and
penitential deliberation, casuistry developed as a result of rapid change including the rise of
nation states, consolidation of monarchies, the reformation, and the counter-reformation. The
rapid change challenged “universal” principles that were taken for granted in the face such
change. In other words, “These changes provided ample material for casuistry: new ‘cases of
conscience’ were constantly being posed by new conditions.” 12 These new conditions
necessitated a type of practical reason that was more open and adaptable to a variety of
situations.
With the growing and rapid change in the 15th and 16th centuries, each case became a
site of inductive reasoning that sought to generate common principles rather than apply general
principles to specific cases. As James Keenan describes, “High casuistry looks to comparative,

12

Jonsen and Toulmin, 144.

222

inductive reasoning, addresses a dilemma, invokes analogies, examines circumstances, resolves
doubt, examines the intentionality of personal agents, and gives its solution. In short it makes its
case.” 13 In the instance of moral argument, cases are made for the probable solution rather than a
certain solution derived from necessity. This probability in the case of moral decision making
became a subspecies of casuistry called probabilism. Probabilism took root in Spain during the
16th century and was prevalent in Hispanic casuistry even in the Americas. According to
Spanish casuistry,
Probabilism, according to which, given doubts about the best among a
range of moral choices, it was permitted to adopt a ‘‘less probable’’ course
of action, provided there was at least some basis for thinking it justified.
Not all casuists were probabilists …. but a probabilistic casuistry was the
most adaptable to different professions, social classes, and political
circumstances. 14
The high degree of change allowed one to have a multiplicity of valid options when one
encountered a moral dilemma. Rather than having stark boundaries of right and wrong, a
probable solution was licit. The probabilism of Spanish casuists was made explicit by the maxim
of Bartolome Medina, of the school of Salamanca, “It seems to me that, if an opinion is probable,
it is licit to follow it, even though the opposite opinion is more probabilism.” 15 Moral decisions
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are rooted in ambiguity and requires a type of ethical analysis that understands a multiplicity of
options utilizing moral wisdom and experience to discern a correct course of action.
Among Spanish Catholic clergy and the new Jesuit order of the 16th century, casuistry
became the norm for moral formation. Because of the wide variety of vocations among the
Jesuits including being sent on papal delegations, teaching at universities, advising princes and
kings, and foreign missions, casuistry became the moral framework that was standard in Jesuit
training because of its adaptability to a variety of situations. Because of their added emphasis on
scholarship and action over contemplation, involvement over withdrawal, “they were forced to
acknowledge the genuine problems of practical decisions faced by agents in complex
circumstances involving conflicts of principle.” 16 Not only were the Jesuits forced to engage in
probabilism and casuistry because of the station of their mission, but their emphasis on the two
were a result of contesting newfound skepticisms of the 16th century. Through the carefully
argued moral guidance in the context of complex commitments and situations, both casuistry and
probabilism, were an answer to increased skepticism that came as a result of turbulent change.
Because of the increased change in culture, religion, politics, and economics, casuistry followed
a particular pattern that taught a multiplicity of options in moral decisions. Its methodology,
much like lived experience, sought to include a variety of changing circumstances.
Casuistry first sought to establish a paradigmatic case in which one would be able to
draw out a general principle or maxim. An example of such a paradigmatic case would be a case
of theft by deceptive banking practice. The general maxim would be that things stolen should be
returned to the original owner. Such principles and maxims were only derived in so far as the
paradigmatic case remained a generality. Next, the paradigmatic case would receive more layers
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and progress in difficulty by adding different circumstances. An example of a layered
circumstance would be a case where making restitution would bring the family of the offender to
the point of starvation. Thus, one would perhaps make a condition of the restitution to allow just
enough to be retained to keep that person’s family fed. Yet, the condition of restitution would not
be a certain and necessary outcome of such a circumstance and thus the concept of probability
would be added to the understanding of the rightness or wrongness of a situation. Restituting
property to a family at the cost of another family probably isn’t the best solution. But, once
again, such a decision depends on the cumulative circumstances surrounding any given case. Is
the family that has been wronged wealthy enough to spare such restitution? Is the restitution of
the property necessary for the safety and wellbeing of the wronged family? The cumulative
arguments and circumstances require considering not only the specific conditions of a case but
also personal, cultural, and social narratives at play. What was the social condition in which the
person in question felt the need to engage in a deceptive business practice? Was such a practice
necessary to feed a family at the point of starvation? These are the questions that casuistic reason
seeks to answer with an acknowledged degree of uncertainty and probability.
Because of the multiplicity of circumstances, reasonings, narratives, high casuistry was
accused of moral laxity and negative equivocation. Casuistry’s main opponent was the Jansenist
and moral rigorist, Blaise Pascal, who attacked the casuistry of the Jesuits. Pascal believed the
Jesuits allowed a moral laxity. As such, “Pascal upbraided the Jesuits for catering to the
intellectual and moral weakness of their powerful and wealthy clients.” 17 For Pascal, “casuistry
was the denial of true morality.” 18 Pascal wanted ethics to be raised from the ambiguity of
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probability and brought to the certainty of scientific reasoning. Based on Pascal’s wager, Baudin
writes about Pascal’s position that, “What is, in any case of doubt, the absolutely certain choice
to procure peace of soul, salvation and the truth that guarantees these? The response to this
question never varies: opt for the unconditioned obligation of the revealed law of God.” 19 For
Pascal, it is better to rely on the potentially certain solution over an ambiguous one. Yet, Pascal’s
critique of casuistry in his Provincial Letters was based on removing casuistry from the context
of its reasoning. As Jonsen and Toulmin write about Pascal's argument,
Casuistry, as an exercise in practical reasoning, involved a tissue of
distinctions, qualifications, and exceptions; and when the resolution of a
moral problem was torn away from this fabric of reasoning it could easily
be made to look ridiculous. Considered within that fabric, which was
intended as a representation of the complexities of real life, it will appear
much more plausible. 20
Pascal’s removing casuistic reasoning from the narratival context from which it developed was
the very transgression that casuistry sought to redress. By taking casuistry out of its context as a
method, Pascal presented casuistic reasoning as trying to do something it never intended to do,
be a set of principles. Casuistry, rather than being a moral theory-based was always a type of
practical reasoning that was rooted in acknowledging the contingency of all moral situations
rooted in a variety of narratives.
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Pascal’s temptation to take casuistry out of its context is a temptation that occurs in
contemporary conversations about casuistry as well. Stanley Hauerwas critiques Albert Jonsen
and Stephen Toulmin’s important work, The Abuse of Casuistry, from which we draw heavily, of
taking casuistry out of its explicitly Christian narrative. Jonsen and Toulmin’s work placed
casuistry in contrast to programs that sought to make ethical reasoning akin to scientific
reasoning by applying general principles to particular cases (e.g., Kantian, Utilitarian, and
Contractarian)., However, Hauerwas argues, “the problem is not, as Jonsen would have it, that
philosophers have tried to do ethics on the model of scientific detachment, but rather they have
tried to do ethics free from any concrete tradition and corresponding moral practices. In order to
accomplish this, they have sought to reduce morality to a few basic moral principles that are
allegedly constitutive of rationality qua rationality.” 21 In other words, Hauerwas believes that the
problem with Jonsen and Toulmin’s assessment about the state of moral deliberation is that they
undervalue the role of narrative traditions in casuistic reasoning.
For Hauerwas, casuistry must be rooted in particular narratives before they develop
general principles to apply to specific situations. For Hauerwas, “No doubt some of our moral
notions and decisions involve some deductions from generally stated principles, but I suspect
that such an account fails to do justice to the interrelation between stories that form our lives and
the prohibitions and positive commitments we think correlative of those stories. What must be
seen is that the virtues and the rules of constituting a morality are community dependent.” 22
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Hauerwas, rather than seeing moral dilemmas as primarily acontextual into which casuistry adds
more context and more circumstance, sees ethics as already rooted in narrative contexts that
bring about normative identities. Hauerwas famously argues that ethics is more about who we
are than what we do. 23 For Christians specifically, “the nature of Christian ethics is determined
by the fact that Christian convictions take the form of a story, or perhaps better, a set of stories
that constitutes a tradition, which in turn creates and forms a community.” 24 For Hauerwas, story
gives rise to ethical commitments rather than general principles being applied to a multiplicity of
stories.
Casuistry takes on a different inflection for Hauerwas. Rather than casuistry being rooted
in practical reason with specific ends, Hauerwas believes that stories are what brings about ends
in which practical reason acts. Thus, casuistry is a way in which Hauerwas believes we test our
narrative commitments. Hauerwas states,
From this perspective casuistry is not simply the attempt to adjudicate
difficult cases of conscience within a system of moral principles, but it is
the form that a tradition must use to test its own commitments. For in fact
a tradition often does not understand the implications of its basic
convictions. Those implications become apparent only through the dayto-day living of a people pledged to embody that narrative within their
own lives. 25

“Thus, questions of what we ought to be necessary are background for questions of
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For Christians, casuistry is a way in which one tests their commitments to the story of God
within a particular community. Casuistry asks: how faithful are Christians to their own stories?
Rather than applying ethical principles to narratives, narratives give rise to ethical principles and
are tested by casuistic reasoning.
Hauerwas’ emphasis on narrative, I believe, is correct. However, Hauerwas often frames
his discussions as if Christianity itself has a coherent and monolithic set of beliefs and narratives.
For Hauerwas, these monolithic projections of Christianity are often latently equated with an
Euroamerican understanding of Christianity. This assumption of a Euroamerican frame of
Christianity is why Hauerwas makes statements such as, “I am in fact challenging the very idea
that Christian social ethics is primarily an attempt to make the world more peaceable or just.” 26
Miguel de La Torre rightly critiques Hauerwas’ attack on a Christianity that works for justice
stating, “all marginalized groups, not just us resident aliens, need to be very concerned, for this is
a church whose actions have historically accommodated and justified every immoral form of
human exploitation, from massacres to war, from slavery to colonialism.” 27 Christianity, or the
Church, is not only a collection of narratives about Jesus, but is also narratives in which Jesus is
used to exploit marginalized groups and is also made up of the narratives of these marginalized
groups. Casuistry, then, cannot be simply a testing of the Christian story against itself. If
Christianity is not a monolithic story but is made up of a multiplicity of stories (for good or bad),
then how can casuistry test itself against multiple and often contradicting stories. Thus, I argue
that casuistry is not the application of general principles to a particular narrative or that casuistry
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is the testing of a narrative against itself in which a single narrative has already created ethical
commitments. Rather, casuistry, in relation to narrative, is the way one reasons through a
multiplicity of continually fluctuating and interrelating narratives.
Acknowledging a multiplicity of narratives and their interconnectivity between them is
an essential aspect of Latinx social ethics. Stories, or cuentos, often form and shape Latinx
ethical commitments. Narrative is an important aspect for Latinx theological ethics because
Latinx theological ethics itself is, “simultaneously a narrative of liberation (of oppressed and
marginalized Hispanic persons in the United States) and one of resistance to the brute forces of
assimilation and the erasure of difference that tend to dominate in U.S. culture.” 28 The forces of
assimilation and erasure are what operate latently in Hauerwas’ critique of social justice.
Hauerwas is selective of his narrative and thus perpetuates the narrative of erasure of the Latinx
community and God’s salvific story within it. As Natalia Imperatori-Lee eloquently argues,
“narratives are indeed más que cuentos--beyond fantasy or story, or poetry or thick description,
because they have the power to present reality and daily life, which for Latinx theology has
always been a primary arena of God’s salvific activity.” 29 Latinx narratives provide the
framework in which ethical commitments are discerned and developed. Rather than seeing an
ethical commitment or principle as derived from a single, monolithic narrative, these intersecting
narratives themselves is the process in which ethical commitments or principles come to be. This
creates an active rather than passive process of moral discernment. The narratives, or cuentos,
themselves create ethical commitments and ethical principles.
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Cuentos as a Source of Ethical Reflection
Cuentos, sometimes translated narrative, stories, or witnesses, are cultural stories operative in
Latinx social ethics. These stories occur in a variety of levels including personal and
interpersonal stories, cultural stories, and communal stories that operate behind and within
personal and cultural stories. These stories can be stories of oppression or resistance and often
are a mixture (mestizaje) of both. Of particular importance are the stories of Hispanic and Latinx
women. Because Hispanic women have faced the brunt of oppression on multiple fronts (race,
gender, class, and sexual orientation), their stories highlight the way that cultural and communal
stories either help or hinder Latina moral agency and reflect Latinx moral agency as a whole.

Interpersonal Narratives
The stories that affect Latina and Hispanic women are the stories that emphasize not only the
cultural and communal, but the interpersonal stories of the everyday struggle for survival. Latina
feminist and mujerista theologians often shape their narratives within the framework of struggle
(la lucha) and the everyday (Lo Cotidiano). For Isasi-Díaz, “La Lucha and not suffering is
central to Hispanic women’s self-understanding.” 30 She argues that despite seeing how Hispanic
women, “manage to live in the midst of such arduous, demanding, rough, and trying reality, in
the midst of great suffering” that she refuses to romanticize the suffering of these Hispanic
women. 31 Rather, for Isasi-Díaz, the ability to put on a fiesta or to find joy in the midst of great
suffering is central to narratives of Latinas and Hispanic women. The struggle in the midst of
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suffering is essential to the narrative quest and moral contour of the Latinx quest for the good
life. For Isasi-Díaz, and for many mujerista and Latina feminist theologians, “la vida buena, es la
que se goza.” 32 For Isasi-Díaz, “The good life does not ignore suffering. It struggles to go
beyond it, to evade it.” 33 The quest for the good life is not one that is rooted in Socratic
contemplation, rather, facing the harsh realities of life, Mujerista and Latina feminist theologians
illustrate that the good life is one that struggles and finds joy in the everyday.
Essential to La Lucha of Mujerista and Latina feminist theologians is the concept of lo
cotidiano, the everyday. The struggle for the good life is not one that is vested in abstract
constructions of suffering. In fact, the abstraction of suffering leads to concepts of salvific
suffering that values suffering itself without regard to the person who is suffering. Struggle
against suffering and oppression happen in the everyday lives of the Latinx community. Lo
cotidiano, in addition to being a category developed by feminist critical theory, “has always been
present in Latino/a cultures as a way of designating the whole of doing and thinking of our
people in their daily and recurring routine.” 34 Developed as a way to expose patriarchal and
hierarchical dynamics in the discourses of ideological totalitarianism, lo cotidiano functions as a
way to critique social models that ignore the reality of everyday people in ways that sublimate
individual struggles under umbrella meta-discourses. 35 The importance of employing a
hermeneutic of valuing daily life is that it broadens the conception of what it means to live a
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good life. The good life is not one that is reserved for patriarchal male contemplation, but one
that, “can be continually supported by the whole of society. That is, a life where people may
everyday enjoy a greater and better quality of life--a life worth living.” 36 By adopting a
hermeneutic of lo cotidiano, ethical expression is one that is induced from the real lives of the
Latinx community as opposed to principle-based deductions coming from an ethical hierarchy.
For Hispanic women, lo cotidiano, “adds to the perspective ‘from below’ the consideration of
‘from within’, and ‘of our own selves’ in such a way that considers how Latinas, “consider
action, discourse, norms, established social roles...” 37 This hermeneutic from below places the
emphasis on the grassroot lives of Hispanic women and of the daily lives of the Latinx
community as a whole. By placing the locus of the ethical narrative on the grass root lives of
Hispanic women, Isasi-Díaz suggests mujerista theologians liberate, “not as an individual but as
a member of a Hispanic community.”

38

Thus, by fighting for the agency of Hispanic women,

Isasi-Díaz uses their individual narratives to bring about principles that are applicable to the
Latinx community as a whole in its quest for authentic and tangible liberation.
Isasi-Díaz is able to work to understand the agency of Hispanic women through
employing a methodology of ethnography and meta-ethnography. Isasi-Díaz employs these
methods because of the qualitative rewards of “sustained interaction of the people being studied”
and the importance of being part of the community from which a mujerista theology is being
developed. 39 Not only does the ethnographic sustained interaction with the community bring
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about a theology derived from that community, but by the interaction of a variety of stories and
narratives one is able to bring about a, “knowledge synthesis” which is both “inductive and
interpretive”, invoking an emic approach to synthesis. The emic approach Isasi-Díaz engages
involves bringing about a system of thought from within the framework of Hispanic women and
applying it to ethical frameworks rather than applying principles to each of their individual
stories. This is a matter of hermeneutic exegesis vs eisegesis of moral agency. As Isasi-Díaz
states, “The purpose of this knowledge synthesis is not to establish norms and values--though
they may be deduced quite easily--but to elucidate the self-understanding of Latinas in order to
contribute to the enhancement of their moral agency.” 40 Rather than taking generalized moral
principles or specific moral precepts and applying them to moral and ethical situations Hispanic
women face, the narratives themselves dictate the terms of ethical discussion. By applying
ethnography and meta-ethnography, Isasi-Díaz, is placing the lived experience of Hispanic
women as the locus of ethical thought. Isasi-Díaz does this by conducting ethnographic
interviews with grassroots Hispanic women to engage in ethical thought.
Isasi-Díaz interviewed nine Latinas from varying cultural and economic backgrounds
asking them a variety of questions in order to get a spectrum of narratives and understandings of
Hispanic women’s decision-making process. Isasi-Díaz had five reasons for interviewing Latinas
for her work on Hispanic women’s moral agency. The first is to enhance the moral agency of
Latinas by, “helping them to grasp how they are self-defining as they struggle to survive and to
be liberated.” 41 Next, for Isasi-Díaz, interviewing these nine Latinas provided a richness of
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testimony and experiences, their testimony filled a theological vacuum absent from theological
studies at the time, they illustrated religion as a vivifying element in Latino culture, and they
illustrated the pluriform understanding of Latinas practices, motivations, and moods. 42 In
focusing on the narratives of these women, Isasi-Díaz filled a void that has been desperately
lacking in Roman Catholic ethical reflection, the actual historical and politically situated lives of
those who engage in moral decision making. Because most moral theology is done from a
principle-based approach, the use of the ethnographic interview provides a frame in which actual
people engage the ethical task.
One of the first questions that Isasi-Díaz asked was what, “what should a mother do who
has no money to feed her child?” 43 The nine interviewers give a variety of answers but
ultimately, after exhausting all of their options, almost all of the women said that they would be
willing to steal to feed her child. Their responses are an illustration of natural law moral
reasoning from inductive casuistry rather than through applying specific moral precepts to a
given situation. In fact, their answers follow the same line of thinking of Aquinas who suggests
in his Summa that, “In cases of need all things are common property, so that there would seem to
be no sin in taking another's property, for need has made it common.” 44 For Aquinas, human law
does not invalidate natural law and since the division of goods is a movement of human law and
the supplying of a person’s needs is governed by natural law, it is thus lawful to take another’s
property in the case of need. Without engaging in such a type of syllogistic reasoning these
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Hispanic women worked through what Díaz calls the generative theme of “binomial survivalliberation.” 45 These women interviewed by Isasi-Díaz did not find it a moral dilemma to steal to
feed their child. In fact, they intuit the first inclination of natural law that life is so important, that
there will always be someone to help the mother of a hungry child. 46 Simply by looking from
within their everyday lives, these women engaged in natural law moral reasoning. By attuning to
their specific stories, these Hispanic women were aware that their reflections, “happen within a
certain context, a given social reality constituted by a historical-political situation, economics,
religious cultural background and personal decisions.” 47 For Isasi-Díaz, “Their telling of their
stories shows how their struggle to survive includes praxis, reflective action.” 48 Isasi-Díaz’s
emphasis on the interpersonal stories of nine Latina women illustrates that their stories, their
lives, and their personal decisions are the central locus of ethical praxis.
Isasi-Díaz frames their answers in the language of self-definition and conscience. She
contrasts this with the ecclesial understanding of conscience which has been used, “knowingly,
or unknowingly as an instrument of control and domination.” 49 Isasi-Díaz critiques the
increasing emphasis on the Roman Catholic magisterium as the arbiter of conscience. For IsasiDíaz, such an increasing control of the magisterium in moral matters, “worries mujerista
theologians because of recent blatant attempts by the Roman Curia to stifle opinions and
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understandings in the church to the point of threatening primacy of conscience (that is,
threatening to subordinate conscience to obedience to Rome in ethical matters as well as in
matters of Church discipline.” 50 She argues that such an understanding of conscience that is
subordinated to the Catholic Church, “disempowers Hispanic women in our attempt to
strengthen our moral agency, an essential component in our struggle for liberation.” 51 In the
continual grasp on conscience by the Church’s magisterium, Isasi-Díaz argues that the
magisterium is enacting an authoritarian framework of conscience that sets up the privileged
clergy against the laity who are under the authority of the magisterium.
In establishing such a framework, the major sin is dissent or disobedience, even when
such dissent is a matter of one’s own individual conscience. For many in the Latinx community,
given the social realities that one must face in the course of the struggle, there may be situations
in which following some of the Church’s teachings may be against one’s conscience. 52 Within
the context of the everyday struggles, deontological ethics that form binding principles such as,
‘do not steal,’ would force those who look to feed their family in a time of extreme scarcity to act
against their conscience. Following Isasi-Díaz’ line of thought, then, such a principle that comes
at the cost of feeding one’s family forces those who are in that marginalized position to go
against their conscience. Thus, “An awareness that we are repeatedly obliged, for whatever
reason, to act against something as central as our conscience contributes greatly to the sense of
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being oppressed.” 53 Such a sense of oppression comes as a result of a double bind. That is to
follow ethical principles without regard to context is a privilege of those who are not
marginalized.
By highlighting the perspectives of grassroots Hispanic women, Isasi-Díaz moves the
understanding of conscience to conscientization. Ethical paradigms that focus on authoritarian
structures of conscience and that do not attune to the everyday struggles of the Latinx
community and in particular, Latinas, perpetuate the marginalization of the Latinx community.
Rather than frame conscience as an adherence to an authority or a set of moral precepts, IsasiDíaz frames conscience as making moral persons. Isasi-Díaz states
“One of the important consequences of focusing on the person as agent
instead of on conscience as an isolated part of the individual is that ethical
considerations are not confined just to decision making but rather focus on
the ‘self who continues from decision through decision and who actually
affirms and create one's moral self in and through those decisions.’
conscience, then, should not be understood as a faculty or power but
instead should be identified with the ‘moral consciousness’ of the
person.” 54
The ethnographic interviews conducted by Isasi-Díaz illustrate that within the everyday struggle
of Hispanic women, moral decision making is rooted in the actual everyday lives and moral
identity of these women themselves in contradiction to authoritarian conscience or hierarchically
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ordered principles. In fact, for Isasi-Díaz, “These women found it difficult to deal with the
‘process’ because they see and understand it within a much broader scope of what constitutes the
fiber of their moral being.” 55 For these women, “They quite appropriately resisted dissecting
their experiences in order to identify the process of decision making” because “their common
sense, formed within the Latino Cultural Ethos and sharpened by their struggle for survival,
provides them the moral wisdom they need in their everyday lives.” 56 Their everyday lives (lo
cotidiano) and narratives form and shape the locus of moral reasoning.

Cultural Narratives
The interpersonal narratives of the Latinx community are often shaped and formed through the
cultural narratives that are emic to the Latinx community as a whole. Cultural narratives provide
frameworks for shared meaning, group identity, and form a locus of ethical reflection. Culture is
often an ambiguous term and it is necessary first to define culture and negotiate a particular view
from within cultural studies for us to begin our ethical reflection on Latinx cultural narratives.
Robert Schreiter provides several frameworks in which scholars approach the subject of
culture. The first is the functionalist approach which is concerned with, “how the various aspects
of society are constituted and interrelated to form a cultural whole.” 57 Schreiter argues that many
scholars of the functional approach to culture focus on method over theory and are primarily
concerned with the categorization of empirical data. Similar to the functional approach are the
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ecological and materialist approaches to culture which focus on the relationship between society
and its environment and how, “how the realities of the physical environment...shape and direct
the cognitive dimension of culture.” 58 Taking a more psychological bend toward culture,
structuralist studies of culture seek to understand the latent structures that form patterns and
networks of systems that establish cultural frameworks. Schreiter relies most heavily on the
semiotic understanding of culture most famously delineated by Clifford Geertz. Geertz primarily
understood cultures within a framework of sign systems that interact and mutually define each
other. Schreiter gives several reasons why he opts to work within a semiotic construction of
culture including its interdisciplinary approach, how culture constitutes identity within the
culture and the individuals within it, and provides strong patterns of change. The main benefit of
adopting a semiotic analysis of culture is that it provides a way of “sorting out structures of
significance...and determining their social ground and import.” 59 For Geertz and Schreiter,
culture provides a system of structure and meaning in which one forms group and personal
identity.
Following Geertz, Massingale provides a useful definition of culture. For Massingale,
“Culture thus denotes a system of meanings and values, expressed in symbolic form, that
conveys and expresses a people’s understanding of life. Culture is the set of attitudes toward life,
beliefs about reality, and assumptions about the universe shared by a human group.” 60
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Massingale provides five observations about culture. Cultures, for Massingale, are shared group
realities, learned communal beliefs, identity forming and are expressed symbolically. The
symbolic expression of culture adds a layer to which culture is not just some outward expression
of rituals that can be measured empirically, rather culture is internalized and constitutive of
identity. Massingale states “...culture, at its core, is something internal. It is a people’s soul, a set
of meanings and values that is an individual’s and social group’s identity. It is the frame of
reference through which they interpret life. Culture shapes consciousness.” 61 Cultural shapes
worldview and as we will later argue worldviews are the grounds through which ethical
reflections are located.
Culture, however, is not a priori, but is constructed through human enterprise. Orlando
Espín has suggested that culture is the result of mutually imbricating shared meaningfulness and
humanness. 62 Espín states, “We are human because we have constructed the meaningfulness of
our being human.” 63 Because of the contingency and constructedness of culture, for Espín, and
for us, it is important to resist the constructions of cultural supremacy that imposes its values on
others. For Espín,
This allows us to affirm furthermore that, no human culture and no
historical configuration of culture (because these are human constructs
and because they are results of culture’s internal struggles over
hegemony and dominance) is ever absolute, permanent, exclusively good,
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sinless, necessary or superior: cultures cannot be turned into idols,
although humankind seems to have this inclination. 64
The idealization and idolization of some cultures over others indicates that culture is not just a
human construct that provides a framework of meaning solely connatural to human existence,
but that culture is also political.
Leticia Guardiola-Sáenz, in constructing Mexican-American identities, illustrates that
culture and cultural studies are not neutral enterprises. Rather, “it is a practice committed to
social reconstruction by critical political involvement, exposing power relationships and the
ways they influence and shape cultural practices. In that sense, culture is analyzed within its
social political context in order to understand and change the structures of dominance.” 65 The
structures of dominance have been defined as cultural hegemony, in which, dominance is
established through cultural and societal means. Thus, culture is not a neutral observation but is a
sight of contestation and resistance. As Guardiola-Sáenz argues, “culture as the terrain where
meaning is incorporated or resisted becomes the battlefield where hegemony is won or lost.” 66
Thus, culture and its relation to the construction of identity is never monolithic or absolutized but
rather is in constant negotiation between persons in power and the marginalized. What is at stake
in this negotiation is the right to identify oneself and one’s community rather than be defined by
others. Culture is a contestation of communal narratives.
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I argue that culture is the system of narratives that construct social imaginaries that give
contour to social identities. The ability to determine one’s narrative is key to establishing and
maintaining moral agency. While Isasi-Díaz sought to preserve and enhance moral agencies
through the telling of personal stories, another front for the preservation of moral agency must
occur on the cultural and communal stories being told about the Latinx community and from the
Latinx community. Through the establishment of social imaginaries through the use of cultural
cuentos, one will be able to understand the ethical task as more than individual moral decisionmaking, but as a communal task of moral discernment in which one is able to construct resisting
narratives.
Charles Taylor has elaborated on the function of social imaginaries. Rather than social
imaginaries being a conscious worldview, they function as the implicit narratives that structure
beliefs about the world. A social imaginary, for Taylor, is more about establishing the way
people use, “images, stories, legends, etc.” in order to establish how people, “imagine their social
existence”. 67 These stories (cuentos), legends, and images do not function as a cognitive choice
but rather, “It concerns our precognitive pre-thematic grasp of the world and the ways this grasp
orients how we perceive the world around us and our place in it.” 68 As such, these stories,
legends, and images are a result of culture rather than rational choice; these stories form the
grounds from which all people enact their choices, in particular moral choices.
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Nancy Pineda-Madrid draws on Taylor’s understanding of social imaginaries to frame
her discussion of feminicide in Ciudad Juárez. For Pineda-Madrid, social imaginaries not only
configure worldviews they also instill them with moral order. Pineda-Madrid believes a social
imaginary is, “the given conception of moral order” and that it “assigns particular characteristics
of the world and to divine action within it such that a given set of moral norms appears right,
merits our pursuit and is at least partially realizable.” 69 A social imaginary does not only
construct a worldview, but constructs a moral order that undergirds moral decisions that
constitute worldviews. While Pineda-Madrid adopts Taylor’s worldview, she does not believe
that Taylor accurately addresses the problem of false worldviews that construct violent realities.
Pineda-Madrid argues, “While he does recognize the significance of people imagining their
social existence and the precognitive dynamic of social imaginaries, he does not help us much
beyond an initial discussion, to understand well and grapple effectively with the presence of false
consciousness and distortion.” 70 Such distortions and false consciousnesses have been used to
justify worldviews and moral orders that enable violence towards women and have framed the
violence against Latin American women in Mexico and Latinas in the Southwest.
Pineda-Madrid draws on the interpersonal stories of women who have faced violence in
Juárez and families who have suffered as a result of feminicide to illustrate that these acts of
violence are a result of violent social imaginaries. Pineda-Madrid argues that Taylor’s
understanding of social imaginaries, “may be extended to suggest that a society in which
feminicide not only emerges but also endures has become subject to a manipulation of its
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‘images, stories, and legends’ so that they forge a ‘moral order’ that implies that violence against
women is just this side of ‘tolerable’.” 71 The interplay between these violent social imaginaries
and the interpersonal suffering that Latin American and Latinx women face is what PinedaMadrid calls a social-suffering hermeneutic. A social suffering hermeneutic does not name
suffering solely as interpersonal stories nor does it discuss suffering in detached and abstract
terms, but a social suffering hermeneutic, “attends to societal problems and personal suffering”
in which it gives, “attention to consequential personal suffering foregrounding particular
experience of victims” while also keeping, “the macro level of analysis from becoming merely
an abstraction.” 72 This interplay of personal suffering and social analysis is at the root of
“reading” the experiences of the suffering of the Latinx community.
For Pineda-Madrid, there are several images and stories that are operative of the
oppression of Latin American women and Latinx communities on the border of Ciudad Juárez
and El Paso. These cultural stories that construct the “social symbolic representation” of violence
against women are the narratives of Guadalupe/La Malinche, La Llorona, and Coyolxauhqui.
These stories form the cultural backdrop that form the social imaginaries that create worldviews
that tolerate violence against women.
The narratives of the cultural heroes of Our Lady of Guadalupe and La Malinche form a
cultural binary that codifies ideologies about the roles of Latina women. The emphasis on
Guadalupe can establish the ideology of “marianismo” which, “idealizes suffering as integral to
what it means to be a woman.” 73 By emphasizing in the story of Mary aspects of, ‘self-sacrifice’,
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‘self-effacement’ and ‘self-subordination’ as a model for all women, Pineda-Madrid argues,
“cultivates in women a stance of passivity and endurance in the face of suffering.” 74 On the other
hand, women who stand up for themselves, take care of themselves, and stand up against cultural
norms are, “dubbed ‘traitors or ‘malinches.’” The narrative of La Malinche, is based off of the
indigenous Mexican woman Malintzín Tenepal who served as Cortez’s translator in the conquest
of Mexico. Malintzín was dubbed a traitor and, “serves as the sacrificial victim in the Mexican
national consciousness and begins to be seen as a scapegoat of her people.” 75 Because Malintzín
did what she needed to do for her own survival, she was dubbed a traitor. Thus, Hispanic women
are caught in a double bind; if they patiently endure suffering their narratives are scripted
through the ideology of marianismo. If Hispanic women resist their suffering, they are dubbed
Malinches and traitors. The social imaginary of the binary of Guadalupe/La Malinche serves to,
“keep Latina agency and behavior tightly circumscribed particularly in the midst of significant
personal suffering.” 76 These social imaginaries work to severely limit Latinas moral agency and
operate to categorize the suffering of Latinas as a given within a patriarchal Anglo-dominated
worldview.
The narratives of La Llorona and Coyolxauhqui function similarly to justify Latina’s
social oppression. La Llorona is a woman in a Mexican folk tale whose children were killed or
who went mad and killed her two children. La Llorona was destined to roam the earth in agony
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for the loss of her children. 77 According to Pineda-Madrid, La Llorona is representative of the
fact that Latina women are expected to live a life of suffering. According to Octavio Paz, in a
patriarchal worldview, La Llorona represents, “la chingada” (the fucked one). To be “chingada”
or a hijo de la chingada is to take on a posture of negativity, to be screwed, to have no way out. 78
Thus, the narrative of La Llorona has been used to suggest that the natural state of Latina women
is to be screwed, betrayed, to suffer. Thus, for Pineda-Madrid, “the patriarchal context in which
many Latinas find themselves must be destroyed at its root lest women be continually relegated
to a ‘long-suffering’ life as central to the female condition.” 79 La Llorona functions as a mythic
representation that justifies women’s suffering.
Coyolxauhqui, the moon goddess in the Nahuatl creation myth functions similarly to La
Llorona as a representation of female suffering. In the Nahuatl creation myth, the mother
goddess Coatilcue wished to have another child, Huitzilopochtli. Coyolxuahqui who was a child
of Coatlicue viewed such a pregnancy as dishonoring her and her four hundred brothers.
Coyolxauhqui plotted to kill her mother. Yet, as she attacked, Huitzilopochtli was born and
killed Coyolxauhqui and her brothers. This myth goes on to illustrate, “the daily supremacy of
the sun (Huitzilopocthili), which utterly obliterates the moon (Coyolxauhqui) and the stars (four
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hundred brothers).” 80 This violence was reenacted at the Aztec Templo Mayor every year. This
violence at the center of the Nahuatl creation myth functions to illustrate that violence is at the
center of many cosmologies. The violence done to Coyolxauhqui and her subsequent
dismemberment, for Pineda-Madrid, creates a, “‘sacred’ link between violence against women’s
bodies and supremacy of male divinity” and “idealizes male humanity as dominant over female
humanity.” 81 In other words, “Perhaps the legacy of this myth can be found in the social-political
unconscious, or said differently, the social imaginary worldview that idealizes ‘Latinas and
suffering’ and makes this connection appear as somehow preordained by God.” 82 The Nahuatl
creation narrative that functions to serve as a justification for gender-based violence has
permeated the unconscious of many Latinx communities but is not only unique to Latinx
communities. Narratives such as Enuma Elish, and the Biblical stories of Dinah, Hagar,
Bathsheba, and Tamar illustrate that violence against women was justified in traditions other
than Nahual communities but remains a prevalent thread in many religious traditions.
These four illustrations provided by Pineda-Madrid illustrate how the personal suffering
of Latin American and Latinx women are also rooted in cultural narratives that form social
imaginaries that not only limits moral agency of Latinx women but also normalizes their
suffering while justifying male dominance. Nancy Pineda-Madrid illustrates the importance of
naming these cultural narratives and imaginaries through a social-suffering hermeneutic. She
states, “If we are to understand the complexity of the appropriation of suffering within society,
and if we are to grasp why social, political and even some religious authorities deem the
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suffering of Latinas to be of a lesser significance than that of others, then we need to recognize
the presence of a hegemonic imaginary worldview as it is generated and sustain by reigning
stereotypes of Latinas.” 83 The personal suffering and La Lucha of Hispanic women engages not
only their personal lives but are intertwined with social and cultural stories that create the
background for moral decision making. The resistance to hegemonic imaginaries and the fight
for moral agency functions not only at the individual level but the communal level, as well.

Communal Narratives
In August 2019, Patrick Crusius, of Plano Texas, drove 650 miles to the Cielo Vista Walmart in
El Paso Texas and shot and killed 23 people, injuring 23 others. This act of violence was
described as the “largest attack on Latinos in modern U.S. history.” 84 Crusius didn’t enact this
violence simply to do a random act of violence, but specifically targeted the Latinx population of
El Paso. 85 Crusius enacted such violence because he was operating under a false cultural
narrative against the Latinx population. In Crusius’ manifesto written before this terrorist attack
he argues his attack was, “a response to the Hispanic invasion of Texas.” 86 Crusius racist
manifesto reflects the current racist cultural narratives about the Latinx community perpetuated
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by then, U.S. President Donald Trump. Trump has called the Latinx community, “drug dealers,
criminals, and racists.” 87 He referred to Latin American undocumented migrants as animals. 88
These racist narratives undergirded his racist immigration policies which included a zerotolerance immigration policy separating undocumented children from their parents, denying
asylum to Latin American immigrants, and instituting a public charge rule limiting low-income
migrants. Both Crusius and Trump operate under racial logics and narratives that substantiate
racist policies and racial attack. While Trump’s rhetoric may not have caused Crusius’ racist
attack against the Latinx community in El Paso, they operate under similar cultural narratives
that portray the Latinx community as dangerous and as invaders that threaten Euroamerican
values and individualism. Both Crusius and Trump work under racial logics and narratives that
support white supremacy. To combat these racist cultural narratives, one must use alternative
social imaginaries that are historically and critically conscious. In other words, to combat antiLatinx cultural narratives one must replace them with truthful narratives that recognize the
connection of Latinx identity in relation to U.S. imperialism and white supremacy. As Laura
Gómez states, “In order to understand and combat racism writ large, we must do two things in
coordination. First, we must know the histories of specific racial groups (e.g., Latinos, African
Americans, etc.). Then we must uncover the connections among racial logics to reveal how they
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support each other in the service of white supremacy.” 89 To combat anti-Latinx racist narratives
one must know how these racial narratives came to be. Thus, the interpersonal narratives of Ada
Maria Isasi-Díaz, the social suffering hermeneutic and social imaginaries discussed by Nancy
Pineda-Madrid, must also consider the national narratives of the U.S. and Latinx countries of
origin. One must frame these cuentos with the larger national cuentos that give rise and shape to
Latinx identity.
U.S. Hispanic and Latinx identity stands in relation to U.S. imperialism and white
supremacy. The United States has instigated or participated in regime change in numerous South
American countries, including Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, Panama,
Cuba, and Paraguay. Such intervention was rooted in the attempt to establish the United States as
a world imperial power under the guidance of Roosevelt and what was called gunboat
diplomacy. The U.S. has set up “banana republics'', supported dictators, and trained torturers. 90
As Laura Gómez succinctly describes,
Whether in order to extend the country to the Pacific (Mexico), to extract
resources like coffee, sugar, or bananas (Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guatemala,
Honduras, Costa Rica), to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
(Panama, Nicaragua), to achieve America’s ‘manifest destiny’ in the
hemisphere (all), or to provide access to an exploitable labor force (all),
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the United States has invaded, annexed, covertly and overtly interfered,
and governed its way across Latin America for two centuries. 91
Yet, while the U.S. has invaded almost every country in South and Central America and Mexico,
it would be beyond the scope of this dissertation to intimately discuss all the ways the U.S. has
enacted neo-colonial and imperial policies against each of these countries. Thus, we will take for
example the way the U.S. imperialism and white supremacist policies have intimately affected
the Mexican American community in the United States. By highlighting the true story of the U.S.
involvement with Mexico, we can establish that any sort of cultural narrative that suggests that
there is a Mexican-American invasion is simply not true, but rather, it was the Euroamericans
that invaded the Southwest.
The U.S. involvement in Latin America started with the 1823 Monroe Doctrine that
served as a warning to England and France not to interfere with affairs in the Western
hemisphere, essentially claiming Latin America to be within the U.S.’s sphere of influence. The
proclamation of the Monroe doctrine coincided with the growing independence of countries in
Latin America. Mexico, weary from a war that resulted in declaring independence from Spain in
1821, alongside with the Monroe doctrine provided opportunities for the U.S. to expand its
influence and power into Mexico. As Gómez illustrates, “Weakened from the long fight for
independence and facing resistance from Indigenous peoples seeking their own sovereignty after
the collapse of the Spanish empire, Mexico encouraged American settlement of its northeast
region, known today as Texas.” 92 With the growing settlement of Texas by white Americans and
the abolition of slavery by Mexico, the white settlers of Texas revolted in what would be called
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in the United States as the War of Texas Independence. In elementary history classes the War of
Texas Independence is often framed as settlers being oppressed by the Mexican Army. Slavery is
not mentioned. This illustrates how racial logics seek to form their own narratives to support
cultures of white supremacy.
The inclusion of Texas into the United States was also rooted in white supremacy. Not
only was Texas included as a Southern, pro-slavery state in order to bolster pro-slavery claims in
the United States but was also annexed to the U.S. through a campaign of racist rhetoric against
Mexicans. Robert Walker, a senator from Mississippi argued that Texas should be included as a
state, to support, “‘our kindred race’ against, ‘the colored mongrel race, and barbarous tyranny,
and superstitions of Mexico’.” 93 Walker also stated, “‘five-sixths’ of Mexicans are ‘semibarbarous hordes...composed of every poisonous compound of blood and color.” 94 Not only was
the inclusion of Texas into the United States the result of the racism rooted in slavery, but was
also a result of anti-Mexican racism.
The rhetoric used to justify the inclusion of Texas into the United States was also used to
provoke the Mexican-American War by James Polk and others. Because of the recent Mexican
War of Independence and the War for Texan Independence the U.S. was able to assert, “an
outrageously expansive border, claiming both Santa Fe and El Paso along the Rio Grande.” 95
When the Mexican government pushed back against the U.S. border expansion policy, the U.S.
waged war. Part of the way such an aggressive war was sold to Congress was through the racist
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rhetoric. Gómez describes a newspaper editorial advocating for the War. It states, “Mexico was
poor, distracted, in anarchy, and almost in ruins--what could she do to stay the hand of our
power, to impede the march of our greatness? We are Anglo-Saxon Americans; it was our
destiny to possess and rule this continent--we are bound to it.” 96 Within twenty-five years of the
proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. provoked a war against Mexico that resulted in
the U.S. appropriating the territories of New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, Colorado and
Utah.
As a result of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, the U.S. appropriated most of its
Southwestern territories and as a condition of this treaty, Mexican citizens living in those
territories were naturalized as American citizens. The prevalence of Mexican Americans in the
Southwest was not a result of crossing the border, or an invasion, but rather the border crossing
them. Any invasion of territory that occurred was on the part of Anglo-Americans invading
Mexican territory, not the other way around. As Gómez states, “The conviction that Mexicans
were racially inferior informed every decision about the incorporation of these original Mexican
Americans.” 97 With the increase of white settlers in the lands of the Cession came more racial
hostility toward Mexican Americans to the point that from 1910-1930 many of these naturalized
American citizens were deported and their citizenship revoked.
The years after the Mexican-American war were marked by massive expansion of
industry through the Southwest. U.S. corporations often dictated the lives of Mexican-American
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citizens and Mexican immigrants as they used both for cheap and exploitative labor. 98 Not only
did U.S. corporations affect naturalized Mexican-American citizens, but they also affected the
economy of Mexico itself. American corporate colonialism, “displaced tens of thousands of
campesinos, rural Mexicans who spoke one of dozens of Indigenous languages native to Mexico.
Campesinos were forced from their homelands to find work in Mexico's cities, and, when that
failed, they migrated north to the United States to find work.” 99 With the growing number of
Mexican nationals coming to the United States, over 50,000 crossing over annually, and the
already naturalized Mexican-American citizens living in their ancestral lands in the Southwest,
White Americans began demonizing Mexican nationals and Mexican-Americans and formed a
national border patrol and immigration service in 1924 to begin deporting both Mexican
nationals and Mexican-American citizens. 100 Mass deportations of anyone who passed as Latinx
became commonplace.
The newly formed immigration service had very little actual oversight. The authority to
deport was almost exclusively up to the discretion of local immigration agents, often using
operative racial logics to decide who to deport. The deportation procedures employed by these
immigration agents, “were made to order for wholesale violations of basic human rights. Mass
raids and arrests were conducted without benefit of warrants. Individuals were often held
incommunicado and not allowed to see anyone. Without the opportunity to post bail, deportees
languished in jail until the next deportation train was formed. These procedures were the norm,
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rather than the exception, during the 1930s.” 101 The racial logics operating with these
immigration officials functioned systematically and interpersonally. Since the Immigration
Service was housed under the department of labor there was reason to suspect that deportations
of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans were to protect white privilege when it came to
employment. As Balderrama and Rodriguez state, “the Service had a vested interest in getting rid
of as many Mexicans as possible. The deportation of more Mexicans meant more jobs for ‘real
Americans’.” 102 Not only were the systematic deportations done to protect white jobs, but they
targeted undocumented workers based on racist projections of the immigration officials. As
Balderrama and Rodriguez illustrate, “All Mexicans, whether legal or illegal, looked alike to
immigration officials. In street sweeps throughout the nation’s major cities, people who ‘looked
Mexican’ found themselves at risk of being picked up and taken into custody.” 103 Deportations
were not the only way in which Mexicans and Mexican-American’s found their lives in
jeopardy. Repatriation of Mexicans and Mexican-American citizens occurred not just because of
the racist constructions of immigration officials but also with the general racist cultures in the
U.S. as a whole.
Mexican and Mexican-American repatriation was not conducted by immigration officials
but by state and local government illustrating that racist logics permeated every aspect of
American government. As a result of these racial logics permeating American culture, when the
great depression occurred, “Latino workers became scapegoats, subject to the vagaries of local
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and state reactions to unemployment. In the 1930s, as many as two million people, including
some American citizens of Mexican descent, were deported so that their jobs could be given to
whites.” 104 These repatriations were not simply done in order to create more jobs but they took
on an unforgivable and nefarious quality through the repatriation of children and parents,
hospital patients, the mentally-ill, and the terminally ill. 105 Repatriations such as medical
repatriations prove that the racial logic took precedence over economic concerns. Since those
who were bedridden and terminally ill posed no threat to the jobs of white Americans, the only
reason left to enact such atrocious repatriation policies was anti-Latinx racism.
While it would seem that such policies are a thing of the past, Miguel De La Torre has
illustrated that the U.S. still enacts, “A Kinder, Gentler, Gunboat Diplomacy.” 106 Such a
diplomacy keeps U.S. corporate interests as the highest priority through exploitative labor
practices at the expense of Latinx bodies. As De Le Torre observers, “In the quest for the lowest
possible wage, the U.S. government encourages U.S. industry to relocate to places south of the
1,833-mile border under the philosophy that it benefits the overall neoliberal market. But
relocating factories to the other side of the border does not mean that countries like Mexico have
received a financial windfall.” 107 In order to protect neoliberal economics that favor U.S.
corporations, the U.S. brought about the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
While NAFTA was intended to stop Mexican migration to the U.S. by reinforcing the economy

104

Gómez, Inventing Latinos, 29.

Balderrama and Rodriguez, 107. These deportations and repatriation have a similar
rhetorical quality to Trump's zero-tolerance immigration policies.
105

106

Miguel De La Torre, “Living on the Border.” 217.

107

Miguel De La Torre, “Living on the Border.” 217.

257

of Mexico, “NAFTA is widely believed to have had the opposite effect.” 108 Because NAFTA
favored U.S. corporations more than the actual economy of Mexico, “Mexican land peasants
were forced to abandon their lands because they were unable to compete against heavily
subsidized U.S. imported agricultural goods. They left their homesteads and moved to colonias
(slums of shacks patched together from pieces of metal, wood and plastic) surrounding the
maquiladoras.” 109 The massive loss of land by the campesinos, resulted in an even more
exploitative labor policy. Because of NAFTA, the purchasing power and real income of
Mexicans dropped by 20 percent and Mexican workers who earned 23% of American income
dropped earning only 11%. 110 Because of NAFTA
Small and medium businesses producing for the domestic market
went out of business. Thousands of workers, especially women,
were pushed out of the formal job market into informal
employment where they had no benefits and job security and there
were no minimum wage requirements. As a result, immigration to
the United States leapt to half a million men, women and children
a year.” 111
In order to curb increased immigration resulting from NAFTA immigration policies of the
United States have sought to limit the migration of Mexicans into the United State through

108

Gómez, Inventing Latinos, 33.

109

De La Torre, Living on the Border, 217.

110

De La Torre, “Living on the Border”, 218.

Laura Carlsen. “Trade Disagreement: The Inequalities of NAFTA.” The Christian
Century 126, no. 18 (September 8, 2009): 10.
111

258

enacting the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act which has been known
by scholars as, “the Latino Exclusion Act” which fostered, “a new atmosphere of exclusion that
had not been felt by Latino immigrants since the federal roundup of over a million Mexicans
during Operation Wetback in the 1950’s.” 112 While the United States sought for capital to flow
freely through borders, it prohibited the people who capital exploits from crossing these porous
borders.
NAFTA not only enacted economic exploitation against Latinos, it also created a
competing narrative about the value of suffering and whose suffering is worth the economic
growth of American corporations. Coming back to the problem of feminicide, Nancy PinedaMadrid reminds us, “When various groups lay claim in the name of various interest to how we
perceive suffering they create contested ground in which competing narratives shape our
understanding of the suffering of the feminicide’s victims.” 113 The expansion of global
capitalism and the exploitation of Latinas, for Pineda-Madrid, go hand in hand. The expansion of
global capitalism and the exploitation of Latinas, “were interpreted as part of a ‘single process.’
Both were interpreted as ‘expressions of exercise of power and gender hierarchies,’ and each
served in part, to explain the other.’” 114 Latinas working at the maquiladoras in Juárez were seen
to be disposable, often called mujeres desechables.115 The economic policies enacted by the U.S.
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tells a story about whose lives matter and whose lives do not and for Pineda-Madrid, alongside
the cultural stories about Hispanic women, NAFTA and its accompanying policies tells stories
that devalue the lives of Latinx women.
The history of the relationship between the United States and Mexico illustrates that
history is saturated with narrative value and not a neutral enterprise. By emphasizing and telling
the story of U.S. exploitation of Mexican nationals and Mexican-American citizens, one combats
the false narratives that present Mexican-Americans and Mexican migrants as invaders and
dangerous when history illustrates it was quite the opposite. Through telling the truthful story of
U.S. military aggression, systematic and violent deportation, repatriation, and negative economic
policies, one can see that the personal suffering and struggle of the Latinx community and
cultural cuentos must always be set within the frame of international relations. While we focused
on the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico, it is by no means the only example of U.S.
exploitation of countries that Latinx communities call their countries of origin. Countries such as
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Columbia, Chile and even U.S. territories such as Puerto
Rico all have histories and stories of physical, cultural, and economic violence committed by the
policies of the United States that give rise to their particular communities' cultural and personal
narratives.

Casuistry and Cuentos
The emphasis on narrative in casuistry and the levels of narratives central to Latinx ethical
reflection provides for a unique opportunity to illustrate how the cultural production of the
Latinx community in both its symbolic-performativity of popular religious practices and its
literary production can be a locus of ethical reflection. Rather than simply addressing each of
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these categories' popular religious production and literary output, we will address how these
elements come together to provide a space for ethical reflection. In particular, we will use the
literature of Ana Castillo’s So Far from God to illustrate how the varying cuentos intersect to
show how Latinx moral agency and ethical decision making is created and sustained by attention
to Latinx narratives as a source of ethical reflection. In emphasizing Latinx literature as a source
of theological reflection in which casuistry and the interpersonal, cultural, and social narratives
intersect we can use Latinx literature as a paradigm that,” can spark methodological insights, or
deeper insights on God, understood as the Good, the True, the Beautiful, and the Just.” 116
Moreover, by looking at Latinx literature, we can further develop the interrelationship between
casuistry and Latinx narratives.
Castillo’s novel, So Far from God, is set in northern New Mexico and is saturated with
the interpersonal, cultural, and national narratives that form Latinx ethical reflection and identity.
So Far from God, is about four sisters (Fe, Esperanza, Caridad, and La Loca) and their mother,
(Sofi). The themes in this novel include feminism, Anglo-dominant and Spanish cultural
hegemony, and environmentalism told through a magical realist style that, as we discussed in the
previous chapter, is saturated with mestizaje epistemology. 117 Through the incorporation of
magical realism, the novel’s politics presents Latina agency as a site of resistance against
narratives that wish to circumscribe their collective agency within pre-given patriarchal and
Anglo-dominant narratives. There are scenes in the novel where the four sisters encounter or
enact the miraculous to combat being circumscribed into oppressive narratives. For example, La
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Loca as a child was resurrected from death claiming to have gone to heaven, hell, and purgatory
undermining the authority of the local priest. The scene of La Loca’s resurrection illustrates that
often, “the church’s devils...are patriarchal reinscriptions of female and indigenous wisdom.” 118
Another sister, Caridad, is raped and abandoned in the streets only to recover and receive healing
and magical powers. She later dies with her female lover in a “Thelma and Louise” type scene
where they dematerialize and their bodies are never found. Esperanza becomes a journalist and
dies while covering the middleeast. She frequently comes back to visit her family as a spirit.
The two most inspiring of the women are the sister Fe, who works an average job as a
bank teller and later at a chemical plant and Sofi, the mother of the four sisters. Their lives are
inspiring because their resistance is rooted in their everyday miraculous lives. Fe dies of cancer
from working with dangerous chemicals. Sofi, after the death of all her daughters, starts an
activist collective called, “Los Ganados y Lana Cooperative” that provides more opportunities
for women in their small town of Tome. Sofi later became the mayor of Tome. What is
emphasized in the lives of Fe and Sofi in particular is the idea that, “how to best address
communal ills are the years of painstaking effort and collective participation rather than the
‘magic’ of divine or saintly intervention.” 119 Yet, what Castillo’s' story emphasizes is that
through being attuned to the varying levels of narrative in these Xicana’s lives, what is
emphasized is their resistance to being told what their narrative is. Rather, the ability to
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determine their own narrative in the face of patriarchy and other oppressive structures is what is
illustrative of their moral agency.
So Far from God serves as an allegory for the moral agency of Latinas and Xicanas. Gail
Pérez argues that the novel is, “extremely allegorical, a quality evident in both the tradition
cuento and the saint’s life.” 120 What Pérez illustrates is that Castillo subverts the patriarchal
understanding of sainthood to focus on the moral agency of Latinx women. The novel illustrates
that these women do not operate in a traditionally androcentric morality, often shirking
traditional morality in order to survive their oppressive contexts. 121 Yet placing these everyday
women within a narrative of saint’s lives sets them to be saints of the Latinx community that do
what they need to do to survive in Anglocentric and dominant culture. This is where Hauerwas’
understanding of narrative context of casuistry can be reworked to the advantage of Latinx
communities. Hauerwas states,
The ultimate test of casuistry in the Christian community is how well our
reasoning embodies as well as witnesses to the lives of the saints.
Casuistry rightly done is meant to call Christians to attend to the
innovative lives that we believe help us know better what our convictions
entail. That does not mean we are called to slavishly imitate the saints, but
rather they provide the paradigms to help us know better what we are to
reason about. 122
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For example, a traditional “saint’s life” about female saints is often oriented around
sexual purity. These women often have sexual agency and an expressively sexuality that the
Catholic Church would frown upon.
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For Hauerwas, the lives of the saints set the paradigmatic context from which we can begin
ethical reasoning. Yet, the saints that Hauerwas has in mind are rooted in a patriarchal,
Euroamerican framework that ignores the everyday struggles of the Latinx community and
ignores its own privilege to forget the way the Church itself has been complicit in the suffering
of marginalized people. The saints provided by Castillo, despite the fact that they are presented
in a magical and miraculous style, are much more realistic in forming paradigmatic casuistic
cases. Castillo’s saints provide a frame that doesn’t demand principled moral excellence from a
Euroamerican rigorist standard of morality. Castillo’s So Far from God understands that in the
context of multivalent stories and narratives, the ethical is not prescriptive in terms of applying
general principles to particular narratives nor having pre-established narratives that prescribe
ethical principles. Rather, So Far from God illustrates that what our lives require is the
discernment of morality in a case-by-case basis that is attentive to the multilayered stories that
give shape to identity and often tries to circumscribe identity. For the Latinx community in
crafting our own narratives in the face of a plethora of interpersonal, cultural, and national
narratives, we are able to engage our moral agency to reason what ways best to survive and to be
able to determine what justice demands in a case-by-case basis, sometimes yielding general
principles of justice.
Casuistry and Latinx cuentos come into relationship with one another in that it is only by
attuning the varying levels of interdependent narratives, that one can engage practical, everyday
moral decision making. Applying general principles to multi-valent and pluriform narratives will
always come up short when addressing the concrete needs and ends of specific communities. In
the case of the Latinx community, applying general principles without regard to understanding
the intersecting levels of cuentos in such a community only leads to the continuing erasure to
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concrete Latinx bodies. By presuming, like Hauerwas, that single monolithic narratives provide
the principles in which casuistry is used to test a narrative against itself leads to ignoring how
dominant narratives are complicit in the oppression of Latinx communities. The principles
derived from single monolithic narratives often superimpose their principles onto marginalized
communities. Thus, only by attuning to the tapestry of narratives that make up multiple
communities in their personal, cultural, and national iterations can one see that casuistry is the
very act of discerning through these narratives to form moral agents.

Conclusion
By adopting casuistry and the centrality of cuentos from Latinx narratives, we are able to
reformulate natural law moral reasoning from simply being the apprehension of specific moral
precepts to moving towards an understanding of moral reasoning that requires not only the use of
practical reason but also the polyvalent narratives that form Latinx identity and social ethics.
Through incorporating the type of casuistry illustrated by the high casuists and a modified
emphasis on narrative provided by Hauerwas, we are able to argue that the interpersonal,
cultural, and national narratives of the Latinx community provide a way to engage in natural law
moral reasoning. As we discussed in chapter one, moral reasoning established by the revisionist
natural lawyers required a culturally and prudentially aware moral reasoning over and against
prescribed moral principles. Casuistry and attentiveness to Latinx narratives provide a type of
reasoning that fits such an effort. Rather than applying moral principles to specific cases and
rather than having a single monolithic narrative prescribing moral principles, Latinx casuistic
moral reasoning provides a way to incorporate an epistemological mestizaje in particular cases.
The road-making epistemology of mestizaje that we discussed in chapter three, is enacted in the
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casuistic reasoning of Latinx social ethics. That is, by the narratives themselves producing, rather
than prescribing, moral taxonomies, Latinx narratives provide a moral reasoning that is adaptive
to different circumstances and is able to redress moral wrongs.
In the next chapter we will look at the specific case of Latin American immigration by
using a mestizaje epistemology and cuentos based natural law moral reasoning to establish a
framework of justice that demands specific measures to redress the moral wrongs of the United
States committed against Latin American countries. In other words, since the United States
instigated the immigration crisis that affects virtually every Latinx person in the country, justice
demands redressing those wrongs with specific actions that requires a mestizaje moral
epistemology and the casuistic moral discernment centered on the narratives of the Latinx
community.
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Chapter 5: Contemporary Theories of Justice, Latinx Natural Law, and U.S. Immigration: A Test
Case
Introduction
In this chapter we will focus on how a Latinx natural law understanding of justice addresses the
U.S. immigration crisis. We will focus on the U.S. immigration crisis because it is a crisis that, at
some level, affects the lives of almost all Latinx persons. The U.S. immigration crisis affects the
Latinx community either through its historic imperialism (i.e., the history of aggression against
Mexico discussed in the previous chapter), or through recent neo-colonial policies affecting a
variety of South American countries. The question at stake for the Latinx community is the
question of justice. If the U.S. has instigated problems that have caused the border to pass over
some and necessitated some to cross borders, what is a just response? In this chapter we will look
at how to address an immigration crisis through the lens of Latinx natural law that takes seriously
it’s communal history, a mestizaje epistemology, and a natural law that takes seriously the
cuentos of the Latinx community. It is important to note that what we are doing in this chapter is
not taking general principles and applying them to the specific situation of the U.S. immigration
crisis. Rather, we are using a natural law that is rooted in a situated moral reasoning, discerning
through the immigration crisis a just response to the multiple narratives that give rise to such a
crisis. First, we will discuss how Euroamerican contemporary theories of justice have failed to
address the U.S. immigration crisis. We will illustrate how political liberalism,
communitarianism, and the capabilities approaches to justice have been inadequate in addressing
the U.S. immigration crisis. Next, we will posit a natural law understanding of justice as a social
virtue as a way to begin to address the crisis by rendering each community its just dessert. In this
understanding of justice as a social virtue we will keep the concepts of mestizaje as a moral
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epistemology and cuentos as casuistry in the background of discerning what is a just dessert.
Finally, we will illustrate by using a Latinx natural law moral reasoning that the just response to
the U.S. immigration crisis in relation to the Latinx community is to recognize and apologize for
the way the U.S. has destabilized Latin American economies and politics, move immigration
courts from the justice department to the judicial system, and create a path to citizenship for the
undocumented Latinx community.

Contemporary Theories of Justice
Unfortunately, contemporary theories of justice create systems, ideas, or capabilities that
overlook specific instances of injustices that demand moral redress. In their plug and play
theories these theories ignore the specific cries for justice by specific communities or they
present communitarian claims of normative justice as arbitrary imagined communities rooted in
exclusion and nationalism. We will look at three major contemporary theories of justice: political
liberalism, communitarianism, and the capabilities approach, and illustrate how they are unable
to address the U.S. immigration crisis. They are unable to address the crisis for either one of two
reasons. First, their theories of justice remain abstract, unable to address specific claims of
justice of particular migrant communities. Or, second, theories that offer thick descriptions of
communities often present these communities as intransigent monolithic communities, not open
to the other. A Latinx natural law response to the immigration crisis requires a theory of justice
that does not remain only a theory nor presents community as rooted in isolated and intransigent
identity. Rather, a Latinx natural law response to the immigration crisis redresses specific moral
wrongs done to immigrant communities and presents communal identity as a construction that
fluctuates and is rooted in the varying cuentos that bring about such an identity. Thus, a Latinx
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natural law response to the immigration crisis will pay attention to the specific needs of specific
communities in relationship to other communities.

Political Liberalism
One can hardly discuss contemporary theories of justice without discussing the political
liberalism of John Rawls and his understanding of “justice as fairness” presented in his
monumental work, A Theory of Justice. Rawls' theory of justice is rooted in constructing a
system of procedural justice. In this frame of procedural justice, “there is no standard for
deciding what is ‘just’ apart from the procedure itself. ‘Justice’ applies not to the outcome, but to
the system.” 1 The system itself, because it is just, should yield a just outcome. Yet, justice is not
rooted in the outcome. In procedural justice, “Principles of justice are derived not by assessing
the utility of actions (or of tendencies of actions) but by rational choice in a fair setting.” 2 The
procedure of justice that Rawls believes brings about just results is rooted in the social contract
tradition. According to Karen Labacqz, “Rawls’ aim is to use the concept of a social contract to
give a procedural interpretation to Kant’s notion of autonomous choice as the basis for ethical
principles. Principles for justice (and moral philosophy in general) are to be the outcome of
rational choice.” 3 The problem, however, with using contracts in themselves as a guide to justice
is that not all contracts based on consent necessarily yield just results.
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Michael Sandel illustrates that consent itself does not yield just contracts. He uses the
illustration of a plumber charging an elderly widow $50,000 for a leaky toilet. Just because the
widow agreed to the price of fixing such a toilet does not make such a contract just. As Sandel
writes, “This case illustrates two points about the moral limits of contracts: First, the fact of an
agreement does not guarantee the fairness of the agreement. Second, consent is not enough to
create a binding moral claim.” 4 Sandel presents the moral limits of actual contracts. In the
situation of actual contracts there is often a disparity of power relations in which one party of a
contract usually has knowledge that the other does not. In Sandel’s example, the plumber knew
the going rates for material and labor while the widow did not. Thus, the plumber was able to use
his knowledge to his advantage in such a way that would be considered exploitive. However,
pure procedural justice would not be able to determine that such a contract would be unjust
because it would appeal to a conception of justice that exists outside the contract itself. Thus,
Rawls' understanding of social contract as the root of justice requires removing itself from the
context of specific situations and actual contracts. Rawls’ understanding of a social contract
framework of justice must exist only theoretically in a place of fairness. In order to facilitate a
concept of justice of fairness, rational choice must not be restricted by power differentials but
rather, “if the principles are to be just, they must be chosen in a situation that is itself fair. That
is, no one must be allowed to dominate the choice, nor to use the unfair advantage such
contingencies as natural endowments or social position. Hence, principles of justice will be the
result of fair choice-- ‘justice as fairness.’” 5 Thus, in order for Rawls to understand the principles
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of justice from an original situation of equality he must take his idea of a social contract to a
level of abstraction that presents all actors in the social contract as equal. Rawls' idea of
procedural justice must be a heuristic.
The heuristic construction of an ideal and fair social contract is what Rawls calls the
original position and must be entered under a “veil of ignorance.” According to Rawls, the
original position is, “a state of affairs in which the parties are equally represented as moral
persons and the outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of
social forces.” 6 The parties in the original position are not bound by their social status or having
knowledge that might affect the outcome of a fair bargaining system. In such a bargaining
system in which the outcome is not rooted in contingencies and social forces, the parties must
enter into it without any pre-acquired knowledge. They must enter such a bargaining situation
through what Rawls calls a “veil of ignorance.” The “veil of ignorance”,
means that the parties choosing principles lack certain kinds of knowledge
that might make the bargaining process unfair. They do not know what
position they hold in society, nor what their own particular goals or lifeplans might be. They do not know what society they belong to, nor what
generation they are. Such particular kinds of knowledge always make it
possible for persons to skew principles in their own favor. 7
Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” in an original position is intended to be a bargaining situation where
each party in the original position is able to discuss what would constitute a just society without
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having knowledge they could use to exploit others. That is, no one knows what social
disadvantage (or advantage) they may or may not have once the veil of ignorance is lifted.
Because of this, persons occupying the original position would only institute principles that
would benefit one person over the other if such differential benefits would also benefit the least
advantaged persons in society. They would do this not out of concern for some greater good but
out of self-interest. That is to say, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, they may turn out to
among the least well-off persons in society. As Rawls states,
In short, we have a circumstance in which people do not know their
specific life plans, but know only that they are likely to want more of
those basic goods that help to support any life plan. They enter the
bargain with a view to furthering their own interests in obtaining such
goods, but without the kind of envy that would make them refuse gain for
themselves accompanied by greater gain for others. They are ignorant of
the kind of things that would give them an unfair advantage in any
bargaining position. Under these stipulations, the hypothetical ‘contract’
can proceed. 8
The hypothetical contract that proceeds from the original position under the veil of ignorance is
one that brings about pure procedural justice. Because no one knows what social position they
occupy, their choices on what would constitute a just society are truly free and are not burdened
by social contingencies such as race, sex, class, or gender. The only knowledge that would be
allowed in the original position would be the general knowledge of economics and what
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constitutes society. With the limited knowledge in the original position the principles of a just
society coming from the heuristic of the original position would be principles that themselves are
just and would have a just outcome.
Rawls argues that from the original position there would be two principles of justice that
would come out of such a hypothetical contract. The first principle of justice that would come
out of the original positions would be one of equal liberty. Rawls states the first principle of
justice this way, “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal
basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.” 9 Because no one in the
original position knows where they stand coming out of the “veil of ignorance”, Rawls argues,
that except under very stringent circumstances, the parties in the original
position would never want to permit any compromising of basic liberties
for the sake of other social or economic benefits. Thus, not only is equal
liberty the first principle, but it stands in serial (‘lexical’) order, so that
liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty and not for the sake of
economic or other social gains. 10
In other words, no one would sacrifice another person’s liberty for the sake of economic gain
because no one would know if they would be negatively affecting their own liberty. Thus, the
very first principle of Rawls hypothetical contract is one of equal liberty or freedom.
The second principle that would come from such a hypothetical contract would be one
that is still rooted in self-interest but is one that makes provisions for the least advantaged in
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society. The second principle of justice coming from the original position is stated thus: “social
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be
to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.” 11 The second
principle of justice is called the difference principle and is rooted in the idea that inequalities
would only be tolerated only if they end up being beneficial to everyone, including the least
advantaged. Only if it would be advantageous to everyone (including the least well-off persons
in society) would persons in the original position agree to some degree of inequality. Thus,
things such as taxes for social welfare would be beneficial not only to the least advantaged but
would create a societal structure that brings about a social safety net for any person coming out
of the veil of ignorance in a disadvantaged position. Difference in pay would also be allowed
where doctors are paid more than bus drivers because, “we could improve the situation of those
who have the least--by increasing access to health care for the poor.” 12 The difference of pay is
not merely one to provide incentives for individuals but oriented toward the good of society.
Thus, for Rawls, “Social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and
authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for
the least advantaged members of society.” 13 Rawls’ difference principle makes an
accommodation for the idea of incentives insofar as they benefis the rest of society but rejects
incentives based on meritocracy. Rawls rejects meritocracy because even effort might be the
result of arbitrary conditions of birth. Any inequality must be for the sake for the common good.
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Despite Rawls' attempt to create a system of procedural justice based on an original
position that seeks to protect the liberty of all people and provides provisions for the least of well
off in society, there are serious methodological and concrete problems to his theory of justice.
Most well-known is Michael Sandel’s critique found in his Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
In this work, Sandel critiques Rawls’ construction of a disembodied self through Rawls
application of a thin theory of the good. In order for Rawls’ original position to work, there must
be some basic conceptions of the good (materially and idealistically) that must be agreed upon
without the thick notions of the good life provided by comprehensive doctrines given by culture
or contingency. These thin notions of the good provide a basic framework in which persons in
the original position can begin their work. Some arguments against Rawls’ original position
argue that his thin notion of the good is, “too thick to be fair, the second contends that the veil of
ignorance is too opaque to yield a determinate solution.” 14 The first argument posits that the fact
that the original position values liberty over all others is actually just a disguise for American
liberal democratic values. The second argument posits that the original position is too vague to
actually provide systems of justice to concrete situations. Sandel’s critique is based on the
question of justice in general and whether Rawls theory can provide a framework of justice in
itself without recourse to outside constructions. Namely, Sandel critiques Rawls’ understanding
of justice in the original position because his, “account of the circumstances of justice ceases to
work as a simple empirical account which can be checked for accuracy against actual human
conditions.” 15 This critique applies methodologically and empirically.
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First, one can ask how Rawls can determine what constitutes a completely equal original
position to establish a fair contract without appealing to an outside context that determines what
is fair in the first place. Secondly, Rawls' understanding of justice based on procedure itself does
not necessarily guarantee just outcomes and cannot be proved empirically because to do so
would undermine the merit of justice existing in the procedure in the first place. In other words,
Rawls' understandings of justice are only realizable within his imagined world of the original
position and cannot be checked empirically to actually concretize justice in the everyday world.
As Sandel argues, the rejection of the empiricist interpretation raises a more difficult question:
“if the descriptive premises of the original position are not subject in any straightforward sense
to empirical tests, to what sort of tests are they subject?” 16 In other words, if Rawls’
understandings of justice only work on paper, they are ineffective to actually address injustices
of specific communities.
These critiques are particularly important for the Latinx community. If the methodology
of Rawls’ original position cannot be subject to concrete and empirical tests of justice, then it is
unable to answer the cries of injustice made from the Latinx community. Rawls original position
may negate the role of dessert when it comes to issues of meritocracy but because of his
idealization of the original position he also ignores desserts that redress moral wrongs. That is,
the criteria of entering an original position through a veil of ignorance, such ignorance also
requires the forgetting of moral wrongs, in particular the wrongs brought about through
colonialism and neo-colonialism. Tisha Rajendra puts it succinctly when she states,
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Rawls presumes a world of people who have no contact or prior
relationship with each other. The global economic system is invisible in
the law of peoples. Colonial and quasi-colonial interventions are treated as
deviations from the ideal, but ones that do not appear to have any
relationship to the present-day global distribution of wealth and power.
Rawls' neglect of these challenges to global justice is only possible
because of his methodology of ideal theory. Both justice as fairness and
the law of peoples use an ahistorical methodology that deliberately
sidesteps the messy relationship that individuals and peoples have with
one another. For Rawls, in order to envision the ideal, one must abstract
from the concrete.” 17
Rawls' abstraction from concrete, messy, and real relationships allows his methodology to
construct a system of justice that does not actually require people receiving what they are due
because of past relationships. It is a heavy burden to ask those who have had historical wrongs
done to them to forget these wrongs for the sake of a heuristic imaginary society that can enter
into discussions about justice without asking any demands of restitution for past wrongs.
Not only does Rawls’ theory not address actual injustices done against concrete
communities but the original position itself perpetuates such injustices. The Latinx community’s
relationship within the United States is one where there is a forced assimilation to the Anglodominant community. The Latinx community is continually asked to shed their identity for some
imagined whole. Such a request to shed identity, especially identities shaped by others and
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forced by others through racist social imaginaries and racist logics is to perpetuate a racist
culture that protects whiteness. According to Brian Massingale, racist culture is the presumption
of whiteness as the norm where, “a core element of white culture is the presumption of
dominance and entitlement, that is, the presumption of being the norm or standard that measures
all other frames of reference and to which all ‘others should conform.” 18 In other words, “white
culture is a particular frame of reference or understanding of reality that does not acknowledge
its particularity.” 19 The original position proposes a self and identity that can stand outside of its
history. To presume such an identity is to negate Latinx identity which is shaped and formed
through la lucha against Anglo-dominant assimilatory practices. To ask Latinx community to
shed its identity that has been shaped by oppressive racist structures is to perpetuate and enact
such structures. Latinx identity that has had to deal with language imperialism, racial violence,
and systematic exclusion from political and cultural institutions in the United States is further
excluded from Rawls’ original position. It can be assumed that in shedding of Latinx identity, the
language of the original position would be in English and the presumed goods would be ones that
emphasize Euroamerican individualism.
Rawls’ original position constructs the self through the Euroamerican individual lens
rather than the intrinsically relational lens of Latinx identity. For the Latinx community, “the
community to which I belong extends beyond me not only spatially but also temporally: that
community includes my ancestors as well as my progeny and their progeny.” 20 The self in Latinx
community is rooted in others. Thus, it is impossible to enter an original position which asks for
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an ahistorical, acontextual self without enacting a white supremacy that views society as a
collection of individuals rather than a community that constitutes the self. To ask the Latinx
community to shed their identity to talk about issues of justice is to enact the same historical
injustices that have excluded the Latinx community from the metaphorical table in the first place.
Using Rawls’ methodology of an original position and veil of ignorance would make justice for
the Latinx community impossible because it enacts the very injustices the Latinx community has
faced in the first place.
It is not only that the original position asks to shed any identifiers that would be required
to discuss retributive justice but also acknowledges that at least some general knowledge is
required for the original position to work. Yet, Rawls believes this general knowledge provided
from a thin notion of the good is universalizable. Epistemologically this is problematic. Because
the parties in the original positions are said to have some knowledge about society and economic
theory one must ask, whose society and whose economic theory do they have knowledge of? As
Wolff argues, “there can be no such ‘general’ knowledge that is not itself based on particular
knowledge. What ‘theories’ about economics would be known? Any such theories have biases
already built into them.” 21 Thus not only does the shedding of identity constitute white
supremacy, but also the basic knowledge needed for the original position presumes the values
that Rawls assumes as universal despite their particularity. Even Rawls' understanding of the
type of person entering the original positions is saturated with cultural bias. For Marxist critics,
“the concepts of humans as free, equal, and rational is not a neutral concept. In Marxist
perspective, human nature cannot be defined entirely apart from social class. Nor is a ‘well-
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ordered’ society necessarily the goal in terms of which justice is to be defined, given Marxist
assumptions about class struggle.” 22 Similarly, a Latinx critique of Rawls' methodology involves
the assumption of racist structures permeating U.S. society. Thus, justice coupled with a ‘wellordered’ society, from a Latinx perspective, has been used to justify structural racism where
‘order’ is used to exclude Latinx communities. Justice does not necessarily mean ‘well-ordered’- in structures of oppression, justice may require destroying the current order.
Despite Rawls effort to create a procedural construction of justice rooted in liberty and
seeks to provide a structural provision for the least advantaged of society, because its
methodology ignores historical injustices against the Latinx community and perpetuates these
injustices by assuming assimilatory practices in its core methodology, Rawls’ theory of justice is
not helpful for the Latinx community and the U.S. immigration crisis. To address the
immigration crisis, a theory of justice must be empirically quantifiable and render tangible
results for the liberation of the Latinx community. In order for these results to be tangible, it
must be able to address the historical injustices perpetrated against the Latinx community. Thus,
a theory of justice that is helpful for the Latinx community is one that does not ask them to forget
the wrongs done to them but rectifies them.

Communitarian Justice
The main critique against Rawls’ political liberalism comes from communitarian
constructions of justice. The two main critiques that communitarians offer against Rawls’ theory
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of justice is that it first paints a picture of liberal society as a fragmentation of society. 23 This is
certainly the state of things that Alasdair MacIntyre paints in his groundbreaking work After
Virtue. MacIntyre’s imagines a dystopian society that has fragments of a natural science
tradition, “detached from any knowledge of the theoretical context which gave them
significance” would result in what would appear to be, “rival and competing premises for which
no further argument could be given.” 24 MacIntyre argues that such fiction is what has actually
occurred in the world of moral language. MacIntyre argues, “what we possess, if this view is
true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts which their
significance derived. We possess indeed a simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the
key expressions. But we have-very largely, if not entirely-lost our comprehension, both
theoretical and practical or morality.” 25 The fragmentary condition of modern morality is seen to
be the result of the emphasis of the individual over community, the emphasis on autonomous
choice over traditions of moral inquiry, and the emphasis on thin descriptions of the good over
thick descriptive communities. Walzer argues that the emphasis of fragmentation is the result of
an increase in geographic, social, marital, and political mobility that creates the conditions for
isolated individuals as opposed to rooted communities. For communitarians, if liberal society is
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seen to be a constellation of fragmentation, then “community is the exact opposite, the home of
coherence, connection, and narrative capacity.” 26
If the first critique is that political liberalism sets up a fragmented society, the second
critique of liberalism is that it radically misrepresents life. 27 The world that political liberalism
presents is one where, “men and women cut loose from all socialities, literally unencumbered,
each one the one and only inventor of his or her own life, with no criteria, no common standards,
to guide the invention: these are mythical figures.” 28 In other words, liberal theory distorts reality
and , “deprives us of any ready access to our own experience of communal embeddedness.” 29
The reality is that all people, regardless of their social conditions, are part of a community and
their knowledge is contingent on their received traditions from communities. An isolated
autonomous individual with nothing but pure will to decide their future is already a fiction
created by a community. As we discussed in our critique of Rawls, that even the free,
autonomous, unencumbered individual needed for the original positions, is a framework already
saturated with tradition from a particular community.
Yet, aside from their general critiques against liberalism the question remains how do
communitarians construct their understanding of justice from their presumed coherent and
privileged communities? Much of their answer depends on how they define community and
which community takes priority. Robert Fowler engages three types of community: (1)
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communities of ideas; for example, the participatory democratic and republican models, (2)
communities of crisis: for example, the earth community born of the environmental crisis, and
(3) communities of memory: for example, religious and traditional ideas of community. 30 The
communities of ideas, for Fowler, involve participatory and voluntarist communities in which
people of diverse backgrounds come together for a common end. Those who participate in such a
participatory community of ideas “emphasize the importance of people deciding together, face to
face, conversing with, and respecting each other in a setting which is as equal as possible.” 31 A
community of crisis on the other hand is “fashioned by the times more than by intellectual ideas
and the attention they receive is not necessarily a statement of approval.” 32 Among this concept
of community Fowler includes communities based on nationalism, race, and other tribal
concepts. He states, “No form of community is less open than these ethnic or racial ones; none is
more insistent on its truth; none can be harsher to those who dissent--or do not belong to the
tribe.” 33 He looks at these communities with disdain but forgets that his own perspective
condemning these communities is already saturated by a community that is shaped by race,
nation, and ethnicity. His presumptive neutral observation is an indication of his complicit
participation in a latent community of crisis that commits the very same monopoly on truth as he
claims these other communities make. Yet, his community does so paternalistically.
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The third type of community Fowler describes is the community of memory. He defines
such a community as ones that, “derive from long-established belief systems that link the present
and the past, communities fashioned, above all from tradition and religion.” 34 While he links
communities of memory more explicitly to religion, his separation of this third type of
community from others shows the general weaknesses of separating these types of communities
in general. Describing communities of ideas, crisis, and memory as separate bounded
communities, Fowler ignores how these different types of communities interact with one another
and reinforce one another. In particular, Fowler ignores how voluntary communities of ideas can
lead to communities of exclusion which lead to communities of crisis that are both codified in
communities of memory. For the Latinx community, it was voluntary white communities that
enacted violence on Latinx communities by “othering” them and thus making them a community
of crisis. These various communities of the oppressor and the oppressed are often codified in
traditions of memory in which racist structures are institutionalized and traditioned to different
generations. Such a simple separation of different types of communities, although might be
useful for observational categorization, ignores how these communities interact to form
communities that enact violence on one another.
What do these imagined communities have to do with justice? For communitarians,
justice is distributed from within the context of communities. Thus, the type of justice that is of
the primary concern of communitarians is distributive justice. Such an emphasis on distributive
justice is exemplified in Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice. Walzer argues that human society
is primarily a, “distributive community” in which, “we come together to share, divide, and
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exchange.” 35 Yet for Walzer distributive justice is not simply the distribution of goods to other
people, but rather rooted in the fact that, “people conceive and create goods, which they then
distribute among themselves.” 36 Goods are not a priori but are created in the context of
communities. Walzer argues,
goods with their meanings--because of their meanings-- are the crucial
medium of social relations; they come into people’s minds before they
come into their hands; distributions are patterned in accordance with
shared conceptions of what the goods are and what they are for. 37
Because goods are patterned according to shared conceptions of the good rooted in community
and communities are not always the same, Archimedean neutral standpoints or original positions
such as the ones advocated by Rawls are simply not possible in pluralistic societies. Walzer
argues for six propositions that concern distributive justice: (1) the goods that concern
distributive justice are social in nature, (2) concrete identities are derived by the way people
create, possess, and employ social goods, (3) no social goods are universalizable across all
material worlds, (4) meanings of goods determine their movement, (5) Social meanings are
historical in character and thus distributions are historically contingent, and (6) when meanings
are distinct, their distributions must be autonomous. 38 The last principle is where Walzer
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introduces the concept of autonomous spheres of justice and the concepts of simple and complex
equality.
When it comes to distributive justice there are certain problems that arise that bring about
unjust distributions of social goods. Those are primarily monopoly and dominance. Historically,
there have been two answers to the problem of monopolies of social goods that affect their just
distribution. The first is the political liberal answer to a monopoly of goods which is to simply
redistribute the monopoly. This would be similar to Rawls’ difference principle which seeks to
protect the marginalized society for the sake of a society as a whole. In order to make a just
distribution according to this framework is to enact “simple equality” (i.e., if wealth is the
monopoly then everyone gets an equal distribution of wealth). The second way monopolies of
social goods have been addressed is through the, “the claim that some new good, monopolized
by some new group, should replace the currently dominant good.” 39 This has been the common
critique of monopolies by Marxism. The problem for Walzer, however, is not monopoly but the
dominance of one social good over multiple spheres of influence. This contrasts with simple
equality in that there are certain monopolies that should not have an effect on other spheres (i.e.,
money in the sphere of politics, or politics affecting healthcare distribution). The dominance of
one social good over the other is what Walzer and classical philosophers calls tyranny. Walzer
quotes Pascal saying, “Tyranny is the wish to obtain by one means what can only be had by
another. We owe different duties to different qualities: love is the proper response to charm, fear
to strength, and belief to learning.” 40 The answer to the dominance of one quality working in
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multiple spheres demands what Walzer calls complex equality. Walzer defines complex equality
as a “complex relation of persons, mediated by the goods we make, share, and divide among
ourselves; it is not an identity of possessions. It requires then, a diversity of distributive criteria
that mirrors the diversity of social goods.” 41 Each social good has its own sphere of influence
and should function relatively autonomously. That is, complex equality, “establishes a set of
relationships such that domination is impossible. In formal terms, complex equality means that
no citizen’s standing in sphere or with regard to one social good can be undercut by his standing
in some other sphere, with regard to some other good.” 42 Because person x has the quality
valuable to sphere y, does not mean that he can influence sphere z. Complex equality means that
the social goods determined by a community that have value in one sphere should not dominate
over values in other spheres.
Not only do social goods come from the context of community, but complex equality
must also play out within a communal setting. In particular, Walzer argues that complex equality
must play out within a political community which is, “the closest we can come to a world of
common meanings.” 43 For Walzer,
Language, history, and culture come together (come more closely together
here than anywhere else) to produce a collective consciousness. National
character, conceived as a fixed and permanent mental set, is obviously a
myth; but the sharing of sensibilities and intuitions among the members of
a historical community is a fact of life.
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It is in Walzer’s constructed political community that the problems of communitarian
constructions of both community and justice prove troublesome because they create political
communities that are unencumbered with historical memory and isolated from other
communities. While Rawls’ imagined an original position of isolated individuals, Walzer and
others imagine originary, ahistorical communities and concepts of membership within these
communities that ignore relationships to other communities. In other words, Walzer’s
construction of a political community in which distributive justice works is an imaginary
autonomous one.
For Walzer, distributive justice, “presupposes a bounded world within which distribution
takes place: a group of people committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods, first
of all among themselves.” 44 Yet not only do communities with clearly defined boundaries share
social goods among themselves, they arguably share the social good of membership among
themselves. Walzer argues that, “The primary good that we distribute to one another is
membership in some human community” and “what we do with regard to membership structures
all our other distributive choices…” 45 Walzer understands membership as a social good that is
constituted by our own understanding. That is, we are already part of our own community, “we
who are already members do the choosing, in accordance with our own understanding of what
membership means in our community and what sort of community we want to have.” 46 Thus, for
Walzer we don’t distribute membership among ourselves, “it is already ours. We give it out to
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strangers.” 47 In other words, what Walzer proposes is that the understanding of community
ultimately consists in our self-understanding of who we have responsibility for. He illustrates this
with a thought experiment gauging how a community is to receive an injured stranger (i.e., a
good Samaritan story). Walzer states
Groups of people ought to help necessitous strangers whom they somehow
discover in their midst or on their path. But the limit on risks and costs in
these cases is sharply drawn. I need not take the injured stranger into my
home except briefly, and I certainly need not care for him or even
associate with him for the rest of my life. 48
Walzer immediately applies this metaphor to the concept of immigration and hospitality as
understood by John Winthrop of Massachusetts. Winthrop argues against free immigration to the
colony, stating, “As for hospitality, that rule does not bind further than for some present
occasion, not for continual residence.” 49 Walzer defends the right for nations to limit their
accepting of outsiders based on need for the sake of maintaining the sovereignty of the original
community. Unfortunately, Walzer only addresses situations of immigration in one direction.
For Walzer, immigration is an issue of only accepting outsiders for their well-being.
Walzer uses refugees and guest workers as the examples of accepting outsiders of a community.
In order for these two groups to be naturalized, “members must be prepared to accept, as their
own equals in a world of shared obligations, the men and women they admit; the immigrants
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must be prepared to share the obligations.” 50 Discussion of immigration for Walzer is always
about the reception of migrants from a place of relative independence of the receiving
community. Walzer works from what Rajendra calls neoclassical/agent-dominant migration
theory, where “a migrant in search of a country is like a worker in search of a job.” 51 The
historical contingencies and interrelationships between countries are generally ignored.
Following Walzer’s understanding of political community, Daniel Tichenor discusses the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) and The Immigration Act of 1990 from a
communitarian lens. Agreeing with Walzer’s understanding for the need of a bounded
community, Tichenor argues, “If bonds of mutual identification and responsibility among
members are to be maintained, a degree of closure is necessary. Who is permitted to cross these
boundaries (if anyone) sheds light on a society’s conception of attachments and obligations to
others., whether they be aliens or citizens.” 52 Tichenor discusses the early U.S. immigration
crisis within the framework of global free markets expansionism and rights-based expansionism.
He argues that both free market expansionists and rights-based expansionists offered an inclusive
vision of political community. But in doing so, “in a society in which many citizens are
economically excluded, they also expose the impoverishment of attachments and obligations
among citizens.” 53 Tichenor offers the traditional tropes against a more expansive immigration
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system by citing that immigrants force U.S. citizens to choose between low wage jobs or
unemployment, despite the continual studies that illustrate that immigration continually leads to
economic growth for all. 54 He adds that immigration has led many Americans to be, “more
partial to Asian, Central American, European and Mexican newcomers than to urban black
citizens” placing the responsibility of white racism on immigrants rather than on white racists
themselves, pitting immigrants against the black community. 55 He also argues that immigrants,
even though they pay more in federal taxes than they cost in government services, place a strain
on state and local governments forgetting the responsibility that state and local governments had
in Mexican-American repatriation and racist deportation policies. 56 Tichenor not only presents
immigration from the same one direction of Walzer which sees migrants only coming to the U.S.
for economic well-being, but also sees immigration as a threat to the citizens already in the
United States. For both Walzer and Tichenor, the reception of migrants is never a matter of
justice. Justice is reserved for the naturalized citizens; the reception of immigrants is always a
matter of arbitrary hospitality.
The problem with both Walzer and Tichenor’s understanding with immigration from
their communitarian perspectives is that they both imagine the communities from which they
work as autonomous, independent, and ahistorical. When one imagines their community as
isolated from others, a person is responsible only for those in the community and the community
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is only necessarily responsible for itself. Any outsider to the community is subject to arbitrary
rules decided by the community and not the outsider, usually taking the form of generosity or
hospitality. Even if a community has decided that it would be a hospitable or generous
community it does not necessarily have responsibility for the other. When it comes to the U.S.
immigration crisis, communitarians do not necessarily have to take any responsibility for
communities other than their own since they imagine their communities to be autonomous,
independent, and ahistorical. Hospitality towards migrants and refugees is all that is on the table.
To use the metaphor Walzer discussed about what one owes to the stranger, “I need not take the
injured stranger into my home except briefly, and I certainly need not care for him or even
associate with him for the rest of my life. 57 Yet the problem with the understanding of hospitality
employed by communitarians is that they assume the home is theirs to begin with. Miguel de La
Torre accurately and succinctly critiques the communitarian virtue of hospitality stating:
...to practice the virtue of hospitality assumes the ‘house’ belongs to the
one practicing this virtue, who is sharing her or his resources with the
Other, who has no claim to the possession. Thus, the complexity caused
by the consequences of empire is missed. For example, consider Mexican
undocumented aliens. Their ‘house’ was stolen from them when the U.S.
invaded Mexico in 1845 and through superior military might appropriated
what is now called the southwestern United States. Rather than speaking
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about the virtue of hospitality, it would historically be more accurate to
speak about the responsibility of restitution. 58
The communitarian understanding of justice and immigration, as it stands, can never address the
U.S immigration crisis because it fails to address its own community’s responsibility for its
complicity with imperial ravaging of other communities and countries.
Communitarian understandings of distributive justice cannot address the the U.S.
immigration crisis not only because they construct their communities as independent and shed
their responsibilities of relationship with other communities but also because distributive justice
as autonomous separate spheres cannot address the injustices done by the dominance already
done by social goods transgressing other spheres. To use U.S. and Mexico relations as an
example, because the U.S. has already transgressed the spheres of political and financial (i.e.,
Polk and the westward expansion of U.S. companies), to imagine a community that does not take
responsibility for such transgressions is not really complex equality, but rather simple
irresponsibility. Complex equality must deal with restitution before they can imagine a world in
which autonomous spheres with their respective social goods can be respected.
While one can agree that goods and their distributions are created, possessed, and
allocated by community, communitarian understandings of justice would radically have to alter
their understandings of community in order to be helpful for Latinx communities and their
relation to the immigration crisis. Rather than viewing constructions of community as
independent, ahistorical entities, they should adopt views of community that are interdependent
and porous to let go of the incessant need for a type of communal unity that excludes others to
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the point of ignoring their responsibilities to others. Linda Hogan’s understanding of porous
communities can be a helpful tool for communitarians. Instead of viewing communities as
idealized and essentialized entities that are distinct and self-contained, Hogan argues that
“contemporary ways of belonging are shaped by, as well as shape, the multiple ways in which
identities and subjectivities are constructed...” 59 That is, identity is not shaped by monolithic
constructions of coherent community but are rather interdependent and shape each other and are
responsible for each other. In other words, communities exist in mestizaje, and should understand
the ways they have historically contributed and enacted violence on one another. Only then can
justice be done for communities that have historically been marginalized by communities
presuming to be pure, distinct, and universalizable.

Capabilities Approach
An alternative approach to both political liberalism’s detached individualism and
communitarianism’s independent parochialism is what has been called the capabilities approach.
Developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, the capabilities approach, rather than
focusing on abstract rights or precepts and imagined communities, focuses on the real
capabilities provided to individuals in their actual communities. For Sen, the capabilities
approach provides a way one can judge the well-being of individuals in a given society based on
particular capabilities provided by these societies. For Nussbaum, capabilities understood from
overlapping consensus provides opportunities to maintain thick descriptive communities while
also creating space for universalizable values or capabilities. What we will see, however, is that
the capabilities approach falls into some of the same pitfalls as both political liberalism and
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communitarianism. Not only does the capabilities approach present capabilities as somewhat
abstracted from context and recapitulates the imagined, independent and autonomous
communities of communitarianism, but it also fails to delineate who is responsible for providing
capabilities in interdependent communal contexts. This abstraction of capabilities from the
communities responsible for providing them is problematic when addressing the U.S.
immigration crisis. Because the inter-communal character of immigration, it is important to place
capabilities in their communal and narratival contexts in order to discern who is responsible for
providing the capabilities for migrants (i.e., host countries, countries of origin, etc.,). Thus, by
acknowledging the strengths of the capabilities approach it is important to acknowledge where it
fails to provide a framework of justice for Latinx communities.
Sen develops his understanding of the capabilities approach by first acknowledging his
indebtedness to Rawls' theory of justice and political liberalism. In particular, Sen praises Rawls’
conception of “justice as fairness.” Alongside Rawls, Sen suggests that the idea of fairness must
come prior to justice and that justice must, “in some sense derives from-the idea of fairness.” 60
Providing a definition of fairness Sen argues
This foundational idea can be given shape in various ways, but central to
it must be a demand to avoid bias in our evaluations, taking note of the
interests and concerns for others as well, and in particular the need to
avoid being influenced by our own respective vested interests, or by our
personal priorities or eccentricities or prejudices. It can broadly be seen
as demand for impartiality. 61
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Yet, this idea of fairness leaves much to be desired. If fairness is simply the demand for
impartiality, it can lead to a sense of neutrality that ignores the fact that certain injustices demand
both partiality and a preferential option. 62 In situations of oppression, neutrality is often
complicity.
The effort to create an impartial framework from which justice can be derived is where
Sen and Rawls take separate paths. While Rawls proposes the original position under the veil of
ignorance, Sen believes that such a framework is limiting to the multiple frameworks that can
derive systems of justice. Sen argues that, “there are genuinely plural, and sometimes conflicting,
general concerns that bear on our understanding of justice” and “many of them share features of
being unbiased and dispassionate, and represent maxims that their proponents can ‘will to be a
universal law’ (to use Immanuel Kant’s famous requirement).” 63 Moreover Sen argues, “indeed,
plurality of unbiased principles can, I would argue, reflect the fact that impartiality can take
many different forms and quite distinct manifestations.” 64 Sen and Rawls differ from the fact that
while Rawls’ believes that justice can only be derived as principles from a singular, unbiased
original position, Sen believes there are a plurality of positions one can argue from that derive
unbiased principles.
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Sen also critiques Rawls’ theory of justice based on the fact that it almost entirely relies
on institutions as the mechanism of justice. Sen argues, “in the Rawlsian system of justice as
fairness, direct attention is bestowed almost exclusively on ‘just institutions’, rather than
focusing on ‘just societies’ that may try to rely both on effective institutions and on actual
behavioral features.” 65 Sen argues that Rawls' theory of justice is the culmination of a
contractarian approach that emphasizes transcendental-institutionalism. Transcendentalinstitutionalism, according to Sen, focuses on first, “what it identities as prefect justice, rather
than on relative comparisons of justice and injustice” and secondly, “in searching for perfection,
transcendental institutionalism concentrates primarily on getting the institutions right, and it is
not focused on the actual societies that would ultimately emerge.” 66 Drawing on Indian traditions
of justice called niti (organizational propriety and behavioral correctness) and nyaya (the
comprehensive concept of realized justice), Sen argues that institutions, organizations, and
principles of justice must be evaluated by the more comprehensive and realized justice espoused
by nyaya. In other words, rather than focusing on a perfect justice of an imagined institution, Sen
argues that one should use a comparative approach that situates justice on a spectrum between
justice and injustice, realizing that there are varying degrees of situations.
Rather than using a transcendental-institutionalist approach such as Rawls, Sen argues
that justice should be evaluated through an “accomplishment-based understanding of justice.” 67
The accomplishment-based approach focuses less on institutional justice but on the the actual
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freedoms that humans experience in their actual lives. Sen argues that, “in noting the nature of
human lives, we have reason to be interested not only in the various things we succeed in doing,
but also in the various freedoms that we actually have to choose between different kinds of
lives.” 68 This accomplishment-based approach involves the relative comparison of different
freedoms or capabilities that different societies have for their citizens.
The accomplishment-based or comparative-based approach focuses on capabilities as
instantiations of substantial freedom over and against traditional utility-based or resource-based
comparative approaches. By emphasizing capabilities, Sen argues that one can accommodate for
the values found in multicultural societies. Sen argues that, “the capability perspective is
inescapably concerned with a plurality of different features of our lives and concerns.” 69 Utility
and resource based approach for judging general well-being tend to present homogenized utility
in which values are judged under the , “counting of exactly one thing (‘is there more here or
less?’)” and have helped, “to generate the suspicion of the tractability of ‘judging’ combinations
of many distinct good things (‘is this combination more valuable or less’).” 70 In other words, not
only does a capability perspective accommodate a plurality of values in a diverse society but its
judgement allows for the principle of incommensurability of a multiplicity of values. Rather than
focusing on whether or not each person of a society has achieved a monolithic value, the
capabilities approach makes space for individuals to have the opportunities to choose the values
that they wish to engage. As Sen argues,
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The capability approach focuses on human life, and not just on some
detached objects of convenience, such as incomes or commodities that a
person may possess, which are often taken, especially in economic
analysis, to be the main criteria of human success. Indeed, it proposes a
serious departure from concentrating on the means of living to the actual
opportunities of living. 71
By focusing on the opportunities of living, the capability approach makes space for people to
have the opportunity to pursue ends of their choosing, whether they are individual or informed
by community. The general appeal of the capabilities approach is that it focuses on the
capabilities of individuals to choose their ends and thus provides a certain versatility to include
not only the specific ends of an imagined community but the multi-faceted ends by a multiplicity
of communities.
The question remains, however, what capabilities are needed to be secured in order for an
individual to to engage in the ends they find valuable? For Martha Nussbaum, there are central
capabilities that are constitutive of human dignity. Nussbaum’s approach, “focuses on the
protection of areas of freedom so central that their removal makes a life not worthy of human
dignity.” 72 Nussbaum gives a list of ten capabilities that form a threshold level human dignity.
These capabilities are (1) life, (2) bodily health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) senses, imagination, and
thought, (5) Emotions and attachments to things or people, (6), practical reason (being able to
form a conception of the good and planning one’s life), (7) Affiliation (being able to live with
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others and having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation), (8) being able to live
with concern for other species, (9) play, and (10) being in control over one’s political and
material environment. 73 These ten capabilities, for Nussbaum, belong “first and foremost to
individual persons, and only derivatively to groups.” 74 Nussbaum’s priority of the individual is
in order to preserve each person from being a means to an end so that no person’s capabilities are
sacrificed for the capabilities of another. For Nussbaum, the protection of each of these
capabilities is the requirement for social justice where, “respect for human dignity requires that
citizens be placed above an ample (specified) threshold of capability, in all ten of these areas.” 75
In securing these capabilities, Nussbaum argues that institutions are important in ensuring that
each person meets the threshold of dignity brought about by these basic capabilities.
Nussbaum contrasts with Sen in her advocacy that governments play a major role in
securing the basic capabilities for each of its citizens. Nussbaum argues that while Sen suggests
that, “capabilities do not have the conceptual connection to government that human rights clearly
do” he however is “willing to assess governments in accordance with their performance in
delivering capabilities.” 76 In discussing the role of government Nussbaum argues that a
government’s job is not simply to remain hands-off and assume that through its nonintervention
that capabilities are secured but rather the capabilities approach insists, “all entitlements involve
an affirmative task for government: it must actively support people’s capabilities, not just fail to
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set up obstacles.” 77 National governments, in particular, play a major role in securing capabilities
in the context of global justice. Contrasting arguments that argue that in order to address global
problems a nation must first fix their own systems of justice or that the best way to address
global justice is through philanthropic endeavors, Nussbaum argues that, “We need, then, an
institutional solution to global problems.” 78 Nussbaum argues that global problems involving
colonial exploitation, the world economy being influenced by global corporations, and everyday
economic decisions “affecting lives as a distance,” requires a solution that involves a nations,
“political structure, its schemes of institutions, and its assignment of duties.” 79 As such, national
governments are not only responsible for securing the capabilities for their own citizens but are
also responsible for global justice that involves a level of redistribution that enables poorer
countries to secure capabilities for their citizens as well.
Despite Nussbaum’s emphasis on government and in particular, national government’s
responsibility in securing basic capabilities for citizens, the capabilities approach still falls short
when it comes to addressing injustice faced by the Latinx community and the migrant
community in particular. The first problem that the capability approach encounters when
establishing a framework of justice is that it fails to develop a theory of responsibility of securing
capabilities for migrants. Despite the fact that Nussbaum never limits national governments to
only provide for capabilities for citizens, she also doesn’t directly address migration which leads
her to not assign particular responsibility to nations or institutions for migrants. For example, she
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never addresses who would be responsible for ensuring the capabilities of migrants whether it
would be their country of origin, their host country, or the countries they occupy in transit. Thus,
O’Neill’s critique that Nussbaum’s approach, “ assigns rights or capabilities to people without
specifying who has responsibility for developing or protecting the capabilities of specific
people”, holds. 80 Not only does the capabilities approach fail to address who has the
responsibility for ensuring capabilities but it also fails to acknowledge, “ the inevitability of
conflicting obligations, the likelihood that people might not be able to discharge their duties
toward all of the poor in the world, and that scarcity imposes compromises in decisions about
entitlements.” 81 In other words, in the effort to secure certain capabilities, the capabilities
approach as described by Sen and Nussbaum, fails to account for the historical contingency of
capabilities and who has responsibility for providing them.
The problematic thread that runs through all of these contemporary theories of justice is
that in an effort to create theories, spheres, or ideas of justice, each of their programs result in the
ahistorical and acontextual frameworks that are unable to address specific instances of injustice.
As Rajendra states these theories, “fail to account for the actual historical relationships that have
brought migrants and citizens together.” 82 While Rawls, Sen, and Nussbaum present liberal
theories of justice that tries to establish universal principles or capabilities of justice by either
presenting an abstract original position or list of basic capabilities, neither of them are able to
address the complicated and messy international relationships that often require redress for moral
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wrongs. Liberal theories of justice such as Rawls’ political liberalism or Sen and Nussbaum’s
capabilities approach both seek either impartial spectators or original positions that emphasize
objectivity and neutrality in their frameworks of justice. Yet, because of the complicated colonial
narratives involved in Latinx and Latin American relationships to migration, impartiality vis-avis historical wrongs often simply result in complicity with the status quo that silences the cries
against injustice from the Latinx community.
The communitarian approaches, while acknowledging that goods are derived, possessed,
and distributed by communities often idealize a particular community as normative for the rest
and in doing so present a form of community that is independent, autonomous, and only
responsible for itself. Communitarians also abstract justice in the frame of idealized communities
to where those outside those communities are not met with justice but with arbitrary generosity
and hospitality. Thus, the idealized communities of communitarian constructions of justice are
incapable of addressing the interdependence of communities and the multiple communal
commitments present in the U.S. immigration crisis.
Political liberalism, communitarianism, and the capabilities approach all involve a type of
idealization that offers the possibility of distributive justice in idealized starting points and
frameworks, but the U.S. immigration crisis must engage a type of justice that address the
consequences of social sin and responsibilities toward relationships. All of these conditions of
justice require attuning to the narratives of the Latinx community and their relation to migration.
This type of justice must be centered on the not only the distributions of goods or ideals of
justice but must be rooted in the mixed history of multiple communities and the narratives of
their relationships.
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Immigration and Conditions of Justice
The type of justice that is needed to address the perspectives of the Latinx community in
regards to the U.S. immigration crisis is a justice that incorporates not only distributive justice
but engages in restorative justice. Restorative justice takes seriously the injustices done both to
the Latinx community and their Latin American countries of origin by taking seriously the
complicated narratives that bring about migration. Narratives of immigration are not monolithic,
and migrants do not fit a binary mold of “good” migrants and “bad” migrants. Migrant narratives
are rooted in complicated histories and interdependent communities that require attention and
nuanced understandings of restoring right relationships. Restorative justice, by attending to the
narratives of migrants establishes a frame of justice that takes serious social sin and
responsibility to relationships. These conditions of justice must be addressed before one is able
to establish systems, ideals, or theories of justice that seek to distribute goods.
Kristin Heyer understands the U.S. immigration crisis in the context of social sin.
Drawing on both John Paull II and Latin American liberation theologians, Heyer argues that,
“The structural inequality between the United States and its Latin American neighbors, in its
historical roots and maintenance in laws and institutions, constitutes objective sin.” 83 For Heyer,
“In its broadest sense social sin encompasses the unjust structures, distorted consciousness, and
collective actions and inactions that facilitate injustice and dehumanization.” 84 Drawing on John
Paul II, Heyer highlights the personal dimension of social sin. For John Paul II and magisterial
teaching, social sin always maintains an element of personal responsibility. For magisterial
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teachings, sin must always at its heart be a personal act. Without the personal dimension
operative of social sin, personal responsibility to resist sinful structures can be lost to a culture of
“passivity and conformity.” 85 Yet, social sin in the magisterial teachings of John Paul II often
ignore the way that institutions create systematic structures of sin that cannot simply be resolved
through personal responsibility.
While John Paul II recognizes social sin as primarily a summation of personal sins, Heyer
argues that, “Latin American liberation theology articulates a framework that explicitly addresses
both voluntary and nonvoluntary dimensions of social sin; in the case of immigration, it thus
incorporates both the reality of the unjust institutions that contribute to border crossings and
ideologies and symbolic systems that perpetuate blindness to such realities.” 86 For Latin
American liberation theologians, social sin is both structural and personal. As José Ignacio
González Faus states, “When human beings sin, they create structures of sin, which, in their turn,
make human beings sin.” 87 This dialectical understanding of sin illustrates that, “structures are
both consequential and causal in nature, and persons are subjectively responsible for sinful
situations, yet remain subject to external influence.” 88 The interplay between personal and social
sin reflects the interdependent cuentos of the Latinx community. To navigate what justice looks
like for the Latinx community one must engage both the personal and social aspects of sin and
engage personal and social aspects of restitution.
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Given the realities of social sin and the troubled history between the U.S. and various
Latin American countries we discussed in chapter four, “U.S. citizens may be willfully negligent
of or indirectly responsible for the conditions that give rise to undocumented migration across
their borders.” 89 In other words, U.S. citizens are complicit in the social sin that brings about the
need for migration in the first place. Heyer identifies two primary ways in which the U.S. is
engaged in social sin when it comes to the immigration crisis. First, Heyer argues that there are
operative ideologies that portray migrants as a threat to U.S. culture and economic well-being
(i.e., Tichenor’s communitarian position). These operative ideologies are rooted in what she
calls, “amplified or distorted xenophobia, ethno cultural nationalism, or fear” and leads to an,
“increasingly acceptable demonization of populations of color.” 90 The second way the U.S. is
engaged in social sin is through a consumerist ideology that leads to the exploitive employment
(either within the U.S. or in countries of origin) of Latinx persons for the sake of inexpensive
goods. Such exploitive practices can be seen in the working conditions of Latinx farm workers or
in the maquiladoras across the U.S. border. Both these ways the U.S. is engaged in social sin,
Heyer argues, “require repentance from sustaining harmful myths out of fear or bias, from the
greed of consumerism and from indifference to the plight of the marginalized south of the U.S.
border and on its street corners.” 91 Both the U.S.’s relationships to Latinx countries of origin and
their complicity in exploitive labor practices constitute social sin in regard to undocumented
migrants and the need for repentance.
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For Heyer, the way of repentance involves a solidarity that involves changing
immigration rhetoric and reality from legitimization of the immigration industrial complex to a
subversive hospitality rooted in a Christian ethic of subversive hospitality that functions as a
“counter narrative of our common humanity, our kinship, with complications for a just
immigration ethic.” 92 Yet despite Heyer’s insistence that such hospitality would yield just
systems, we have illustrated that the language of hospitality implies that the “house” one
occupies belongs to you. A stronger language that takes into account restitution for wrongs done
is needed. There needs to be a language of responsibility over a language of hospitality.
Rather than focusing on justice for immigrants in relationship to hospitality, Trisha
Rajendra argues that an adequate account of justice for migrants is one that views justice as
responsibility toward relationships. Rajendra argues that justice as a responsibility has three
characteristics. First, “justice as responsibility takes as its starting point, the messy, complicated,
and ambiguous relationships in which we find ourselves.” 93 That is, rather than abstracting away
from relationships (i.e., Rawls) or idealizing certain forms of relationships (i.e.,
communitarianism), what takes priority are the actual relationships that form the need for
immigration. These relationships are not always positive but are rooted in the often ambiguous
conditions that most citizens and migrants find themselves in. Justice as responsibility takes
seriously relationships that are rooted in history and fallibility.
The second characteristic of justice as responsibility is that it sees justice itself as a social
good that exists and is given out in communal life. Rajendra argues that “responsibilities are
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distributed by means of social narratives that map responsibilities onto various kinds of
relationships.” 94 Because not all social narratives are truthful to reality, Rajendra argues that it is
necessary to tell the right kind of stories. With respect to immigration, traditional narratives
about who migrants are and why they have chosen or have been forced to migrate are often
saturated with structural sin. Rajendra argues that structural sin affects narratives in two ways:
“(1) it entrenches inaccurate narratives, and (2) it conditions relationships into patterns of
domination and exploitation.” 95 Thus, it is important to recognize these inaccurate narratives and
patterns of domination and understand the immigration crisis in the context of its multiple
narratives. Rather than seeing migration solely as an effort to attain a better life (i.e., Walzer and
Tichenor), it is important to understand migration in the multifaceted systems in which it exists,
including its narratives of relationships past including guest- worker programs, colonial
migration systems, and foreign investment. 96 Through telling the right kind of stories, “justice as
responsibility, therefore, requires an understanding of the particularities of the relationships
binding peoples across borders. It may require us to construct narratives where there are none
and to critically examine the narratives we do have.” 97 Taking seriously the importance of telling
the right stories, justice as responsibility can begin to map the ways particular communities
allocate responsibilities towards other communities.
For Rajendra, the third characteristic of justice as responsibility is that rather than simply
replacing understandings of structural theories and ideas of justice as understood in political
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liberalism, communitarianism, and the capabilities approach, justice as responsibility
supplements and compliments these theories. Specifically, by placing the theories of Rawls and
Nussbaum in the contexts of right relationships, justice as responsibility can supplement
Rawlsian ideal theories by not only describing how inequalities can be regulated but also how
inequalities are historically situated. For Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, justice as
responsibility can help delineate which nations are responsible for providing capabilities. By
placing these theories in the content of responsibility toward relationships with undocumented
migrants, justice as responsibility, “involves recognizing that their presence in the United States
is the result of a migration system that has roots in the actions of the U.S. government and
corporations. Extending full citizenship to undocumented Mexican migrants is not a matter of
amnesty or forgiveness of their supposed transgressions; rather it is a recognition of the history
of the ongoing relationship between the two parties.” 98 In placing justice within the context of
historical relationships and telling the right narratives, Rajendra’s justice as responsibility
supplements the theories of justice we have just discussed.
Yet, despite Rajendra situating justice as responsibility to relationships, she does not
make explicit what the underlying condition of what responsibility entails. While she offers the
same solution I would advocate, the full inclusion of undocumented persons into citizenship in
the United States, she fails to derive the governing principle on why that should occur. Namely,
telling the right kind of stories should yield a path that governs different types of relationships.
Namely, that justice requires giving each person their due. Justice as giving each person what
they are due is not only what it means to have responsibility to a relationship but is also a longstanding principle of natural law that I believe not only incorporates distributive and structural
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theories of justice, but also incorporates Rajendra’s responsibility to relationships as well.
Moreover, by incorporating a natural law understanding of justice, done latinamente, one can not
only incorporate justice as fairness, communal understandings of distributive justice, the
protection and distribution of capabilities, and the responsibility towards relationships, but also
incorporate methods of restitution leading to restorative justice of right relationships.

Natural Law, Restitution, and Restorative Justice
Natural law’s understanding of justice usually starts from Roman classical law and in particular
Ulpian’s definition of justice. Ulpian defines the function of justice, “to render each his right
(ius). 99 While many take Ulpian’s understanding of right (ius) to be understood as a subjective
right or faculty, Michel Villey makes the argument that classical Roman law did not understand
ius, as a subjective right. Villey argues that ius, as understood by Ulpian, “refers to the just share,
the just due, of someone within an established structure of social relationships, varying with each
person’s status and role...the meaning of ius is not congruent with our idea of right.” 100 A right
(ius), in Roman law, was not seen as a power, faculty, or capability. Rather a right (ius), was
primarily seen in the objective sense, “for them ius was not a power over something; it was a
thing itself, specifically an incorporeal thing.” 101 Since a right (ius) was an incorporeal thing that
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existed outside of the self, a right (ius), was derived from particular relationships and was the
resulting claim that came out of these relationships. If one were to enter into a relationship or
contract, one’s right (ius) was that which one was due from the relationship or contract.
The notion of right as rooted in relationship is also found in Aquinas. Discussing the
virtue of justice, Aquinas argues that while the other virtues are oriented towards the individual,
“the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to the agent is set up by its relation to
others.” 102 A right for Aquinas is not a power but is also a thing. For Aquinas, ius was still
primarily a ‘thing’ (rem), something existing in external nature.” 103 Aquinas then delineated two
different types of right, natural and positive. Both rights are understood to be related to another
person according to, “some kind of equality.” 104 A natural right is based on natural relationships
and positive rights are based on public consent. Yet, any right was always oriented and
commensurate with another person either publicly or privately and not a subjective power of an
individual agent.
Justice for Aquinas, follows the same trajectory as Ulpian’s definition. For Aquinas,
justice is, “a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual
will.” 105 For Aquinas, justice is never really a matter of simply protecting individual, subjective
rights rooted in an individualist anthropology but always involves keeping, “men together in
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society and mutual intercourse...therefore justice is concerned only about our dealing with
others.” 106 For Aquinas, there is a further delineation of different parts of justice. The first is
commutative justice which is what is due between two individuals. The second is distributive
justice which is what the whole owes to the parts or the distribution of goods. While at first
glance it would seem that commutative justice could correspond to Rawls' first principle of
justice and that distributive justice could be understood of the distribution of goods similar to
Walzer’s understanding of distributive justice, for Aquinas both commutative justice and
distributive justice are not individual rights or goods but rather is the distribution of what one is
owed by virtue of relationships to other people. In other words, justice cannot be simply
structural or principled but has to do with real things that are owed to real people. As Aquinas
argues
Justice is about certain external operations, namely distribution and
commutation. These consist in the use of certain externals, whether things,
persons, or even works: of things as when one man takes from or restores
to another that which is his; of persons, as when a man does injury to the
very person of another, for instance by striking or insulting him, or even
by showing respect for him; and of works, as when a man justly exacts of
another or does work for him. 107
Thus, justice has to do with real things that people are owed. This precludes both systems of
justice that seek to isolate people in an original position to which what one is owed is forgotten
and precludes systems that create isolated/independent communities that do not owe anything to
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other communities. Justice, according to Aquinas, also further defines what it looks like to be
responsible towards relationships since justice is constituted through giving each person in
relationship their due. Aquinas' understanding of justice incorporates structural justice systems
such as political liberalism, provides for the distributions of goods and capabilities, and further
defines the rules of relationship but most importantly for Latinx social ethics, also is related to
the understanding of restitution.
One of the reasons justice can never be simply related to a theory, idea, or an abstraction
is because there are real wrongs done to real people. For Aquinas, justice always makes
provision for the fact that real injustices can and do occur. This is why Aquinas situates a
question of restitution within his conversation on justice.
For Aquinas, restitution is a central matter of justice and is necessary for salvation.
Before any kind of distributive or structural justice can be done, restitution must occur because,
“restitution re-establishes equality where an unjust taking has caused inequality.” 108 For
Aquinas, however, restitution is not simply the payment of a debt but must be considered in
respect to the “part of the thing” (the payment of restitution), and the “sin of injustice” which
requires (according to Aquinas’ Catholic background) either punishment, penance, or
satisfaction. Restitution is also not simply the payment of the direct actor to the person or group
for whom restitution is due but is also required from the person who causes an unjust taking
either directly or indirectly. For Aquinas, “whoever is cause of an unjust taking is bound to
restitution.” 109 A person is the direct cause of an action if they move another to take by command
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or council, if they give a taker shelter or assistance, or if they are an accomplice in any way. A
person is indirectly the cause of unjust taking if they do not stop the taking, “by command, by
counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by participation, by silence, by not preventing, by
not denouncing.” 110 Given these definitions of direct and indirect cause of unjust taking, the
United States, in regard to its relationship to Latin American countries, both directly and
indirectly has caused unjust taking. Whether through unjust wars (as we discussed in chapter
four), through gunboat diplomacy, setting up banana republics, setting up dictators, or instigating
civil wars and civil unrest, the United States is the direct cause of taking labor, precious metals,
and land from Latin America, causing the immigration crisis. Through unfair economic policies
such as NAFTA, the U.S. also contributes to the unjust taking of Latin American goods. As
Heyer states, “Due to uneven agricultural subsidies that belie the term ‘free’, one-sixth of
Mexican farmers have been expelled from their lands” and forced to immigrate. 111 Thus in an
effort for cheap goods, U.S. citizens participate in and fail to denounce unfair trade practices that
result in the loss of Mexican land. Aquinas’ natural law theory of justice makes room for an
important aspect of justice that is absent in the contemporary conversations about justice,
restitution.
How does the U.S. begin to think about how to make restitution for its historical
misdeeds towards Latin American countries and its current complicity in causing the
immigration crisis that negatively affects the Latinx community? This is where natural law done
Latinamente, or incorporating the epistemological and methodological practices of chapters three
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and four come into play. The first step towards a just restitution towards the Latinx community
and undocumented migrants is simply to acknowledge that a wrong has been done. So far, there
has only been one occurrence acknowledging wrongdoing to South American countries and that
was when former president Barack Obama apologized for the U.S. intentionally infecting
Guatemalan prisoners, women, and intellectually disabled patients with syphilis without
consent. 112 The U.S. did not offer compensation and did not submit to an authority of
international court to make restitution.
In acknowledging any wrong doing the U.S. must also acknowledge the way in which it
has systematically treated the Latinx community and the undocumented community with
ambiguity by placing their bodies in precarious positions. The U.S. cannot simply make up its
mind on how it treats both its citizens or undocumented persons in its midst, leading to both
racialized violence and a position of in-betweeness for the Latinx community. Both in terms of
acceptance and rejection from the U.S. and the Latinx community’s respective countries of
origin but also in relation to the “ambiguities and contestations” that “emerge as the defining
features of Latino racialization in America”, Latinx undocumented persons are excluded from
cultural, political, and economic institutions in the U.S. 113 Because the racial ambiguity and antiLatinx racism in the U.S., undocumented migrants from Latinx countries face more of a difficult
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time gaining naturalization as U.S. citizens. Because of this ambiguous violence done to the
Latinx community and undocumented migrants, the border (and one can say Latinx identity), has
been what Gloria Anzaldúa has called, “una herida abierta (an open wound).” 114 Thus,
acknowledging wrongdoing means taking on a mestizaje epistemology in order to see how the
Latinx identity is shaped by the precarious in-between positioning it has been placed in. In doing
so, the need for strict borders, binaries, and categorizations of being can be dismantled alongside
the harsh policies that infest the physical borders. Cases of immigration can then be treated with
nuance rather than broad, racialized policy decisions. Clear cut definitions, binaries, and borders
can be understood to be a fiction that does not give an honest assessment of the reality of Latinx
communities' relationship to immigration.
In acknowledging wrongs through the adoption of a mestizaje epistemology and
immigration cases being treated with nuance, the second step towards restitution is to establish
immigration courts that listen to the stories of undocumented migrants. This would require the
establishment of immigration courts that are not under the jurisdiction of the department of
justice. According to Reno v. Flores and Zadvydas v. Davis, undocumented migrants are entitled
to due process under the fifth amendment. 115 Because the relationship established by these two
cases between the U.S. and undocumented migrants, undocumented migrants are afforded the
right to a fair trial under an impartial judge. Thus, a court system that would put in place unfair
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and biased judges would result in an injustice that would be contrary to the objective rights (ius)
established by the relationship. Because immigration courts are not under the judicial system but
rather the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the executive branch, whose job under the U.S.
constitution is to enforce laws, judges in immigration courts, who work for the attorney general,
function as prosecutors rather than impartial judges. As immigration judge Ashley Tabbador
states, “What people don't realize is our immigration court system is actually within a law
enforcement agency, and the immigration judges are hired by our chief federal prosecutor, the
U.S. attorney general. We can be fired - and that the Department of Justice and Department of
Homeland Security are also the ones who are overseeing our courts.” 116 Since immigration
courts are under the Attorney General, the Southern Poverty Law Center has accused the DOJ of
tolerating bias, allowing judges to enact arbitrary rules, engaging in docket changes that
undermine a migrants right to a fair hearing, unprofessional conduct from judges, and the
weaponization of the immigration court system towards political ends. 117 Because of these
abuses in the immigration system, thousands of deportations are occurring without due process
and without listening to the needs of each migrant. For example, a case of where a woman who
was fleeing gang and domestic violence from El Salvador was denied asylum because of a biased
immigration judge, she was denied her appeal, and because then Attorney General Jeff Sessions,
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“used his controversial regulatory power to take over the case,” he transgressed precedent to give
his judges the power to categorically deny asylum to domestic abuse survivors from Central
America. 118 Immigration courts are not only denying asylum for survivors of domestic abuse
coming from countries that the U.S. destabilized, immigration courts are also trying toddlers
alone in court. Children as young as three are forced to attend immigration court alone without a
parent or guardian. 119 If justice is as Ulpian, Aquinas, and the natural law tradition defines as
giving each person what they are due and the U.S. court system has established that
undocumented persons are afforded due process, the immigration court under the Department of
Justice, is in fact an aberration of justice.
On top of acknowledging wrongdoing and changing the immigration court system, a
system of reparations is needed to address the multiple narratives, cuentos, and stories of U.S.
mistreatment of Latin American countries, repatriation, racialized violence, and economic
exploitation. Laura Gómez gives four policy shifts to begin reparations for the Latinx and
undocumented communities. First, she argues that “every Latino migrant in the country today
should receive legal authorization to live and work here and a path to citizenship.” 120 Second,
she argues that due to the U.S. destabilization of Central American countries, Central American
migrants should have a lower threshold to be admitted to the U.S. as refugees. Third, Puerto Rico
should be admitted to statehood. Lastly, there should be an organization under the department of
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labor to protect migrants from labor exploitation. Gómez argues because, “of the pervasiveness
of mixed-immigration-status families and residential segregation of Latinos--poor and workingclass Latinos--” these policy shifts, “will have far-reaching impacts on Latinos generally.” 121
These policy shifts are necessary because responsibility toward relationships and giving each
person their due, demands restitution be made for the abuse of relationships that have occurred
between the U.S. and the Latinx community. For justice to occur, restitution must be made in
order to restore equity between all peoples in the United States.

Conclusion
Restitution and restorative justice cannot just occur in a political and economic dimension, but
must have a cultural and spiritual dimension. One simply cannot pay off the Latinx or
undocumented community in an effort to return to an idealized time where white U.S. citizens do
not have to deal with the Latinx community or its undocumented members. The fact is, the
Latinx community and the white U.S. community’s stories are deeply intertwined and
constitutive of one another. Aquinas does not simply view justice as restitution but a habit of
rendering the other their due by a constant and perpetual will. In other words, justice is a social
virtue oriented toward the common good. Virtue is teleological and ordered to specific ends, the
natural law conception of justice is oriented toward the good of others as its end. Because justice
is oriented toward the good of others, it is necessary to understand and get involved in each
other’s stories. Thus, a Latinx view of natural law that we previously discussed in chapters twofour provide a unique framework to view the virtue of justice as a mutual looking for the good of
others.
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First, Vitoria’s, De Soto’s, and Las Casas’ understanding of the the communal aspects of
natural law and its roots in the commonwealth helps us understand that natural law conception of
justice must, in so far as it relates the U.S. immigration crisis and its relationship to the Latinx
community, be one that must take into context the value of occupying multiple communities.
That is, much like Las Casas took into account not only his own framework but also the
framework of the indigenous communities to discern the natural law from within multiple
contexts, justice coming from the mutual stories between Anglo U.S. citizens and the Latinx
community must discern and come from a mutual understanding of each person’s role in these
stories. That is, since we share a common space, our stories have commonality and justice must
come from both communities that share the same space. Vitoria would call this shared space a
commonwealth. Since these Hispanic theologians saw that the natural law was derived from the
community, then justice must come from the mutual stories of these communities.
The mutual stories and the fact that justice has to come from these communities
illustrates the need to discern justice through a mestizaje epistemology. Anglo-American citizens
and the Latinx community do not exist in two isolated communities but have mutually
intertwining stories. This can be seen in the mixed raced and bicultural children that occupy both
Anglo and Latinx identities, resulting in a continued tradition of mestizaje. Justice, as a virtue
seeking the common good, looks at what aspects and what stories are shared and discerns
through these mixed stories how to give each person their due. It is only in mining and inhabiting
these stories that we begin to see the contours of justice. Through knowing the stories of
exploitation and pain that the Latinx community endures, one can discern the need for restitution.
In the mutually intertwining stories, one can understand the need for distributive justice. Each
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story requires special attention and must exist on a case-by-case basis, employing a casuistic
reasoning to discern what is constitutes giving the other what they are due.
While contemporary theories of justice often try to create systems of justice that are
universally binding, they often forget that the common good means encountering each other’s
stories and relationships. Sometimes, these relationships require restitution. Sometimes these
stories need to be told and represented by the people telling them. Yet, what is required of justice
is to get to know the stories that require restitution and the stories that require commutative and
distributive justice. A Latinx natural law framework of justice is able to incorporate all.
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Conclusion
This dissertation is rooted in the effort to continue the history, cuentos, and tradition of
one particular perspective of the Latinx community. Part of this perspective is the seeking of an
ethical framework that takes seriously the history and relationship of the Latinx community to
the Euroamerican and Hispanic natural law. We illustrated that the American natural law
tradition was rooted in the traditions of Grotius, Locke, and Kant as opposed to Aquinas.
Grotius, Locke, and Kant establish a natural law that presents the natural as a way to protect
individual property and equates nature with white Eurocentric reason. This natural law
framework was used to take Indigenous land, justify slavery, and exclude Indigenous, Latinx,
and African American communities from U.S. political, economic, and social institutions. The
Kantian iteration of this natural law sought to establish autonomous reason (rooted in epistemic
racism), became normative for the new natural law. This framework sought to establish a type of
natural law that was rooted in autonomous reason that universalized it particular framework to
establish specific moral precepts that exclude Latinx communities. We then discussed revisionist
and contextual natural law as establishing, rather, natural law as a context dependent
understanding of moral reason. Such a type of moral reasoning is a frame of natural law used as
a model to understand a Latinx natural law.
We also situated a Latinx natural law in its historical antecedents in Spanish natural law
as it was understood by the school of Salamanca. We discussed natural law as understood by
theologians such as Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, and Bartolomé de Las Casas. These
theologians presented a natural law that was subversive to the natural law that justified Spanish
colonialism. Ultimately through situating natural law in the context of community, the imago dei,
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and solidarity with the indigenous community, we illustrated that such a natural law can be
useful to subvert frameworks that seek to marginalize the Latinx community.
Not only have we sought to situate the natural law tradition in relationship to the Latinx
community, but we also sought to establish a Latinx natural law framework by drawing from the
culture and narratives in the Latinx community. Through these narratives and cultural
frameworks, we sought to incorporate the mestizaje as a type of synderesis and moral
epistemology, understand Latinx narratives and cuentos as a type of moral casuistry, and
understand a Latinx understanding of justice as giving the Latinx community its due in terms of
reparations, restitution, and the establishment of justice as a social virtue.
While establishing mestizaje as a type of synderesis and moral epistemology, we sought
to subvert the type of moral epistemology that sought to establish conceptions of the good as
static and intransigent binaries. These binaries create stark conceptual borders such as the
universal as opposed to the particular. An epistemology that is rooted in mestizaje presented an
opportunity to transgress arbitrary conceptual borders. Through establishing a Latinx and
mestizaje based epistemology we were able to critique the concept that the universal must be
univocal, see moral reasoning as a type of journey rather than an immediate apprehension, and
privilege the knowledges of marginalized communities.
Through adopting mestizaje as a type of moral epistemology we were also able to
understand Latinx cuentos as a type of casuistry and method of moral reasoning. We discussed
three types of Latinx narratives including interpersonal, cultural, and communal narratives that
shape Latinx identity. In these narratives we were able to illustrate that in attuning to these
particular narratives we understand the everyday economic, political, and social conditions that

323

give rise to Latinx ethical reflection. In diving into these stories, we see that in doing so we
engage in natural law casuistic reflection.
In viewing the specifics of Latinx narratives, in particular the U.S. immigration crisis, we
looked to the conditions of justice. We critiqued understandings of justice that were rooted in
political liberalism, communitarian distributive justice, and the capabilities approach. All of
these approaches work for idealized and abstract constructions of justice that are acontextual and
ahistorical understandings of justice that ignore instances of injustices done against the Latinx
community. Drawing on the concept of justice as responsibility we posited the natural law
conception of justice as giving one their due as what responsibility towards relationships looks
like. By understanding the varying stories of undocumented persons in the Latinx community we
can see that a natural law moral reasoning of giving people their due requires a framework of
justice that involves restitution. We posited that restitution requires acknowledging wrongs,
providing economic and political reparations, and understanding justice as social virtue.
By attuning to both the historical narratives of natural law in both its Euroamerican
frameworks and Spanish frameworks, we were able to historically situate Latinx natural law.
Through giving attention to the cultural narratives of the Latinx community we were able to
derive a moral epistemology, a cuentos based casuistry, and a historically situated understanding
of justice derived from the Latinx community. In so doing, we formulated a type of natural law
oriented toward moral reasoning rather than moral precepts. Moreover, by providing a
specifically Latinx natural law, we were able to establish a normative ethical framework that can
provide liberative opportunities for the Latinx community and continue their narratives and the
narratives of my mother and grandmother.
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